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Abstract 
Empathy is crucial for successful social interactions and it is impaired in many 
devastating disorders. Empathy deficits are highly burdensome for affected individuals, 
caregivers, and significant others, and costly for society as a whole. However, empathy is 
thought to be a multifaceted construct, including cognitive empathy, affective sharing, and 
empathic concern components. These constituents may be linked to different behavioural 
outcomes and neurocognitive substrates, and presentation varies depending on the facets 
affected. Thus, there is a critical need to determine the behavioural and neurocognitive substrates 
of different components of empathic responding, and how these are affected in particular 
disorders. 
The present work aimed to elucidate the nature of different components of empathy and 
how they vary as a function of clinical diagnoses and individual differences in subclinical traits, 
as well as their underlying functional neural mechanisms. Study I used the Multifaceted Empathy 
Test, a performance-based task tapping cognitive empathy, affective sharing, and empathic 
concern elicited by realistic emotional images, in patients with behavioural variant 
frontotemporal dementia (bvFTD). This revealed a global cognitive empathy deficit, deficient 
affective sharing for negative experiences, and a generalized processing impairment for negative 
stimuli in bvFTD. In Study II, healthy adults completed the Multifaceted Empathy Test and 
questionnaire measures of autistic traits, coldhearted psychopathic traits, and trait anxiety. 
Coldhearted traits were found to disrupt affective sharing and empathic concern, whereas trait 
anxiety appeared to influence subjective affective experience via generalized arousal. Study III 
investigated the involvement of action-perception matching, simulation mechanisms in cognitive 
versus emotional empathy, using fMRI during cognitive empathy, emotional empathy, and 
simulation network localizer tasks in healthy adults. Increased activation was observed in 
identified simulation regions during emotional versus cognitive empathy, providing evidence for 
greater involvement of simulation mechanisms in emotional empathy.   
Taken together, this work suggests that cognitive empathy, and emotional empathy, 
including affective sharing and empathic concern, represent aspects of empathy that are 
 
 
ii 
 
distinguishable and differentially linked with certain patient populations, subclinical traits, and 
neurocognitive mechanisms. These findings are discussed with respect to the nature and 
conceptualization of empathy and its components, as well as implications for disorders featuring 
empathy dysfunction.        
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1 Introduction 
While walking through the park, you spot a man with tears in his eyes sitting under a 
bridge, shivering beneath a thin dirt-laden blanket. You infer that he is feeling miserable, and 
likely homeless. His apparent sorrow also fills you with sadness and concern for him. Later that 
day, your daughter’s face breaks into a huge grin and she raises her fist into the air upon 
receiving a call about a recent job application. You sense that she is feeling excited and that she 
probably got the job. You swell up with excitement and feel happy for her. These reactions 
exemplify the phenomenological experience of empathy for both negative and positive 
experiences, including cognitive aspects (understanding the feelings of others) and emotional 
aspects (sharing or reacting affectively to the feelings of others).  
Empathy is a crucial component of successfully interacting and relating with strangers 
and those known intimately alike, and it is impaired in many debilitating disorders. It is easy to 
see why empathy deficits are highly debilitating. Empathy is thought to be one important means 
by which we are able to respond appropriately to someone else’s emotional state, and adapt our 
social behaviour. Accordingly, patients with empathy impairments demonstrate atypical or 
inappropriate social behaviour (Finger, 2016; Frith, Happe, & Siddons, 1994; Hare, 1996). 
However, it is important to note that empathy is thought to include several components, which 
may be linked to different behavioural outcomes and neurocognitive substrates, and presentation 
may vary depending on the facets affected. Beyond the negative impact empathy impairments 
have on affected individuals, they are also extremely distressing to significant others and 
caregivers, and costly for society as a whole (Weder, Aziz, Wilkins, & Tampi, 2007). Indeed, 
evidence suggests that socioemotional deficits are a source of great burden to both patients and 
caregivers (Boutoleau-Bretonniere, Vercelletto, Volteau, Renou, & Lamy, 2008; Diehl-Schmid 
et al., 2013; Hillis & Tippett, 2014; Uflacker, Edmondson, Onyike, & Appleby, 2016). With 
regard to societal impact, empathy has been positively associated with prosocial behaviour 
(Batson, 1991; Batson, Fultz, & Schoenrade, 1987; Eisenberg, Fabes, & Spinrad, 2006), whereas 
empathy deficits have been linked to aggressive, antisocial behaviour (Miller & Eisenberg, 
1988), as well as criminal behaviour and violent offending (Eisenberg, Eggum, & Di Giunta, 
2010; Jolliffe & Farrington, 2004). Consequently, treatments that focus on underlying cognitive 
and neurological risk factors in individuals with empathy dysfunction are essential. Elucidating 
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the nature of empathy and the dissociability of its constituents will also be pivotal for identifying 
such risk factors and providing targeted treatments for deficits in particular components of 
empathy. Crucially, there are currently no approved treatment options to target these devastating 
socioemotional impairments (Eslinger, 1998; Finger, 2011). Thus, there is a critical need to 
determine the behavioural and neurocognitive substrates of different components of empathic 
responding, and how these are affected in particular disorders.  
 
1.1 Empathy and Its Components 
 The term empathy came from the translation of “Einfühlung” (Titchener, 1909), a 
German word meaning ‘to feel into’. Einfühlung was first used in the context of intersubjectivity 
by the philosopher Theodor Lipps, referring to the projection of oneself into the situation of 
another (Lipps, 1903). Other earlier canonical definitions of empathy include experiencing 
emotions more applicable to someone else’s situation rather than your own (Hoffman, 1987), or 
an emotional response akin to another individual’s based on understanding their affective state 
(Eisenberg, Shea, Carlo, & Knight, 1991). It has also been described as imagining how someone 
else feels by adopting their perspective (Batson, Early, & Salvarani, 1997), or projecting oneself 
into another’s mental shoes to simulate their feelings (Goldman, 1992). Such definitions tend to 
favour certain aspects of empathy. Taken together, empathy is defined here as the 
comprehension of, identification with, and vicarious experience elicited by another individual’s 
mental state. At present, empathy is largely considered to be a multidimensional construct, 
including both cognitive and emotional facets (Blair, 2005; Davis, 1980; Decety & Jackson, 
2004; Eslinger, 1998; Shamay-Tsoory, 2011). Further, though there is variability in the purported 
distinct components contributing to empathy (Batson, 2009; Blair, 2005; de Vignemont & 
Singer, 2006; Decety & Jackson, 2004), it is widely believed to include cognitive empathy, 
affective sharing, and empathic concern constituents (Bernhardt & Singer, 2012; de Waal, 2008; 
Decety & Cowell, 2014b; Decety & Jackson, 2004; Hatfield, Rapson, & Le, 2009; Preston & de 
Waal, 2002; Zaki & Ochsner, 2012).  
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1.1.1 Cognitive empathy and its neural correlates 
Cognitive empathy is often used interchangeably with theory of mind (Blair, 2005; 
Lawrence, Shaw, Baker, Baron-Cohen, & David, 2004) and refers to the capacity to understand 
another individual’s perspective, and thereby infer their emotional or mental state. Despite some 
variability, the core neural substrates of cognitive empathy have been fairly well-established and 
replicated across a variety of paradigms tapping mental state inference, including belief and 
intention understanding, utilizing both verbal and visual stimuli (Carrington & Bailey, 2009; 
Mitchell, 2009). Indeed, meta-analyses of functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies 
have demonstrated that cognitive empathy consistently elicits activity in areas including the 
medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), the temporoparietal junction (TPJ), the superior temporal 
sulcus (STS), and precuneus, and sometimes the inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) and temporal poles 
(Bzdok et al., 2012; Mar, 2011; Molenberghs, Johnson, Henry, & Mattingley, 2016; Schurz, 
Radua, Aichhorn, Richlan, & Perner, 2014; Van Overwalle, 2009). Certain tasks that reliably 
recruit these core regions have also been validated and used as cognitive empathy localizers, 
including the False-Belief Task (Dodell-Feder, Koster-Hale, Bedny, & Saxe, 2011; Dufour et al., 
2013) and the Why/How Task (Spunt & Adolphs, 2014).  
Lesion data indicates that the mPFC and TPJ are particularly important for cognitive 
empathy. More specifically, an early lesion study demonstrated cognitive empathy deficits in 
individuals with lesions of the ventromedial PFC in comparison to patients with lesions outside 
of this region and healthy controls (Stone, Baron-Cohen, & Knight, 1998). Subsequent 
investigations have corroborated these findings, providing evidence for impaired cognitive 
empathy in patients with lesions of the mPFC (Shamay-Tsoory, Tomer, Berger, & Aharon-Peretz, 
2003; Shamay-Tsoory, Tomer, Goldsher, Berger, & Aharon-Peretz, 2004; Stuss, Gallup, & 
Alexander, 2001). Though fewer studies have included such patients, impaired cognitive 
empathy performance has also been observed in three individuals with lesions of the left TPJ 
(Samson, Apperly, Chiavarino, & Humphreys, 2004). Consistent with these findings, application 
of repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation over the right TPJ has been found to impair 
performance on cognitive empathy tasks, including increased response times for false belief 
detection and reduced mental state attribution accuracy, as compared to control stimulation 
(Campanella, Shallice, Ius, Fabbro, & Skrap, 2014; Costa, Torriero, Oliveri, & Caltagirone, 
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2008). Thus, there is some evidence to suggest that both the mPFC and TPJ are necessary for 
cognitive empathy.  
 
1.1.2 Emotional empathy and its neural correlates 
Emotional empathy has been used to refer to both affective sharing and empathic concern 
components of empathy. Indeed, prior work often does not distinguish between these 
components, referring to either using this overarching construct (Decety, 2009; Vossen, 
Piotrowski, & Valkenburg, 2015). Affective sharing refers to the ability to share the emotional 
experience of another person, whereas empathic concern relates to the motivation to care for the 
welfare of another, including feelings of compassion and concern. Thus, affective sharing 
involves an emotional response that is congruent with that of another individual, while empathic 
concern may not. Investigations involving functional imaging of emotional empathy have 
identified consistent activation in areas including the anterior insula, anterior cingulate cortex, 
and IFG, and sometimes the dorsomedial PFC, amygdala, and inferior parietal lobule (IPL), as 
evidenced by reviews (Shamay-Tsoory, 2011; Walter, 2012) and meta-analyses (Bzdok et al., 
2012; Fan, Duncan, de Greck, & Northoff, 2011; Lamm, Decety, & Singer, 2011). This 
functional imaging evidence is corroborated by findings from lesion studies. For example, 
reviews of focal lesion studies addressing emotional empathy have also suggested that the 
anterior insula and IFG are critical for emotional empathy (Hillis, 2013; Shamay-Tsoory, 2015). 
Of particular interest, lower questionnaire scores of emotional empathy have been associated 
with damage to the right insula in veterans with traumatic brain injuries (Driscoll, Dal Monte, 
Solomon, Krueger, & Grafman, 2012), and impaired emotional empathy for pain has also been 
demonstrated in individuals with anterior insula, but not anterior cingulate cortex, lesions (Gu et 
al., 2012). 
 
1.1.2.1 Affective sharing versus empathic concern 
Investigations regarding the neural substrates of empathy have focused primarily on 
neural systems involved in cognitive and emotional empathy, as opposed to parcellating affective 
sharing and empathic concern. This may be in part because these constructs can be difficult to 
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disentangle as they are concurrently elicited in many circumstances. Thus, less is known 
regarding the differences between neural circuitry involved in these components of empathy. 
However, a meta-analysis has demonstrated that affective sharing for pain is associated with 
activity in the anterior insula into the IFG, the anterior cingulate cortex, and the precuneus, based 
on common recruitment during both directly experienced pain and empathy for pain (Lamm et 
al., 2011). In contrast, training in empathic concern has been found to produce greater activation 
in the ventromedial PFC and ventral striatum to distressful social videos in comparison to 
memory training (Klimecki, Leiberg, Lamm, & Singer, 2013). Consistent with these findings, in 
a subsequent study, training healthy individuals in affective sharing increased subsequent activity 
in the insula, anterior cingulate cortex, and the dorsal striatum to distressful videos, whereas 
empathic concern training heightened activation in the ventromedial PFC, anterior cingulate 
cortex, and the ventral striatum (Klimecki, Leiberg, Ricard, & Singer, 2014). Thus, there is some 
evidence to suggest that affective sharing and empathic concern may be subserved by at least 
partially distinct neural systems.  
Delineating these different components of emotional empathic responding is important 
because they may be associated with different behavioural outcomes. For example, there is 
evidence that empathic concern motivates prosocial behaviour and the desire to relieve the stress 
of another individual in distress (Batson, Duncan, Ackerman, Buckley, & Birch, 1981). In 
contrast, observing another in a negative situation can alternatively elicit personal distress, or 
feelings of anxiety and discomfort in response to another individual’s distress (Davis, 1980). 
Personal distress has been associated with motivation to relieve one’s own discomfort and stress 
(e.g., promoting aversion) as opposed to motivating approach and altruistic behaviours that 
relieve the distress of another (Batson, 1991; Batson et al., 1987; Eisenberg et al., 2006). 
Specifically, responding with predominantly empathic concern to the distress of another 
individual has been associated with offering help even when it is easy to escape the situation 
(i.e., altruistic responding), whereas responding to another’s distress by expressing 
predominantly personal distress has been linked to helping less often if escape or avoidance is 
easy (Batson, 1991; Batson et al., 1987). Personal distress is believed by some to be a form of 
emotional empathy akin to emotional contagion (Dziobek et al., 2008; Rankin, Kramer, & 
Miller, 2005), which may align to some degree with affective sharing for negative situations 
(Singer & Klimecki, 2014). Therefore, these findings suggest that differences in empathic 
7 
 
 
concern are linked with prosocial and altruistic behavioural outcomes in response to the affective 
experience of another individual. In contrast, high affective sharing levels may be related to 
greater personal distress in response to negative social situations and therefore have fewer 
implications for motivating altruistic behaviour (Batson et al., 1987; Decety & Svetlova, 2012; 
Eisenberg et al., 2006). 
 
1.1.3 Alternative conceptualizations of empathy 
It is important to note that there are alternate conceptualizations of empathy and its 
constituents, some of which adopt different terminology (de Vignemont & Singer, 2006; Decety 
& Cowell, 2014a, 2014b; Singer & Lamm, 2009). Here we include affective sharing and 
empathic concern under the facet of emotional empathy because they both involve the elicitation 
of an affective response. Importantly, the nature of affective sharing and empathic concern 
constructs tends to remain constant, even though the nomenclature may differ.  
Additionally, autonomic arousal has also long been considered integral to the experience 
of empathy (Ax, 1964), and emotional empathy in particular (Batson, 2009). Accordingly, 
emotional empathy is sometimes assessed via autonomic arousal (Blair, Jones, Clark, & Smith, 
1997; de Wied, Boxtel, Posthumus, Goudena, & Matthys, 2009; Eisenberg & Fabes, 1990). 
However, limited research has focused on the relationship between arousal and different 
components of empathy. High questionnaire scores of emotional empathy in healthy individuals 
have been associated with increased physiological arousal (Balconi & Bortolotti, 2012a, 2012b, 
2014; Bogdanov et al., 2013; Wiesenfeld, Whitman, & Malatesta, 1984) and subjective arousal 
ratings (de Sousa et al., 2010) in response to emotional videos and images. Interestingly, most of 
the questionnaire measures used in these investigations assess vicarious emotional responding, 
suggesting a link between autonomic arousal and questionnaire measures of emotional empathy 
akin to affective sharing, which may have fewer implications for prosocial behaviour. However, 
results are mixed (Eisenberg et al., 2006; Fabes, Eisenberg, & Eisenbud, 1993; Gu et al., 2015), 
with some investigations finding no significant relationship between self-reported emotional 
empathy scores and physiological arousal (Anastassiou-Hadjicharalambous & Warden, 2007; de 
Sousa et al., 2011) or subjective arousal ratings (de Sousa, McDonald, & Rushby, 2012) in 
response to emotional stimuli. Further, most investigations do not include behavioural indices of 
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different aspects of empathic responding in conjunction with autonomic measures. Thus, there is 
a need to elucidate the potential link between empathy and arousal, and whether autonomic 
arousal is indeed reflective of emotional empathy. It is also unclear whether arousal contributes 
to the experience of particular aspects of empathy, such as affective sharing or empathic concern. 
 
1.1.4 Cognitive versus emotional empathy  
Taken together, functional neuroimaging and lesion studies have implicated largely 
different neural substrates in cognitive and emotional empathy, providing evidence for their 
dissociability. Indeed, a lesion study has demonstrated a double dissociation between cognitive 
and emotional empathy, observing a cognitive empathy deficit with intact emotional empathy in 
patients with ventromedial prefrontal cortex lesions, and impaired emotional empathy but intact 
cognitive empathy in patients with lesions to the IFG (Shamay-Tsoory, Aharon-Peretz, & Perry, 
2009). Further support for this double dissociation comes from behavioural data in clinical 
populations featuring empathy impairments (Jones, Happe, Gilbert, Burnett, & Viding, 2010; 
Schwenck et al., 2012), as well as some trait correlational data in the healthy population 
(Lockwood, Bird, Bridge, & Viding, 2013). However, it should be noted that the demonstration 
of a double dissociation does not preclude the possibility that cognitive and emotional empathy 
are related to some degree. It may be the case that these constructs are separable, but interact and 
often do not occur in isolation (Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2009). Accordingly, these aspects are 
widely believed to influence one another and both contribute to our phenomenological 
experience of empathy (Cox et al., 2012; Decety & Svetlova, 2012; Kerem, Fishman, & 
Josselson, 2001; Shamay-Tsoory, 2011). Nevertheless, the apparent dissociability of cognitive 
and emotional empathy is indicative of different underlying mechanisms. The conceptualization 
of empathy and its components presently considered is depicted in Figure 1.1. 
Notably, the components of empathic responding affected in patient populations 
characterized by empathy impairments have been elucidated to varying degrees and remain 
unclear in many cases. Further, less is known in both clinical and healthy populations about the 
dissociability of affective sharing and empathic concern. Indeed, as mentioned, many 
investigations to date do not distinguish between these two putative components of empathy. 
From a clinical perspective, addressing these gaps in knowledge is critical because the 
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demonstration of a deficit in a particular aspect of empathy informs potential targeted treatment 
or compensatory options for affected patients. 
 
 
Figure 1.1 The conceptualization of empathy presently adopted  
Empathy is believed to be a multidimensional construct subsuming partially dissociable but 
interacting components, including cognitive empathy, as well as affective sharing and empathic 
concern aspects of emotional empathy. There is evidence to suggest that cognitive and emotional 
empathy can bidirectionally modulate each other in an inhibitory or excitatory fashion.    
 
1.2 Empathy Dysfunction 
Investigations in clinical populations featuring empathy dysfunction can uniquely 
elucidate fundamental aspects of empathic responding (Blair, 2005; Marsh, 2013). More 
specifically, determining the aspects of empathy that are affected in particular disorders provides 
critical insight into the nature of empathy and associated behavioural disturbances. It also 
informs types of treatment or compensatory options that might be most beneficial for different 
patient populations. Empathy impairments are featured in many debilitating neurological, 
developmental, and psychiatric disorders, including frontotemporal dementia (Dermody et al., 
10 
 
 
2016; Rankin et al., 2006), autism spectrum disorder (Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985; 
Mathersul, McDonald, & Rushby, 2013b), schizophrenia (Green, Horan, & Lee, 2015), 
borderline personality disorder (Dziobek et al., 2011; Harari, Shamay-Tsoory, Ravid, & 
Levkovitz, 2010), and psychopathy (Blair, 2005). Of particular interest, loss of empathy is an 
early and salient discriminating feature of behavioural variant frontotemporal dementia 
(Rascovsky et al., 2011), including deficits in both cognitive and emotional empathy. Autism 
spectrum disorder and psychopathy are also especially informative as they have provided 
evidence for a double dissociation between cognitive and emotional empathy dysfunction, and 
are typically associated with more selective impairments in cognitive, and emotional, empathy, 
respectively. Further, subclinical autistic and psychopathic traits vary independently in the 
healthy population as well (J. Rogers, Viding, Blair, Frith, & Happe, 2006), and have been 
respectively inversely associated with cognitive, and emotional empathy, performance.    
 
1.2.1 Empathy in behavioural variant frontotemporal dementia 
Behavioural variant frontotemporal dementia (bvFTD) is a progressive neurodegenerative 
disorder caused by neuronal loss and aberrant protein accumulations in the prefrontal and 
anterior temporal cortex (Neary, Snowden, & Mann, 2005; Snowden, Neary, & Mann, 2002). 
Critically, this patient population is of particular interest because a loss of empathy is one of the 
core diagnostic features of bvFTD, and it is characterized by profound impairments in social and 
emotional behaviour (Rascovsky et al., 2011). These symptoms manifest early on in the disorder 
and are both highly debilitating to affected patients and distressing to caregivers (Boutoleau-
Bretonniere et al., 2008; Diehl-Schmid et al., 2013; Levenson & Miller, 2007; Uflacker et al., 
2016). For example, individuals with bvFTD often present with callousness, apathy, disinhibited 
behavior and speech, aggression, decline in manners and personal hygiene, impulsivity and 
reckless decision-making, and lack of insight (Finger, 2011, 2016). Further, brain areas thought 
to be critically involved in cognitive and emotional empathy are among the first to physically 
degenerate in these patients. More specifically, atrophy of the mPFC, as well as the anterior 
insula and anterior cingulate cortex is apparent even in very mild cases of bvFTD (Seeley et al., 
2008), which are key areas consistently implicated in cognitive and emotional empathy, 
respectively (Bzdok et al., 2012; Fan et al., 2011; Shamay-Tsoory, 2011; Walter, 2012). Thus, 
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bvFTD presents a unique opportunity to answer fundamental questions about the nature of 
empathy and its constituents, at both a neural and behavioural level, due to the early and 
progressive deterioration of empathic abilities and their neural substrates (Levenson & Miller, 
2007). Indeed, it has been recognized as a powerful model for the investigation of relationships 
between behaviour and neural activity (Wittenberg et al., 2008). These patients also represent a 
favourable group for the study of empathic dysfunction because their social deficits often 
precede decline in memory and visuospatial abilities (Finger, 2016), generally limiting the 
influence of such confounding factors at earlier disease stages. Further, though there is evidence 
for deficits in both cognitive and emotional empathy in patients with bvFTD, gaps in knowledge 
remain with regard to these impairments. Critically, highlighting potential treatment targets and a 
means to assess the impact of novel therapies on social and emotional impairment in bvFTD is of 
great importance being that there are currently no approved treatment options for these extremely 
debilitating socioemotional symptoms (Finger, 2011). 
 
1.2.1.1 Cognitive empathy in behavioural variant frontotemporal dementia 
Cognitive empathy and theory of mind impairments have been demonstrated using 
various measures in bvFTD. Specifically, caregiver questionnaires indicate lower perspective-
taking scores, an index of cognitive empathy (Davis, 1980), for patients with bvFTD in 
comparison to healthy controls (Eslinger, Moore, Anderson, & Grossman, 2011; Rankin et al., 
2006; Rankin et al., 2005) and patients with Alzheimer’s disease (Fernandez-Duque, Hodges, 
Baird, & Black, 2010; Hsieh, Irish, Daveson, Hodges, & Piguet, 2013). Patients with bvFTD 
have also shown a deficit in mental state inference compared to healthy controls on performance-
based cognitive empathy tasks, including false belief tasks (Gregory et al., 2002; Lough, 
Gregory, & Hodges, 2001), faux pas detection (Gregory et al., 2002; Torralva et al., 2007), 
theory of mind stories, cartoons, and videos (Eslinger et al., 2007; Shany-Ur et al., 2012; 
Torralva et al., 2007), and the Reading the Mind in the Eyes test (Couto et al., 2013; Gregory et 
al., 2002; Torralva et al., 2007). Though a cognitive empathy deficit is well-established in 
bvFTD, whether this impairment exists for both negative and positive mental states has yet to be 
investigated in this patient population.  
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1.2.1.2 Emotional empathy in behavioural variant frontotemporal dementia 
There is also evidence for an emotional empathy deficit in bvFTD from several sources. 
In the past, the lack of behavioural indices of emotional empathy available made this dimension 
difficult to evaluate objectively, such that there were few performance-based assessments of 
emotional empathy in patients with bvFTD. An emotional empathy impairment in this patient 
group was instantiated based on lower empathic concern scores on caregiver questionnaires for 
patients with bvFTD as compared to healthy controls (Eslinger et al., 2011; Lough et al., 2006; 
Rankin et al., 2006) and patients with Alzheimer’s disease (Fernandez-Duque et al., 2010; Hsieh 
et al., 2013), as well as an abundance of case descriptions reporting emotional blunting and 
heightened coldheartedness (Lough et al., 2001; Snowden et al., 2001; Thibodeau & Miller, 
2013). Patients with bvFTD have also demonstrated reduced emotional reactivity in the form of 
lower blood pressure in response to a disgust-eliciting video than healthy controls (Eckart, 
Sturm, Miller, & Levenson, 2012). However, psychophysiological measures can be difficult to 
interpret being that the emotional response reflected by changes in arousal is ambiguous. 
Similarly, whether patients with bvFTD demonstrate a deficit in both affective sharing and 
empathic concern is unclear. Further, items on questionnaire measures of emotional empathy 
include predominantly negative situations rather than evaluating emotional empathy for positive 
mental states. Thus, as with cognitive empathy, it is uncertain whether the emotional empathy 
deficit in bvFTD is apparent for both negative and positive states. 
 
1.2.1.3 Summary 
Deficits in both cognitive and emotional empathy have been demonstrated in bvFTD. 
However, whether cognitive and emotional empathy are impaired for both negative and positive 
mental states is of particular interest being that these patients have shown impaired recognition 
of negative, but not positive, facial expressions (Fernandez-Duque & Black, 2005; Kipps, 
Mioshi, & Hodges, 2009; Kumfor et al., 2011; Lavenu, Pasquier, Lebert, Petit, & Van der 
Linden, 1999; Lough et al., 2006). Determining if this is a generalized impairment could provide 
insight into the neural representation of empathy and whether this varies according to valence. 
This information would also be beneficial for identifying treatment targets in affected patients. 
With regard to emotional empathy in particular, past investigations have largely utilized 
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questionnaire measures rather than behavioural paradigms for its evaluation. Thus, less is known 
about deficits in online empathic responding in bvFTD. Further, studies in this patient population 
have not included measures of both affective sharing and empathic concern, such that it remains 
unclear whether bvFTD is associated with impairments in both aspects of emotional empathy. 
Overall, there is a need to determine whether emotional valence may influence cognitive and 
emotional empathic responding in patients with bvFTD, and if they show impairments in both 
affective sharing and empathic concern. Critically, this may serve to increase insight into both 
fundamental aspects of empathy and the intricacies of empathy deficits in bvFTD. 
 
1.2.2 Empathy in autism spectrum disorder versus psychopathy  
 Autism spectrum disorder (ASD) and psychopathy also present two disorders 
characterized by empathy deficits of particular interest. Specifically, these patient populations 
have been purported to provide evidence for a double dissociation between cognitive and 
emotional empathy dysfunction (Blair, 2008). Accordingly, they have the potential to provide 
critical insight into the fundamental nature of cognitive and emotional empathy, and their 
dissociability (Blair, 2005). Further, traits associated with these disorders have also been linked 
to variability in cognitive and emotional empathic responding in the healthy population.  
 
1.2.2.1 Empathy in autism spectrum disorder  
 ASD is a developmental disorder characterized by social impairment and communication 
deficits, and a theory of mind or cognitive empathy deficit is one of its defining features (Baron-
Cohen, 2000; Hill & Frith, 2003). Accordingly, individuals with ASD have shown cognitive 
empathy impairments across multiple paradigms, including false belief tasks (Baron-Cohen et 
al., 1985; Happe, 1995), faux pas detection (Baez et al., 2012; Stone et al., 1998), the Reading 
the Mind in the Eyes test (Baron-Cohen, Jolliffe, Mortimore, & Robertson, 1997; Baron-Cohen, 
Wheelwright, Hill, Raste, & Plumb, 2001; Kirchner, Hatri, Heekeren, & Dziobek, 2011), and 
paradigms involving the inference of mental states or intentions from stories or vignettes (Happe, 
1994; K. Rogers, Dziobek, Hassenstab, Wolf, & Convit, 2007) and animations (Abell, Happe, & 
Frith, 2000; White, Coniston, Rogers, & Frith, 2011). Further, individuals with ASD have shown 
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a deficit in cognitive empathy but intact emotional empathy, including ratings of subjective 
arousal and empathic concern, on the Multifaceted Empathy Test (Dziobek et al., 2008), as well 
as the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (Davis, 1980), a canonical empathy questionnaire measure 
with perspective taking (cognitive empathy) and empathic concern (emotional empathy) 
subscales (Baez et al., 2012; K. Rogers et al., 2007; Rueda, Fernandez-Berrocal, & Baron-
Cohen, 2015). Adolescents with ASD have also been found to provide similar ratings of affective 
sharing (valence and arousal) and exhibit similar physiological arousal in response to emotional 
images compared to healthy controls (Louwerse et al., 2014; but see also Mathersul, McDonald, 
& Rushby, 2013a, 2013b; Shamay-Tsoory, Tomer, Yaniv, & Aharon-Peretz, 2002) .   
 
1.2.2.2 Empathy in psychopathy 
 Psychopathy is a developmental disorder characterized by callousness and emotional 
dysfunction paired with antisocial behaviour (Cleckley, 1967; Hare, 1991). Indeed, callous-
unemotional traits are one of the primary features of psychopathy, including a lack of empathy, 
loyalty, and guilt (Frick, 1995; Hare, 1991). Impairments in emotional empathy in adults with 
psychopathy and youths with psychopathic tendencies have been inferred from reduced 
physiological emotional reactivity to distress cues (Anastassiou-Hadjicharalambous & Warden, 
2008; Blair, 1999; Blair et al., 1997; de Wied, van Boxtel, Matthys, & Meeus, 2012), atypical 
neural activation in emotion-related brain areas in response to emotional stimuli (Decety, Skelly, 
Yoder, & Kiehl, 2014; Marsh et al., 2008), and emotion recognition deficits (Blair, Colledge, 
Murray, & Mitchell, 2001; Fairchild, Van Goozen, Calder, Stollery, & Goodyer, 2009; Hastings, 
Tangney, & Stuewig, 2008). However, what is responsible for driving these effects is 
ambiguous, and as such, whether they reflect a lack of affective sharing and/or empathic concern 
is unclear. In contrast, individuals with psychopathy have demonstrated intact theory of mind or 
cognitive empathy fairly consistently, on tasks including mental state inference from short stories 
(Blair et al., 1996), faux pas detection, false belief tasks, and questionnaire measures (Dolan & 
Fullam, 2004), and the Reading the Mind in the Eyes test (Richell et al., 2003). 
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1.2.2.3 Summary  
 Thus, psychopathy is thought to be particularly related to emotional empathy 
impairments and ASD is often specifically linked with cognitive empathy deficits (Blair, 2005; 
but see also Baron-Cohen, 2009; Grove, Baillie, Allison, Baron-Cohen, & Hoekstra, 2014; 
Mazza et al., 2014). Indeed, this double dissociation has been demonstrated using behavioural 
tasks tapping cognitive and emotional empathy in clinical samples of youths with ASD versus 
those with psychopathic tendencies (Jones et al., 2010; Schwenck et al., 2012). However, 
regarding emotional empathy, whether psychopathic traits are differentially linked to affective 
sharing versus empathic concern remains unclear. This is of particular importance being that 
multiple phenomena are referred to using the term empathy, and these may have different 
implications for social behaviour. It is also of interest to determine whether these phenomena 
may vary independently in some disorders. Interestingly, autistic and psychopathic traits also 
vary in the healthy population and have been associated with reduced cognitive and emotional 
empathy, respectively, which raises the possibility of gaining valuable insight into differences in 
components of empathic responding in community samples.  
 
1.3 Empathic Variability and Subclinical Traits 
 
1.3.1 Empathy, and autistic and psychopathic traits in the healthy population 
 Much work has been done to investigate empathic abilities in patient populations. 
However, less is known about the relationship between particular traits linked with empathy 
deficits in clinical samples and empathic responding in healthy individuals. Interestingly, 
evidence suggests that both autistic (Constantino & Todd, 2003; Posserud, Lundervold, & 
Gillberg, 2006) and psychopathic (Edens, Marcus, Lilienfeld, & Poythress, 2006; Hare & 
Neumann, 2008) traits vary continuously in the general population, and can vary independently 
of one another (J. Rogers et al., 2006). Nonetheless, evidence is limited as to how individual 
differences in these traits map onto components of empathic responding. In non-clinical samples, 
individuals with high affective-interpersonal psychopathic trait levels have demonstrated lower 
emotional empathy scores on questionnaire measures (Mahmut, Homewood, & Stevenson, 
2008), dampened empathic responding to emotional faces and stories (Seara-Cardoso, Dolberg, 
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Neumann, Roiser, & Viding, 2013; Seara-Cardoso, Neumann, Roiser, McCrory, & Viding, 
2012), and functional abnormalities in affect-related neural regions in response to emotional 
stimuli (Han, Alders, Greening, Neufeld, & Mitchell, 2011; Harenski, Kim, & Hamann, 2009). 
Alternatively, autistic traits have been inversely correlated with cognitive empathy performance 
in neurotypical adults (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001; Miu, Pana, & Avram, 2012; Voracek & 
Dressler, 2006). Bridging this evidence, high autistic traits have been associated with diminished 
theory of mind performance, whereas high psychopathic traits have been linked to dampened 
affective resonance in the same community sample (Lockwood et al., 2013). However, a 
measure of empathic concern was not included in this investigation. As mentioned, little is 
known about the dissociability of affective sharing and empathic concern, and most 
investigations do not distinguish between these two components, often using emotional empathy 
to refer to either. Thus, the relationship between autistic versus psychopathic traits with different 
components of empathy has rarely been examined in the same sample of healthy individuals. 
Accordingly, it remains unknown whether coldhearted psychopathic and autistic traits in a 
community sample are differentially associated with cognitive empathy, empathic concern, and 
affective sharing performance. 
 
1.3.2 Empathy and anxious traits in the healthy population 
In addition to psychopathic and autistic traits, trait anxiety varies continuously in the 
general population (Spielberger, Gorsuch, Lushene, Vagg, & Jacobs, 1983). Trait anxiety may 
have important implications for empathy, as arousal is widely considered to be a component of 
empathic responding (Decety, Norman, Berntson, & Cacioppo, 2012; Decety, Smith, Norman, & 
Halpern, 2014). Accordingly, high questionnaire scores of emotional empathy in healthy 
individuals have been associated with increased autonomic arousal in response to emotional 
stimuli (Balconi & Bortolotti, 2012b; Bogdanov et al., 2013; de Sousa et al., 2010; Mehrabian, 
Young, & Sato, 1988). Indeed, as mentioned, autonomic arousal is sometimes used as an 
emotional empathy index (Blair et al., 1997; de Wied et al., 2009; Eisenberg & Fabes, 1990); 
though this can be problematic because it is unclear what this physiological arousal reflects. 
Lastly, amygdala activation has been differentially linked with levels of trait anxiety (Stein, 
Simmons, Feinstein, & Paulus, 2007) and emotional empathy (Seara-Cardoso, Sebastian, Viding, 
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& Roiser, 2015), indicating that there may be overlap in their neurocognitive substrates. 
However, very little work exists concerning individual differences in trait anxiety and the 
elicitation of empathy. Thus, though trait anxiety may be theoretically important for empathic 
responding, studies rarely include measures of both anxiety and empathy, and their relationship 
has been the focus of few investigations.  
 
1.3.3 Summary  
Evidence from patients with ASD and psychopathy suggests that these disorders are 
differentially linked with deficits in cognitive and emotional empathy, respectively. Limited 
evidence has also suggested that cognitive and emotional empathy may vary as a function of 
autistic and psychopathic traits in the healthy population. However, the relationship between 
psychopathic versus autistic traits with dissociable empathy indices has rarely been examined in 
healthy individuals. Crucially, no study to date has assessed cognitive empathy, affective 
sharing, and empathic concern performance in relation to individual differences in autistic, 
psychopathic, and anxious traits in the same group of healthy individuals. Elucidating these 
associations at a more refined level is critical given that the term empathy is used to refer to 
multiple phenomena that relate differentially to social behavioural outcomes. It will also provide 
insight into whether subclinical levels of these traits influence different components of empathic 
responding. In addition, this would allow for the examination of whether psychopathic traits are 
associated with deficits in both affective sharing and empathic concern aspects of emotional 
empathy. For example, a selective deficit in affective sharing but not empathic concern might 
result in an individual feeling afraid in response to another individual’s fear, but lacking concern 
for the victim or the desire to reduce their distress. Lastly, the inclusion of trait anxiety measures 
would uniquely elucidate the relationship between emotional empathy and trait anxiety. Trait 
anxiety is implicated in arousal and may be associated with empathy on both a neurocognitive 
and conceptual level, such that this may have significant implications for models of empathy and 
their relationship to neurocognitive systems involved in trait anxiety. This could also have 
important implications for the use of arousal indices and their interpretation in empathy 
investigations.  
 
18 
 
 
1.4 Neurocognitive Mechanisms of Empathy 
Though the brain areas associated with cognitive and emotional empathy have been fairly 
well-established, the neural mechanisms underlying empathic responding remain unclear. Given 
evidence for the dissociability of cognitive and emotional empathy, elucidating their underlying 
mechanisms is critical for developing targeted treatment or compensatory options for patients 
featuring deficits in either of these facets of empathy. Many believe that empathy involves both 
bottom-up and top-down processing (Decety & Meyer, 2008; Preston & de Waal, 2002; Shamay-
Tsoory, 2011; Singer & Lamm, 2009; Tousignant, Eugene, & Jackson, 2016). More specifically, 
it has been proposed that bottom-up processing occurs automatically in response to perceptual or 
sensory information, involving an action-perception matching mechanism. Alternatively, top-
down processing is thought to underlie the projection of oneself into another’s situation. It 
involves the incorporation of an individual’s intentions, motivation, and self-regulation, and is 
believed to influence the degree of empathic responding and resultant outcomes, such as 
prosocial and moral behaviour (Decety & Cowell, 2014b; Decety & Meyer, 2008; Decety & 
Moriguchi, 2007). Emotional empathy, and affective sharing in particular, are commonly thought 
to be largely dependent on bottom-up processing, whereas cognitive empathy is believed to rely 
more on top-down processing (Decety & Jackson, 2004; Decety & Meyer, 2008). However, these 
processes are not purported to map exclusively onto emotional and cognitive facets of empathy 
and may not have entirely disparate neural circuitry, such that they may be involved in the 
experience of both (Decety, 2011; Shamay-Tsoory, 2011). More specifically, it has been 
suggested that simulation mechanisms involving action-perception matching, a form of bottom-
up processing, may contribute to both cognitive and emotional empathy.   
 
1.4.1 Empathy and simulation 
Despite evidence for the dissociability of cognitive and emotional empathy, it is still 
debated whether they rely on some of the same neurocognitive mechanisms. Specifically, and 
consistent with bottom-up processing, some advocate that empathy is the result of shared 
representations, and the activation of similar neural substrates during the observation of 
behaviour as during the execution of such behaviour (Bastiaansen, Thioux, & Keysers, 2009; 
Carr, Iacoboni, Dubeau, Mazziotta, & Lenzi, 2003; Gallese, 2001; Gallese, Keysers, & 
19 
 
 
Rizzolatti, 2004; Iacoboni, 2009; Pineda, Moore, Elfenbeinand, & Cox, 2009; Preston & de 
Waal, 2002). The discovery of mirror neurons in the ventral premotor cortex (PMC) into inferior 
frontal gyrus (IFG), and inferior parietal lobule (IPL) of macaque monkeys, which fire during 
both action observation and action execution, provided a potential physiological substrate for 
such an action-perception matching mechanism (di Pellegrino, Fadiga, Fogassi, Gallese, & 
Rizzolatti, 1992; Fogassi et al., 2005; Gallese, Fadiga, Fogassi, & Rizzolatti, 1996). There is 
evidence to suggest that a similar system exists in humans, which responds to both the perception 
and execution of actions, including the ventral PMC into IFG and the IPL (Caspers, Zilles, Laird, 
& Eickhoff, 2010; Molenberghs, Cunnington, & Mattingley, 2012). The posterior superior 
temporal sulcus (STS), though not believed to contain these observation-execution matching 
neurons and instead responding selectively to action observation, is thought to provide the visual 
input to these two critical simulation regions (Iacoboni et al., 2001; Keysers & Perrett, 2004). 
Presently, this circuitry, including the ventral PMC into IFG, the IPL, and the posterior STS, is 
referred to as the ‘simulation network’ (Figure 1.2). Of particular note, increased activation in 
critical frontal and parietal areas of the simulation network has been demonstrated during the 
observation and imitation of emotional expressions (Carr et al., 2003; Leslie, Johnson-Frey, & 
Grafton, 2004; Montgomery & Haxby, 2008), suggesting that these regions may generate a 
motor representation of the emotional or mental states of others. Although there is some 
evidence to suggest that cognitive and emotional empathy may rely on simulation mechanisms, 
this remains unsettled. Thus, it is of particular interest to determine the relative contribution, if 
any, of simulation mechanisms to these dissociable facets of empathy.        
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Figure 1.2 The simulation network  
A depiction of the regions comprising the simulation network, including action-perception 
matching areas considered critical for simulation, and the visual input to these areas. Figure 
adapted by permission from Macmillan Publishers Ltd: Nature Reviews Neuroscience (Iacoboni 
& Dapretto, 2006). PMC, premotor cortex; IFG, inferior frontal gyrus; IPL, inferior parietal 
lobule; STS, superior temporal sulcus. 
 
1.4.1.1 Cognitive empathy and simulation 
Some have proposed that the simulation network may underlie cognitive empathy, with 
simulation allowing one to adopt the perspective of another and thereby understand their mental 
state (Agnew, Bhakoo, & Puri, 2007; Gallese, 2001; Gallese & Goldman, 1998; Pineda et al., 
2009; Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia, 2010). More specifically, it has been suggested that the simulation 
network may influence cognitive empathy via the posterior STS/TPJ, rapidly providing goal-
related information from perceived actions (Tramacere & Ferrari, 2016; Van Overwalle, 2009). 
The simulation network has been implicated in aspects of cognitive empathy including intention 
understanding and mental state attribution. Early evidence suggested that the simulation network, 
and the IFG in particular, was sensitive to the intended goal of actions rather than merely actions 
themselves (Iacoboni et al., 2005; Kaplan & Iacoboni, 2006). Activity in putative simulation 
regions has also been observed during mental state inference tasks (Lawrence et al., 2006; Pineda 
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& Hecht, 2009). Indeed, one investigation found that mental state attribution accuracy modulated 
activity in simulation regions (Zaki, Weber, Bolger, & Ochsner, 2009). However, another failed 
to find modulation of activity in these regions based on mental state content in participants’ 
descriptions of others’ actions (Spunt, Satpute, & Lieberman, 2011). Of particular interest, a 
conjunction analysis between a cognitive empathy animation task and an action observation task 
used to localize simulation areas has revealed overlap in the posterior STS, but not the critical 
simulation regions of the IFG or IPL (Ohnishi et al., 2004). Accordingly, many fMRI 
investigations of cognitive empathy fail to find significant activation in putative critical 
simulation areas (Van Overwalle & Baetens, 2009). Thus, findings are mixed regarding the role 
of the simulation network in cognitive empathy. 
 
1.4.1.2 Emotional empathy and simulation 
 It has also been proposed that the simulation network may influence parts of the limbic 
system and emotional experience via connections between the IFG and the insula, to mediate 
emotional empathy (Carr et al., 2003). Indeed, some accounts have adopted the view that 
simulation mechanisms are particularly involved in the experience of emotional empathy rather 
than cognitive empathy (Dvash & Shamay-Tsoory, 2014; Molnar-Szakacs, 2011; Shamay-
Tsoory, 2011). Evidence in support of this comes largely from demonstrations of positive 
associations between questionnaire measures of emotional, but not cognitive, empathy, and IFG 
activity during the observation and imitation of emotional expressions (Pfeifer, Iacoboni, 
Mazziotta, & Dapretto, 2008), right IFG and IPL gray matter volume (Cheng et al., 2009), and 
white matter integrity in a tract connecting inferior frontal and temporoparietal regions 
(Parkinson & Wheatley, 2014). Of particular relevance, an fMRI investigation of cognitive and 
emotional empathy interpreted greater engagement of the PMC during emotional empathy than 
cognitive empathy as evidence for greater engagement of the simulation network (Nummenmaa, 
Hirvonen, Parkkola, & Hietanen, 2008). However, to date there is a void of evidence directly 
relating online emotional empathy to activity in localized simulation regions (Baird, Scheffer, & 
Wilson, 2011; Decety, 2010; Lamm & Majdandzic, 2015). 
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1.4.1.3 Summary  
Overall, there is some support for a greater role of the simulation network in emotional 
versus cognitive empathy, but the degree to which simulation is involved in these different facets 
remains unclear. This is due to the fact that prior studies have largely provided evidence in the 
form of correlations between questionnaire measures of empathy and activity in identified 
simulation regions, which do not provide insight into online empathic responding and its neural 
correlates. Evidence also comes from activation during empathy tasks in vast regions broadly 
accepted as being part of the simulation network, rather than functionally defined regions of 
interest based on simulation involvement. Critically, the involvement of the simulation network 
in cognitive versus emotional empathy has never been statistically compared. Further, no studies 
to date have utilized functional localizers to determine the correspondence between brain areas 
identified as having simulation properties, and those recruited during cognitive and emotional 
empathy within the same participant population. Such steps are necessary in order to confirm 
that regions being interrogated with regard to their involvement in simulation are indeed those 
engaged during a simulation task, and to resolve whether these areas are preferentially involved 
in emotional versus cognitive empathy.  
Determining the involvement of the simulation network in cognitive versus emotional 
empathy could provide unique insight into the mechanisms underlying different facets of 
empathy, and the contributions of bottom-up processing to these components. This would serve 
to elucidate the nature of empathy and daily interpersonal interactions. Further, it could be 
particularly crucial for identifying potential compensatory options or targeted treatments for 
individuals with cognitive and emotional empathy impairments.  
 
1.5 Thesis Objectives and Hypotheses 
 The overall objective of this thesis is to elucidate the nature of different components of 
empathy and how they vary as a function of clinical diagnoses and individual differences in 
subclinical traits, as well as their underlying functional neural mechanisms. Three independent 
studies were conducted to address this overall goal using a multifaceted approach to investigate 
the behavioural and functional neural correlates of different facets of empathy in the healthy 
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population and patients featuring empathy deficits. The central hypothesis is that cognitive 
empathy, and aspects of emotional empathy including affective sharing and empathic concern, 
represent distinguishable components of empathic responding that are differentially associated 
with particular disorders, traits, and neurocognitive mechanisms. More specifically, it is 
predicted that aspects of empathy can be differentially affected in clinical populations 
characterized by empathy dysfunction, and differentially associated with traits in the healthy 
population. Lastly, it is expected that cognitive and emotional facets of empathy will involve 
action-perception matching, simulation mechanisms to different degrees. 
 
1.5.1 Study I - Parsing cognitive and emotional empathy deficits for negative and positive 
stimuli in frontotemporal dementia 
Examining empathy impairments in clinical populations can provide insight into the 
fundamental nature of empathy, and the dissociability of its components. Accordingly, bvFTD is 
a debilitating neurodegenerative disorder characterized by empathy impairments. Both cognitive 
and emotional empathy deficits have been associated with bvFTD. However, little work has 
focused on the performance of patients with bvFTD on behavioural measures of emotional 
empathy, and whether empathic responses differ for negative versus positive stimuli. The 
objective of this study was to examine empathy for negative and positive mental states in 
bvFTD. We utilized the Multifaceted Empathy Test, a performance-based task that taps cognitive 
empathy, affective sharing, and empathic concern components of empathy, and allows for the 
discrimination of responses to negative versus positive realistic images. This represents the first 
time this task has been utilized in patients with FTD, and allowed for emotional empathy to be 
assessed based on behavioural responses to naturalistic images. We hypothesized that patients 
with bvFTD would demonstrate impaired cognitive empathy based on consistent evidence from 
the literature to date, and an emotional empathy deficit based largely on caregiver and clinical 
reports of patient behaviour. We also predicted that cognitive and emotional empathy would be 
more impaired for negative stimuli compared to positive stimuli, based on some evidence of a 
selective deficit in recognizing negative emotional expressions in bvFTD (Fernandez-Duque & 
Black, 2005; Kipps et al., 2009). Beyond providing unique insight into the empathy impairment 
associated with bvFTD, this could also elucidate whether valence is influential in the 
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representation of particular aspects of empathy, as well as the potential dissociability of these 
components. 
 
1.5.2 Study II - Distinguishing the relationship between different aspects of empathic 
responding as a function of psychopathic, autistic, and anxious traits 
Although cognitive and emotional empathy impairments have been associated with 
specific developmental and neurological disorders, such as ASD and psychopathy, respectively, 
little is known about how performance-based measures of cognitive empathy, affective sharing, 
and empathic concern relate to individual differences in autistic, psychopathic, and anxious traits 
in the healthy population. In particular, investigations of empathic responding rarely distinguish 
between different aspects of emotional empathy, or consider the potential impact of anxiety. 
Based on the findings of differential deficits in components of empathy in patients with bvFTD 
from Study I, we were particularly interested in the potential dissociability of cognitive empathy, 
affective sharing, and empathic concern in a community sample. Accordingly, there were two 
main objectives of this investigation. First, we sought to determine whether autistic and 
coldhearted psychopathic traits in a community sample were differentially related to cognitive 
empathy, affective sharing, and empathic concern performance. Our second goal was to elucidate 
the relationship between trait anxiety and empathy. Healthy adults completed the Multifaceted 
Empathy Test, a performance-based task tapping cognitive empathy and multiple aspects of 
emotional empathy, as in Study I, as well as trait questionnaire measures. It was hypothesized 
that coldhearted psychopathic traits, which reflect the core emotional features of psychopathy, 
including a lack of empathy (Lilienfeld & Widows, 2005), would be negatively correlated with 
emotional empathy ratings, including both affective sharing and empathic concern, but not 
cognitive empathy performance. Alternatively, we expected autistic trait levels to be inversely 
associated with cognitive empathy performance, but not emotional empathy ratings. Lastly, it 
was predicted that trait anxiety would be positively related to emotional empathy, but that this 
would be driven by an association with measures of affective sharing, and arousal ratings in 
particular. The identification of differential relationships between aspects of empathy and 
subclinical traits provides insight into their dissociability, as well as their potential behavioural 
outcomes and neural substrates.  
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1.5.3 Study III - The neurocognitive correlates of distinct facets of empathy: Greater 
involvement of simulation mechanisms in emotional relative to cognitive empathy 
Findings from Studies I and II provided compelling evidence for the distinguishability of 
cognitive empathy, affective sharing, and empathic concern components of empathy. This 
contributes to a large body of evidence suggesting that cognitive and emotional empathy facets 
are dissociable. Despite this, whether these processes rely on different underlying mechanisms is 
still debated. Specifically, it has been suggested that action-perception neural matching, or 
simulation mechanisms, may facilitate empathy by supporting the simulation of perceived 
experience in others. Though there is some support for a role of the simulation network in 
cognitive empathy, evidence suggests that it is preferentially involved in emotional empathy. 
However, this remains unclear, and no studies to date have statistically compared the 
involvement of the simulation network in these two facets of empathy. Thus, the objective of this 
study was to delineate the involvement of the simulation network in cognitive and emotional 
empathy. Healthy adults underwent fMRI while completing tasks targeting cognitive empathy, 
emotional empathy, and the simulation network. Critically, this marks the first use of functional 
localizers to determine the common recruitment among brain areas identified as having 
simulation properties, and those engaged during cognitive and emotional empathy within the 
same sample. Our central hypothesis was that critical regions for action-perception matching 
within the simulation network would be more involved in the facilitation of emotional than 
cognitive empathy. Specifically, localized regions of the simulation network were predicted to 
show some overlap with areas engaged by both the cognitive and emotional empathy tasks. 
However, critical simulation areas, including the ventral PMC/IFG and IPL, were expected to be 
recruited to a greater degree during emotional as compared to cognitive empathy. Lastly, 
performance on the emotional empathy task was expected to be more strongly associated with 
activity in the simulation network than performance on the cognitive empathy task.   
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2 Parsing Cognitive and Emotional Empathy Deficits for Negative 
and Positive Stimuli in Frontotemporal Dementia1 
Abstract 
Objectives: Behavioural variant frontotemporal dementia (bvFTD) is a debilitating 
neurodegenerative disorder characterized by frontal and temporal lobe atrophy primarily 
affecting social cognition and emotion, including loss of empathy. Many consider empathy to be 
a multidimensional construct, including cognitive empathy (the ability to adopt and understand 
another’s perspective) and emotional empathy (the capacity to share another’s emotional 
experience). Cognitive and emotional empathy deficits have been associated with bvFTD; 
however, little is known regarding the performance of patients with bvFTD on behavioural 
measures of emotional empathy, and whether empathic responses differ for negative versus 
positive stimuli.  
Methods: 24 patients with bvFTD and 24 healthy controls completed the Multifaceted Empathy 
Test (MET; Dziobek et al., 2008), a performance-based task that taps both cognitive and 
emotional facets of empathy, and allows for the discrimination of responses to negative versus 
positive realistic images. MET scores were also compared with caregiver ratings of patient 
behaviour on the Interpersonal Reactivity Index, which assesses patients’ everyday 
demonstrations of perspective taking and empathic concern.  
Results: Patients with bvFTD were less accurate than controls at inferring mental states for 
negative and positive stimuli. They also demonstrated lower levels of shared emotional 
experience, more positive emotional reactions, and diminished arousal to negative social stimuli 
relative to controls. Patients showed reduced emotional reactions to negative non-social stimuli 
as well. Lastly, the MET and IRI measures of emotional empathy were found to be significantly 
correlated within the bvFTD group. 
                                                          
1 Chapter 2 is modified from its published format as: Oliver, L. D., Mitchell, D. G. V., Dziobek, 
I., MacKinley, J., Coleman, K., Rankin, K. P., & Finger, E. C. (2015). Parsing cognitive and 
emotional empathy deficits for negative and positive stimuli in frontotemporal dementia. 
Neuropsychologia, 67, 14-26. 
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Conclusions: The results suggest that patients with bvFTD show a global deficit in cognitive 
empathy, and deficient emotional empathy for negative, but not positive, experiences. Further, a 
generalized emotional processing impairment for negative stimuli was observed, which could 
contribute to the emotional empathy deficit. This work highlights potential treatment targets and 
a means to assess the impact of novel therapies on socioemotional impairment in bvFTD.  
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2.1 Introduction 
Frontotemporal dementia (FTD) is a debilitating neurodegenerative disorder 
characterized by progressive deterioration of the frontal and temporal lobes, for which there is 
presently no cure. There are several variants of FTD, including behavioural variant (bv) FTD, 
semantic dementia, and progressive non-fluent aphasia (PNFA). Patients with bvFTD present 
with early, strikingly dysfunctional social and emotional behaviour, including disinhibition and 
impulsivity, lack of insight, and emotional blunting, callousness, and a loss of empathy 
(Gustafson, 1987; Neary, Snowden, & Mann, 2005). Notably, patients with semantic dementia 
with right temporal lobe atrophy also tend to demonstrate similar behavioural symptoms early in 
the course of illness (Bozeat, Gregory, Ralph, & Hodges, 2000; Seeley et al., 2005; Snowden et 
al., 2001), and all three subtypes can include these behavioural abnormalities (Neary et al., 1998; 
Rosen et al., 2006).  
 One of the core diagnostic features of bvFTD is a loss of empathy, exhibited by 
decreased social interest, diminished responsiveness to the feelings of others, and increased 
coldheartedness (Perry & Miller, 2001; Rascovsky et al., 2011). Empathy has been defined as 
“an affective response more appropriate to another’s situation than one’s own” (Hoffman, 1987, 
p. 48), or an affective response similar to another individual’s feelings based on the 
comprehension of their emotional state (Eisenberg, Shea, Carlo, & Knight, 1991). It is 
considered to be a multidimensional construct by many, including both cognitive and emotional 
facets (Davis, 1980; Eslinger, 1998). Some have argued for the existence of an additional facet 
termed motor empathy, referring to inherent mirroring of the movements and facial expressions 
of others (e.g., Blair, 2005), though cognitive and emotional aspects are more traditionally 
considered. Cognitive empathy is sometimes used interchangeably with theory of mind (Blair, 
2005; Lawrence, Shaw, Baker, Baron-Cohen, & David, 2004), and refers to the ability to adopt 
another individual’s perspective, and thereby infer their mental or emotional state. Emotional 
empathy refers to the capacity to share and react affectively to the emotional experience of 
another individual. The dissociation of these facets is supported by behavioural, functional 
imaging, and lesion studies. For example, an emotional empathy deficit but intact cognitive 
empathy has been demonstrated in individuals with high psychopathic traits, whereas individuals 
with high autistic traits have been found to show the reverse pattern (Lockwood, Bird, Bridge, & 
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Viding, 2013). Further, tasks tapping cognitive empathy versus emotional empathy have been 
found to result in different patterns of activation (Fan, Duncan, de Greck, & Northoff, 2011; 
Shamay-Tsoory, 2011). Accordingly, patients with lesions to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex 
have shown impaired cognitive empathy and intact emotional empathy, whereas patients with 
inferior frontal gyrus lesions have demonstrated an emotional empathy deficit but intact 
cognitive empathy (Shamay-Tsoory, Aharon-Peretz, & Perry, 2009). 
 Considerable evidence exists for impaired cognitive empathy and theory of mind in 
bvFTD, while a smaller number of studies have shown deficits on emotional empathy measures 
as well. Cognitive empathy impairments in bvFTD have been identified using both performance-
based measures and caregiver ratings. For example, relative to controls, patients with bvFTD 
have demonstrated deficiencies in inferring the mental state, beliefs, and/or intentions of 
characters in false belief tasks (Lough, Gregory, & Hodges, 2001), humorous cartoons (Lough et 
al., 2006; Snowden et al., 2003), and vignettes of social scenarios (Eslinger et al., 2007; Shany-
Ur et al., 2012). During one such task, termed the Faux pas test (Stone, Baron-Cohen, & Knight, 
1998), participants are read short stories. Patients with bvFTD have shown a deficit in 
understanding whether a social faux pas has occurred based on representing the mental states of 
characters in the stories (Gregory et al., 2002; Torralva et al., 2007). Patients with bvFTD have 
also exhibited impaired theory of mind via poorer performance on the Reading the Mind in the 
Eyes test (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, Raste, & Plumb, 2001) relative to controls (Couto et 
al., 2013; Gregory et al., 2002; Torralva et al., 2007), in which participants are shown the eye 
region of a face and asked to best identify what the individual is feeling from two or four 
choices, and the Judgment of Preference Task, in which participants are presented with a face 
whose eyes are directed at one of four objects and asked which object the face likes best 
(Snowden et al., 2003). Additionally, patients with bvFTD have been found to score lower on the 
Perspective Taking subscale of the Interpersonal Reactivity Index, according to caregiver ratings 
of patient behaviour, relative to controls (Eslinger, Moore, Anderson, & Grossman, 2011; Rankin 
et al., 2006; Rankin, Kramer, & Miller, 2005) and patients with Alzheimer’s disease (Fernandez-
Duque, Hodges, Baird, & Black, 2010; Hsieh, Irish, Daveson, Hodges, & Piguet, 2013). While 
these studies confirm that patients with bvFTD have a cognitive empathy deficit, little is known 
about whether this impairment is present for both negative and positive mental states. Patients 
with bvFTD are known to have significant deficits in the recognition of negative facial 
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expressions such as fear and sadness, whereas identification of positive expressions such as 
happiness is often relatively preserved (Fernandez-Duque & Black, 2005; Kipps, Mioshi, & 
Hodges, 2009; Kumfor et al., 2011; Lavenu, Pasquier, Lebert, Petit, & Van der Linden, 1999; 
Lough et al., 2006). As facial expression processing is likely one important component of the 
recognition of other’s mental states, it is possible that patients with bvFTD may present with a 
more pronounced deficit in cognitive empathy for negative mental states. However, the 
distinction between cognitive empathy in response to negative versus positive stimuli has yet to 
be investigated in bvFTD.   
 Evidence of a deficit in emotional empathy, or the ability to share and react affectively to 
another individual’s emotional experience, has also been reported in bvFTD using caregiver 
measures and clinical assessments. However, there have been few performance-based 
assessments of emotional empathy in this patient group. Caregivers completing the Interpersonal 
Reactivity Index (IRI; Davis, 1980), a multidimensional questionnaire assessing four 
components of empathy, report lower scores on the Empathic Concern subscale (i.e., feelings of 
concern, warmth, and compassion for less fortunate others) for patients with bvFTD in 
comparison to controls (Eslinger et al., 2011; Lough et al., 2006; Rankin et al., 2006) and 
patients with Alzheimer’s disease (Fernandez-Duque et al., 2010; Hsieh et al., 2013). Reports of 
increased coldheartedness and emotional blunting also abound in detailed case descriptions 
(Lough et al., 2001; Snowden et al., 2001; Thibodeau & Miller, 2013). The paucity of objective 
measures of emotional empathy makes this a difficult dimension to objectively evaluate. Though 
emotion recognition likely captures aspects of emotional empathy and has been used as an index 
of emotional empathy in some populations (Blair, 2013), we are particularly interested in the 
affective response and/or shared emotional experience generated as a result of the emotional 
experience of another individual. Physiological measures, such as facial electromyography, skin 
conductance, heart rate, and blood pressure, are another avenue to assess emotional empathy or 
emotional reactivity. In patients with bvFTD, reduced blood pressure has been observed relative 
to controls in response to a disgust-eliciting video (Eckart, Sturm, Miller, & Levenson, 2012). 
However, such techniques can be challenging in patients with bvFTD, and may require 
additional means to determine the specific emotional response reflected by changes in arousal 
and related psychophysiological measures. Furthermore, items on the Empathic Concern 
subscale of the IRI include predominantly negative scenarios, and do not assess the potential for 
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empathy for positive mental states. Thus, similar to cognitive empathy, it is unclear whether 
emotional empathic deficits are specific to negative mental states of others, or may be found for 
both negative and positive states.  
 The present study was undertaken in order to examine empathy for negative and positive 
mental states in bvFTD using a performance-based measure, the Multifaceted Empathy Test 
(MET; Dziobek et al., 2008). The MET is a multidimensional empathy measure previously 
validated in healthy adults and patients with autism (Dziobek et al., 2008), which is designed to 
tap both cognitive and emotional facets of empathy in a dissociable way. Specifically, it includes 
questions that require mental state inference, and separate ratings of participants’ emotional 
responses to realistic emotionally charged images. However, it should be noted that 
physiological responding is not measured during the task, and thus the degree to which 
participants’ emotional empathy responses are independent from other cognitive response 
strategies cannot be completely delineated. The MET also allows for the discrimination of 
empathic responses to negative versus positive stimuli. Thus, the MET allows for the evaluation 
of both cognitive and emotional empathy, for negative and positive experiences, using a single 
task. This represents the first time this task has been utilized in patients with FTD, and will allow 
for emotional empathy to be assessed based on behavioural responses to naturalistic images. As 
well, the ability to distinguish between empathic responses to negative and positive stimuli is of 
particular interest based on some evidence of a selective deficit in recognizing negative 
emotional expressions in bvFTD with relatively intact positive emotion recognition (Fernandez-
Duque & Black, 2005; Kipps, Mioshi, et al., 2009). In addition, there have been recent reports of 
less negative valence ratings being given to negative emotional pictures, with typical ratings of 
positive and neutral images, in patients with bvFTD (St. Jacques, Grady, Davidson, & Chow, 
2014). We predicted that patients with bvFTD would show a deficit in cognitive empathy based 
on the consistent evidence from the existing literature, as well as an emotional empathy 
impairment based largely on clinical presentations and caregiver reports of patient behaviour. We 
also hypothesized that deficits in cognitive and emotional empathy would be more pronounced 
for negative stimuli compared to positive stimuli. In addition, caregivers were asked to complete 
the IRI in order to determine whether performance-based and caregiver-reported measures of 
empathy for negative experiences would be correlated in patients with bvFTD. 
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2.2 Methods 
 
2.2.1 Participants 
Forty-eight participants took part in this study, including 24 patients with bvFTD (12 
male, 12 female) and 24 healthy volunteers (10 male, 14 female). All participants in the bvFTD 
group had abnormalities in social behaviour and emotional blunting as indexed on the Frontal 
Behavioural Inventory. All participants in the bvFTD group presented with behavioural 
symptoms meeting the revised international consensus diagnostic criteria for bvFTD (Rascovsky 
et al., 2011). Five patients with dual diagnoses of bvFTD and another FTD subtype were 
included [three patients with features of semantic dementia who had predominantly right 
temporal lobe atrophy, one patient with bvFTD and PNFA (Gorno-Tempini et al., 2011), and one 
patient with bvFTD, PNFA, and corticobasal syndrome (Armstrong et al., 2013)]. As a part of 
their initial clinical evaluation all patients completed cognitive testing assessing attention, 
memory, executive functioning, language, and visuospatial skills, and had magnetic resonance 
imaging, computed tomography, or single-photon emission computed tomography imaging 
consistent with the diagnoses. Diagnoses were made by a trained neurologist (ECF or AK). 
Patients were recruited through the Cognitive Neurology and Alzheimer Research Centre at 
Parkwood Hospital in London, Ontario, Canada. Age-matched control participants were 
recruited through advertisements to caregivers at local FTD family support groups and volunteer 
databases of the centre. All participants and caregivers provided written informed consent. This 
study was approved by the Health Sciences Research Ethics Board at the University of Western 
Ontario, London, Ontario, Canada.  
 
2.2.2 Measures 
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2.2.2.1 Addenbrooke’s Cognitive Examination - Revised (ACE-R; Mioshi, Dawson, Mitchell, 
Arnold, & Hodges, 2006) 
 The ACE-R was administered to participants in order to assess non-social cognitive 
functioning, and whether this might differ between patients with bvFTD and the healthy control 
group. The ACE-R evaluates five cognitive domains, including attention/orientation, memory, 
verbal fluency, language, and visuospatial abilities. The Mini-Mental State Examination 
(MMSE), a screening tool for cognitive impairment in older adults, is also included in the 
examination. All participants had complete MMSE data. For one patient and two control 
participants the ACE-R was not completed alongside the initial MET testing, and we were 
unable to attain concurrent measures due to logistical reasons.  
 
2.2.2.2 Multifaceted Empathy Test (MET; Dziobek et al., 2008; Figure 2.1)  
 The MET was administered to all participants in order to evaluate empathy multi-
dimensionally. The MET is a performance-based measure which taps both cognitive and 
emotional facets of empathy in a dissociable way, and allows for the discrimination of empathic 
responses to negative versus positive stimuli. It consists of a series of images of realistic 
situations, about which participants are asked to answer a number of questions. Research staff 
administered the task using Microsoft PowerPoint and controlled slide presentation, recording 
the participant’s responses as they voiced them aloud. Alternatively, two patients preferred to 
respond by pointing to the screen and another preferred to respond via button press. Each 
question was displayed on a separate slide that also displayed the relevant image. All ratings 
were provided using a 9-point Likert scale with pictograms from the Self-Assessment Manikin 
(Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 1997). Completion of the MET required approximately 45 minutes. 
Stimuli include 23 pairs of naturalistic pictures (14 negative, 9 positive): a context-only image 
that is presented first, and a social image with a person or people embedded in this context 
expressing a relevant emotion that appears later. For each context-only picture, participants are 
asked ‘How positive or negative does this picture make you feel?’ (valence rating; 1 = most 
positive, 9 = most negative), and ‘How calm or aroused does this picture make you feel?’ 
(arousal rating; 1 = most calm, 9 = most aroused). For the social stimuli, participants are asked to 
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identify how the person or people in the picture are feeling (i.e., ‘How do you think this person is 
feeling?’) from four possible mental state descriptor choices as a measure of cognitive empathy 
accuracy. Feedback is then provided to ensure that improper mental state inference does not 
drive subsequent emotional responses to the stimulus. Participants subsequently provide a 
cognitive empathy intensity rating by indicating the degree to which they think the person is 
experiencing the given emotion (e.g., ‘How miserable do you think this person feels?’). The 
correct mental state descriptors, as well as the distractor options with the same valence, were 
chosen by consensus of a psychiatrist and three psychologists for each social image (Dziobek et 
al., 2008). Twenty-one unique mental state descriptors are included in the task. To capture the 
empathic concern component of emotional empathy, participants rate their emotional reactions to 
the stimuli, including how happy they are for the people (i.e., ‘How happy are you for this 
person?’ for positive stimuli), or their level of concern for them (i.e., ‘How concerned are you for 
this person?’ for negative stimuli). In addition, affective sharing is evaluated by asking 
participants to indicate the degree to which they share the emotional experience of the people in 
the photographs (intensity rating; e.g., ‘When looking at this picture, does it make YOU feel 
miserable at all? If so, how miserable do you feel?’), how positive or negative they feel in 
reaction to the stimuli (valence rating), and how calm or aroused they feel in response to the 
stimuli (arousal rating). A summary of measures included in the MET with example questions 
and responses are presented in Table 2.1. As mentioned, objective measures of physiological 
responding to the emotional stimuli were not included. Measures of affective sharing, which 
could be considered more implicit or indirect indices of emotional empathy, as well as empathic 
concern, a more explicit or direct measure of emotional empathy, were included in attempts to 
decrease socially desirable responding and the degree of introspection required throughout the 
task (Dziobek et al., 2008). 
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Figure 2.1 The Multifaceted Empathy Test 
Example of a negative context-only image with the valence rating question and response scale 
(left), and the corresponding negative social image with the empathic concern question and 
response scale (right) taken from the Multifaceted Empathy Test (MET; Dziobek et al., 2008).   
 
Table 2.1: MET measures 
 
Measure Question Response
Cognitive Empathy
   Accuracy How do you think this person is feeling? Choice from 4 possible mental states
   Intensity How _____ do you think this person feels? 1 = not at all, 9 = completely
Emotional Empathy
   Empathic Concern How concerned are you for this person? (negative stimuli)         
How happy are you for this person? (positive stimuli)
1 = not at all, 9 = completely
   Affective Sharing
      Intensity When looking at this picture, does it make YOU feel _____ 1 = not at all, 9 = completely
at all? If so, how _____ do you feel?
      Valence How positive or negative does this picture make you feel? 1 = most positive, 9 = most negative
      Arousal How calm or aroused does this picture make you feel? 1 = most calm, 9 = most aroused
Context-Only
   Valence How positive or negative does this picture make you feel? 1 = most positive, 9 = most negative
   Arousal How calm or aroused does this picture make you feel? 1 = most calm, 9 = most aroused
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2.2.2.3 Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI; Davis, 1980)  
Caregivers of the patients with bvFTD also completed a third-person version of the IRI, a 
well-validated multidimensional empathy questionnaire (mean scores presented in Table 2.2). 
The IRI consists of four subscales, each comprised of seven items answered using a 5-point 
Likert scale ranging from ‘Does not describe him/her well’ to ‘Describes him/her very well’. The 
subscales of interest for this investigation included the Perspective Taking subscale, which 
assesses the tendency to spontaneously adopt the perspective of another individual (e.g., ‘I try to 
look at everybody's side of a disagreement before I make a decision’), and best captures 
cognitive empathy. In addition, the Empathic Concern subscale evaluates the extent to which 
someone experiences feelings of concern and sympathy for unfortunate others (e.g., ‘I often have 
tender, concerned feelings for people less fortunate than me’), and the Personal Distress subscale 
measures the tendency to experience distress in tense interpersonal situations (e.g., ‘When I see 
someone who badly needs help in an emergency, I go to pieces’). The Empathic Concern scale in 
particular is thought to be reflective of emotional empathy, whereas the Personal Distress 
subscale is believed by some to be a less mature form of emotional empathy akin to emotional 
contagion (Dziobek et al., 2008; Rankin et al., 2005). All but two of the patients had caregivers 
complete the IRI, leaving an N of 22 for scores on the Perspective Taking, Empathic Concern, 
and Personal Distress subscales.  
 
2.2.3 Statistical approach       
Chi-square analyses and independent t-tests were conducted to determine whether there 
were between-groups differences in demographics and/or standardized neuropsychological test 
performance. Two (group) by two (valence) repeated-measures ANOVAs were utilized to 
determine whether performance differed between negative and positive stimuli and/or the control 
group and the patients with bvFTD for each of the cognitive and emotional empathy measures 
included in the MET. Repeated-measures ANOVAs were also conducted on the valence and 
arousal ratings provided for the context-only stimuli. Follow-up independent and paired t-tests, 
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with Bonferroni correction and corrected values according to Levene’s Test where appropriate, 
were conducted to delineate the nature of significant effects. Repeated-measures ANCOVAs 
were also performed on empathic concern and affective sharing intensity measures of emotional 
empathy with context-only valence and arousal ratings as covariates to control for effects 
unrelated to the social content of stimuli.  
In addition, correlational analyses were also performed to investigate the association 
between measures of cognitive and emotional empathy on the MET and corresponding subscales 
on the IRI in the patients with bvFTD. These analyses included patient MET data from both 
negative and positive stimuli for the Perspective Taking subscale, and only the negative stimuli 
for the Empathic Concern and Personal Distress subscales, based on the predominantly negative 
valence of the items on these subscales of the IRI. Specifically, the relationship between 
cognitive empathy accuracy and scores on the Perspective Taking subscale of the IRI was 
examined. Correlational analyses were also performed on empathic concern ratings and affective 
sharing intensity ratings for negative images with scores on the Empathic Concern subscale of 
the IRI. Lastly, correlations between affective sharing arousal ratings for negative images and 
scores on the Personal Distress subscale of the IRI were examined. None of the distributions 
included in these correlational analyses deviated significantly from normality according to visual 
inspection of normal Q-Q plots and the Shapiro-Wilk Test (all p > .05). Scatter plots for each of 
these correlations of interest were examined, and Mahalanobis distance values were calculated 
for each participant in order to detect bivariate outliers [data points with a Mahalanobis distance 
value greater than the critical chi-square value of 5.99 (df = 2, p < .05)]. One outlier was 
identified as influencing the relationship between scores on the Empathic Concern subscale and 
both empathic concern ratings and affective sharing intensity ratings for negative stimuli. Thus, 
correlational analyses were conducted for these variables with this participant’s data removed (N 
= 21). Two outliers were also removed from the correlational analysis for Personal Distress and 
affective sharing arousal ratings for negative images (N = 20). No outliers were detected in the 
Perspective Taking and cognitive empathy accuracy correlational analysis.  
Finally, to determine whether impaired cognitive functioning in the patients with bvFTD 
could account for observed empathy deficits, correlational analyses were conducted between 
patients’ ACE-R total scores and scores on each of the cognitive empathy and emotional 
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empathy measures for negative and positive stimuli included in the MET. The same outlier 
criteria as above were used for these analyses.   
 
2.3 Results 
 
2.3.1 Participant demographic and neuropsychological characteristics  
Participant demographic and neuropsychological characteristics are presented in Table 
2.2. Chi-square analyses revealed no significant difference in sex between bvFTD and control 
groups. Independent t-tests also demonstrated that groups did not differ significantly in age at 
testing or years of education. However, patients with bvFTD performed significantly worse than 
controls on the MMSE and all subtests of the ACE-R. See Table 2.2 for statistical details. In 
order to confirm that the inclusion of patients with some language deficits who also met 
diagnostic criteria for semantic dementia (N = 3) and PNFA (N = 2) did not unduly influence our 
results, repeated-measures ANOVAs were conducted with these five participants excluded. 
Results were not substantively different from the whole group analysis. Specifically, the group 
by valence interactions for cognitive empathy accuracy (p = .052) and cognitive empathy 
intensity ratings (p = .054) were marginally significant with the removal of these participants’ 
data, likely consistent with a reduction in power. Because the results remained fundamentally 
unchanged, data from these patients were included in the analyses. 
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Table 2.2: Participant demographic and neuropsychological characteristics 
Characteristic Control bvFTD df p
Age at Testing 65.0 (8.5) 64.7 (7.9) 46 > .1
Sex (male:female) 10:14 12:12 1 > .1
Education (years)* 13.5 (3.3) 13.5 (3.1) 45 > .1
Disease Duration (years) NA 6.0 (3.4) NA NA
Mini-Mental State Examination    (/30) 28.9 (1.5) 22.0 (5.1) 26.9 < .001
ACE-R
§
   Total                             (/100) 89.3 (7.5) 54.4 (14.5) 33.2 < .001
                Attention and Orientation  (/18) 17.9 (0.4) 13.8 (3.4) 22.7 < .001
                Memory                          (/26) 20.6 (4.4) 8.0 (4.3) 43 < .001
                Fluency                                      (/14) 11.1 (2.0) 4.3 (3.3) 36.9 < .001
                Language                         (/26) 24.9 (1.9) 16.1 (6.3) 26.3 < .001
                Visuospatial                    (/16) 14.8 (1.5) 12.1 (3.4) 31.0 < .005
IRI☼         Perspective Taking      --- 14.1 (4.3)        ---          ---
               Empathic Concern                 --- 17.8 (4.7)        ---          ---
               Personal Distress                  --- 18.9 (6.5)        ---          ---
               Total      --- 63.0 (14.5)        ---          ---
Group; mean (SD)
SD = standard deviation; df  = degrees of freedom; bvFTD = behavioural variant frontotemporal 
dementia; ACE-R = Addenbrooke's Cognitive Examination - Revised
* Education information was available for N  = 23 control participants                                                    
§ ACE-R data were available for N  = 22 control participants and N  = 23 patients with bvFTD                        
☼ IRI data were available for N  = 22 patients for Perspective Taking, Empathic Concern, and 
Personal Distress subscales, and N  = 20 for IRI Total scores
 
 
2.3.2 MET 
 
2.3.2.1 Cognitive empathy  
Performance on cognitive empathy measures was first examined for both the negative 
and positive stimuli comparing the healthy control group and the patients with bvFTD. Data are 
presented in Figure 2.2. Group means and statistical details are presented in Table 2.3. A two 
(group) by two (valence) repeated-measures ANOVA conducted on cognitive empathy accuracy 
(i.e., the proportion of mental states correctly identified) demonstrated a main effect of group and 
valence. Patients with bvFTD (M = 0.70, SD = 0.21) were less accurate at mental state inference 
overall relative to healthy controls (M = 0.95, SD = 0.04), and individuals across groups were 
less accurate at inferring the mental states of people in negative images (M = 0.79, SD = 0.23) 
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compared to positive images (M = 0.89, SD = 0.17). A group by valence interaction was also 
apparent, and separate independent t-tests with Bonferroni and Levene’s Test corrected p values 
were conducted for negative and positive stimuli to elucidate this. These demonstrated that 
patients with bvFTD were less accurate at inferring how the people were feeling in both the 
negative [t(26.0) = -5.73, p < .001] and positive [t(25.5) = -4.40, p < .001] images relative to 
controls. Thus, patients with bvFTD demonstrated a cognitive empathy deficit for both negative 
and positive stimuli. Paired t-tests conducted in each of the groups revealed that cognitive 
empathy accuracy was significantly lower for negative images compared to positive images in 
the bvFTD group [t(23) = -4.28, p < .001], as well as the control group [t(23) = -2.58, p < .05]. 
However, the interaction appears to be driven by the fact that the differential effect of negative 
versus positive stimuli is greater in patients than controls (Figure 2.2). A second repeated-
measures ANOVA for cognitive empathy intensity ratings unveiled a main effect of valence, but 
no significant effect of group. Across groups, individuals provided lower intensity ratings for the 
feelings exemplified in negative images (M = 7.81, SD = 1.3) in comparison to positive images 
(M = 8.11, SD = 1.3). A group by valence interaction was also identified. Follow-up independent 
t-tests revealed that patients with bvFTD provided significantly lower intensity ratings for the 
mental states exemplified in the negative images relative to controls [t(27.3) = -2.46, p < .05], 
whereas intensity ratings did not differ significantly between the groups for positive stimuli 
[t(46) = -0.66, p > .1]. Thus, patients with bvFTD provided lower intensity ratings for negative, 
but not positive, mental states depicted in comparison to controls. 
 
66 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2 Cognitive empathy results 
Mean cognitive empathy scores in control and bvFTD groups by stimuli valence. (a) Mean 
proportion of mental states correctly identified for the negative and positive social stimuli. (b) 
Mean ratings of feeling intensity for the mental states exemplified in the negative and positive 
social images. Error bars represent standard errors. Asterisks indicate a significant difference in 
accuracy, * p < .05, **** p < .001. 
 
2.3.2.2 Emotional empathy  
 Emotional empathy data are presented in Figure 2.3. See Table 2.3 for group means and 
statistical details. Repeated-measures ANOVAs were also conducted to determine whether 
performance on measures of empathic concern differed as a function of group for negative 
images (when asked, ‘How concerned are you for this person?’) or positive images (when asked, 
‘How happy are you for this person?’). A main effect of valence was apparent for empathic 
concern ratings, with participants providing lower ratings for negative images (M = 6.73, SD = 
1.4) compared to positive images (M = 7.47, SD =1.5). However, the effect of group was non-
significant, and there was no significant group by valence interaction. Thus, interestingly patients 
with bvFTD were found to endorse similar levels of concern as controls for people in negative 
images, and levels of happiness for those in positive images.   
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 With regard to measures of affective sharing, the repeated-measures ANOVA performed 
on affective sharing intensity ratings (e.g., when asked, ‘When looking at this picture, does it 
make YOU feel excited at all? If so, how excited do you feel?’) revealed a  main effect of 
valence, though the effect of group was not significant. Participants reported a lower degree of 
shared feeling intensity for negative stimuli (M = 5.47, SD = 1.8) compared to positive stimuli 
(M = 6.63, SD = 1.5). There was also a group by valence interaction. Whereas, the patients with 
bvFTD shared the feelings of people in the negative images to a lesser degree than controls 
[t(35.2) = -2.11, p = .084], there was no evidence that the two groups differed in ratings of shared 
feeling intensity for positive stimuli [t(39.0) = 0.73, p > .1]. Thus, patients with bvFTD showed 
diminished levels of affective sharing intensity for negative, but not positive, stimuli relative to 
controls. 
 Examining affective sharing further, valence ratings (i.e., how positive or negative a 
stimulus made the participant feel), demonstrated main effects of group and valence. Patients 
with bvFTD (M = 4.34, SD = 1.6) provided lower (i.e., more positive) valence ratings overall 
relative to controls (M = 5.16, SD = 0.59), and ratings were significantly lower for positive 
images (M = 2.27, SD = 1.2) compared to negative images (M = 6.34, SD = 1.7), as expected. A 
group by valence interaction was also apparent. To delineate the observed interaction, separate 
independent t-tests were undertaken for each valence. These revealed that patients with bvFTD 
rated negative stimuli as making them feel less negative than controls [t(32.7) = -3.00, p < .05], 
though there was no significant difference between groups for ratings of how the positive stimuli 
made them feel [t(46) = 0.041, p > .1]. Therefore, patients with bvFTD felt less negative in 
response to negative stimuli relative to controls, but showed no significant difference in the 
feelings elicited by positive stimuli.  
 For arousal ratings, the final measure of affective sharing (i.e., how calm or aroused a 
stimulus made the participant feel), there was a main effect of valence, but no significant effect 
of group. Participants rated negative stimuli (M = 5.78, SD = 1.5) as making them feel more 
aroused than positive stimuli (M = 3.23, SD = 1.6). A group by valence interaction was also 
found for arousal ratings. Independent t-tests demonstrated that the patients with bvFTD 
provided significantly lower arousal ratings than controls for negative images [t(38.0) = -3.08, p 
< .01], but there was no significant difference in arousal ratings between groups for positive 
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images [t(37.2) = 1.74, p > .1]. Thus, patients with bvFTD expressed lower levels of arousal in 
response to negative, but not positive, stimuli in comparison to controls. 
 
 
Figure 2.3 Emotional empathy results 
Mean emotional empathy ratings in control and bvFTD groups by stimuli valence. (a) Mean 
ratings of concern (for negative stimuli) and happiness (for positive stimuli) for the individuals in 
the social images. (b) Mean ratings of the degree to which participants shared the feelings of 
those in the negative and positive social stimuli. (c) Mean ratings of how positive or negative the 
image made participants feel (1 = most positive, 9 = most negative) for negative and positive 
social stimuli. (d) Mean ratings of how calm or aroused the image made participants feel (1 = 
most calm, 9 = most aroused) for negative and positive social stimuli. Error bars represent 
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standard errors. Asterisks indicate a significant difference in accuracy, * p < .05, ** p < .01, † p < 
.05 uncorrected (p = .084 with Bonferroni correction). 
  
2.3.2.3 Context-only stimuli  
 In order to determine whether the impairments demonstrated by the patients with bvFTD 
were specific to social stimuli or represented a more generalized processing difference, repeated-
measures ANOVAs were also conducted on valence and arousal ratings for the negative and 
positive context-only stimuli. Data for context-only stimuli are presented in Figure 2.4. Group 
means and statistical details are presented in Table 2.3. As with the social stimuli containing 
people, for valence ratings of context-only stimuli there were main effects of group and valence. 
Patients with bvFTD (M = 3.76, SD = 1.4) provided lower (i.e., more positive) ratings than 
controls (M = 4.61, SD = 0.64) across valences, and participants across groups provided higher 
(i.e., more negative) ratings for negative stimuli (M = 5.29, SD = 1.5) in comparison to positive 
stimuli (M = 2.47, SD = 1.0), as expected. A group by valence interaction was also identified. 
Independent t-tests for each valence demonstrated that the patients with bvFTD rated negative 
context-only stimuli as making them feel significantly less negative than controls [t(33.3) = -
3.45, p < .005]). Interestingly, patients actually rated the negative context-only stimuli as making 
them feel slightly positive on average. There was no significant difference in valence ratings for 
positive context-only stimuli between the patients and controls [t(46) = -0.15, p > .1]. Lastly, for 
arousal ratings of context-only images, there was a main effect of valence, but no significant 
effect of group. Participants rated positive context-only images (M = 3.06, SD = 1.3) as less 
arousing than negative context-only images (M = 5.07, SD = 1.5). A group by valence interaction 
was also apparent. Separate independent t-tests for each valence suggested that this interaction 
was driven by a trend of patients with bvFTD providing lower arousal ratings for negative 
context-only stimuli relative to controls, though this trend did not survive Bonferroni correction 
[t(37.3) = -1.95, p = .118]. There was no indication of a difference in arousal ratings for positive 
context-only stimuli between the patients with bvFTD and the controls [t(46) = 0.93, p > .1]. 
Thus, patients with bvFTD provided ratings indicative of decreased emotional responding 
specifically to negative context-only stimuli relative to controls. 
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Figure 2.4 Context-only results 
Mean ratings for context-only stimuli in control and bvFTD groups by stimuli valence. (a) Mean 
ratings of how positive or negative the image made participants feel (1 = most positive, 9 = most 
negative) for negative and positive context-only stimuli. (b) Mean ratings of how calm or 
aroused the image made participants feel (1 = most calm, 9 = most aroused) for negative and 
positive context-only stimuli. Error bars represent standard errors. Asterisks indicate a significant 
difference in accuracy, *** p < .005. 
 
Table 2.3: Group means and statistical details for MET measure main effects and 
interactions 
 
 
 
Measure
Control bvFTD Control bvFTD
Cognitive Empathy F p F p F p
   Accuracy (%)      93 (6.3)     64 (25)       98 (4.6)     80 (20) 32.2 < .001 24.6 < .001 8.28 < .01
   Intensity 8.26 (0.52) 7.36 (1.7)  8.23 (0.90) 7.99 (1.6) 2.90    .096 4.11 < .05 4.80 < .05
Emotional Empathy
   Empathic Concern   6.99 (1.0) 6.47 (1.8)    7.53 (1.2) 7.40 (1.8) 0.699 > .1 17.4 < .001 1.19 > .1
   Affective Sharing
      Intensity    5.99 (1.2)  4.94 (2.1)    6.47 (1.1) 6.79 (1.8) 0.794 > .1 26.6 < .001 9.26 < .005
      Valence 7.02 (0.94) 5.66 (2.0) 2.26 (0.92) 2.28 (1.4) 4.24 < .05 311 < .001 8.82 < .01
      Arousal   6.40 (1.0) 5.15 (1.7)   2.82 (1.2) 3.63 (2.0) 0.412 > .1 93.2 < .001 15.4 < .001
Context-Only
   Valence 5.97 (0.85) 4.60 (1.7) 2.49 (0.78) 2.44 (1.3) 5.72 < .05 218 < .001 11.9 < .005
   Arousal   5.47 (1.0) 4.66 (1.8)   2.88 (1.1) 3.24 (1.5) 0.398 > .1 137 < .001 11.6 < .005
SD = standard deviation; df  = degrees of freedom; bvFTD = behavioural variant frontotemporal dementia
Positive Stimuli; mean (SD)Negative Stimuli; mean (SD) Effect (df  = 46)
Group Group X ValenceValence
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2.3.3 Controlling for context-only effects 
To determine whether the emotional empathy deficits observed could be driven by 
abnormalities in patient ratings for the context-only, non-social stimuli, separate repeated-
measures ANCOVAs with context-only ratings were conducted on the indices of emotional 
empathy. Interestingly, these analyses indicated that abnormalities in context-only valence 
ratings impacted ratings of shared feeling intensity for negative images. Thus, we cannot 
conclude whether the lower degree of affective sharing intensity (i.e., shared feeling intensity) 
for people in negative images expressed by patients with bvFTD was driven mainly by the 
contextual aspects of the stimuli, or by responses specific to the depicted persons.  
 
2.3.4 Correlational analyses 
Correlational analyses were performed to investigate the relationship between measures 
of cognitive and emotional empathy on the performance-based MET and caregiver-completed 
IRI in patients with bvFTD. As mentioned, the negative valence of most items on the Empathic 
Concern and Personal Distress subscales of the IRI prompted the inclusion of MET emotional 
empathy data for the negative stimuli only. Correlational analyses between cognitive empathy 
accuracy on the MET and scores on the Perspective Taking subscale of the IRI revealed no 
significant association between the two measures (r = .205, p > .1). However, a positive 
correlation was identified between empathic concern ratings for negative images and scores on 
the Empathic Concern subscale (r = .438, p < .05; Figure 2.5a). A trend of a positive relationship 
was also evident between affective sharing intensity ratings for negative images and scores on 
the Empathic Concern subscale (r = .415, p = .061; Figure 2.5b). Finally, there was no significant 
correlation between patients’ affective sharing arousal ratings for negative stimuli and their 
scores on the Personal Distress subscale of the IRI (r = .091, p > .1). Thus, within the bvFTD 
group, a positive association was apparent between measures of emotional empathy, but not 
cognitive empathy, on the MET and IRI. 
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Figure 2.5 Correlational analyses 
Correlation between Multifaceted Empathy Test (MET) and Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI) 
measures of emotional empathy. Plots with best-fitting regression lines showing (a) MET 
empathic concern ratings for negative stimuli (i.e., level of concern for people) and (b) MET 
affective sharing intensity ratings for negative stimuli (i.e., level of shared emotional experience) 
as a function of scores on the Empathic Concern subscale of the IRI for patients with bvFTD. 
 
In order to investigate the influence of cognitive functioning deficits on MET empathic 
performance, correlational analyses were also performed using ACE-R total scores and scores on 
each of the cognitive empathy and emotional empathy measures for negative and positive stimuli 
included in the MET, for the patients with bvFTD. Performance on several of the MET measures 
was found to be positively associated with ACE-R total scores (Table 2.4). Correlational 
analyses reported here were performed using ACE-R total scores as we felt attention, executive 
functioning, language, and visuospatial abilities might all be engaged to some extent by the 
MET.  
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Table 2.4: Correlational analyses between ACE-R total scores and MET measures of 
cognitive and emotional empathy in patients with bvFTD 
 
 
2.3.5 Summary 
Overall, patients with bvFTD performed worse than controls at mental state inference for 
both negative and positive images. They also expressed sharing the emotional experience of 
others to a lesser degree, less negative emotional reactions, and lower levels of arousal for 
negative, but not positive, social stimuli. Additionally, patients demonstrated diminished 
emotional responses to negative, but not positive, non-social context-only stimuli relative to 
controls. Covariate analyses suggested that impaired encoding of negative contextual cues could 
contribute to the observed emotional empathy deficit. Lastly, measures of emotional empathy on 
the MET and IRI were found to be positively correlated within the bvFTD group, and cognitive 
functioning was associated with several of the MET measures. 
 
Measure Valence p r
Cognitive Empathy 
   Accuracy    Negative > .1 .357
                      Positive .047 .428
   Intensity     Negative > .1 .020
                      Positive > .1 - .321
Emotional Empathy
   Empathic Concern Negative > .1 .074
                      Positive > .1 .094
   Affective Sharing
      Intensity   Negative .065 .400
Positive > .1 .059
      Valence Negative .050 .434
Positive > .1 - .005
      Arousal Negative .054 .417
Positive > .1 .279
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2.4 Discussion 
Previous investigations of empathic capacity in patients with bvFTD have demonstrated 
deficits in both cognitive empathy (i.e., the ability to adopt and understand the perspective of 
another individual) and emotional empathy (i.e., the tendency to share and react affectively to 
another’s emotional experience). However, the present investigation utilizing the MET 
represents the first time that empathic responding to negative versus positive mental states has 
been evaluated in patients with FTD. Further, we assessed emotional empathy in this patient 
population using a performance-based measure, as opposed to caregiver or clinician reports. 
Patients with bvFTD presented with a deficit in inferring both negative and positive mental 
states, indicative of a global deficit in cognitive empathy. Deficient affective sharing for negative 
experiences was also demonstrated in patients with bvFTD, by way of lower levels of shared 
emotional experience, less negative emotional reactions, and decreased arousal to negative social 
stimuli. Patients with bvFTD also reported less negative emotional reactions to negative context-
only stimuli relative to healthy controls. Strikingly, there was no evidence of impairment in 
emotional empathy for positive social stimuli or emotional responsivity for positive context-only 
stimuli in patients with bvFTD. They expressed similar levels of shared feeling intensity, 
valence, and arousal for positive social stimuli in comparison to controls, and provided similar 
valence and arousal ratings for positive context-only stimuli. 
As predicted, patients with bvFTD demonstrated a deficit in cognitive empathy accuracy 
in comparison to healthy controls. This impairment has been well established in the literature 
using theory of mind tasks (for reviews see Henry, Phillips, & von Hippel, 2014; Poletti, Enrici, 
& Adenzato, 2012) and the Perspective Taking subscale of the IRI (Eslinger et al., 2011; Rankin 
et al., 2006; Rankin et al., 2005). Though patients with bvFTD have shown deficits on theory of 
mind tasks that include both negative and positive stimuli such as the Reading the Mind in the 
Eyes task (Couto et al., 2013; Gregory et al., 2002; Torralva et al., 2007), their reported 
performance has not been parsed apart by valence. The MET includes a performance-based 
measure of cognitive empathy, similar to a theory of mind task, but it is scored in a manner that 
distinguishes between responses to negative versus positive mental states. Patients with bvFTD 
were significantly worse at inferring the mental states of people (i.e., exhibited lower cognitive 
empathy accuracy) for both the negative and positive images. Thus, we provide evidence that 
75 
 
 
patients with bvFTD demonstrate a cognitive empathy impairment for both negative and positive 
states. Nevertheless, patients with bvFTD appeared to exhibit a more pronounced deficit for 
inferring negative compared to positive mental states, as anticipated. Although controls showed a 
similar pattern, the significant interaction was driven by a greater differential effect of valence in 
the patient group relative to the control group. However, this interaction should be interpreted 
with caution. Because the controls performed at close to ceiling for positive stimuli, the 
differential effect for this group may have been constrained by the limited range of scores 
available. As well, it is possible that this disparity could be due to increased difficulty of 
recognizing negative mental states, as healthy individuals have more difficulty recognizing 
negative emotions (Russell, 1994). Regardless, a more pronounced deficit for inferring negative 
mental states in patients with bvFTD is of interest because there is some evidence of a selective 
impairment in recognizing negative, but not positive, emotional expressions in patients with 
bvFTD (Fernandez-Duque & Black, 2005; Kipps, Mioshi, et al., 2009; Kumfor et al., 2011; 
Lavenu et al., 1999; Lough et al., 2006). Further, patients with bvFTD were found to provide 
lower intensity ratings for the mental states portrayed in negative images relative to controls 
(cognitive empathy intensity), while intensity ratings did not differ between groups for positive 
mental states. Thus, the present results indicated that patients with bvFTD have a global 
cognitive empathy deficit, which may be more pronounced for negative stimuli.  
 Patients with bvFTD also exhibited an emotional empathy impairment relative to 
controls, as reflected by indices of affective sharing, selectively for negative experiences. 
Though this has been subjectively demonstrated by way of caregiver ratings on the Empathic 
Concern subscale of the IRI (Eslinger et al., 2011; Lough et al., 2006; Rankin et al., 2006) and 
case descriptions (Lough et al., 2001; Snowden et al., 2001; Thibodeau & Miller, 2013), far less 
work has been done examining deficiencies in emotional empathic responses using a behavioural 
measure in this patient population. However, it should be noted that aspects of emotional 
reactivity have been investigated in patients with bvFTD in response to emotion-eliciting videos. 
Our findings fall in line with demonstrations of diminished facial displays of emotion, subjective 
emotional experience, and physiological responding while viewing a disgust-eliciting film in 
patients with bvFTD relative to controls (Eckart et al., 2012). Very recently, patients with bvFTD 
have been found to rate negative emotional stimuli containing people as less negative than 
matched controls, whereas their valence ratings of positive and neutral stimuli did not differ 
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significantly from controls (St. Jacques et al., 2014). We have replicated these valence-specific 
findings, and also provide further insight into the influence of a general deficit in emotional 
encoding through the inclusion of both stimuli containing people and context-only stimuli. 
It has been suggested that emotional empathy not only involves the shared experience of 
emotional states, but also the translation and comprehension of emotional expressions (Blair, 
2013). Indeed, brain regions implicated in processing and/or recognizing emotional expressions 
are also thought to be involved in emotional empathy (Blair, 2005). The more pronounced deficit 
in bvFTD patients’ empathic abilities for negative mental states observed on the MET thus is 
consistent with  reports of impaired recognition of negative emotional expressions, but intact 
recognition of happy faces, in patients with bvFTD (Fernandez-Duque & Black, 2005; Kipps, 
Mioshi, et al., 2009; Kumfor et al., 2011; Lavenu et al., 1999; Lough et al., 2006; but see also 
Diehl-Schmid et al., 2007; Keane, Calder, Hodges, & Young, 2002; Snowden et al., 2008). It 
should be noted that increased difficulty recognizing negative emotions is also apparent in the 
healthy population (Russell, 1994), such that task difficulty may contribute to our observed 
effects. However, preservation of happiness recognition has been demonstrated in patients with 
bvFTD even when using morphed facial expressions to increase task sensitivity (Lough et al., 
2006). Furthermore, in the context of the current study, unlike facial expression recognition 
paradigms where there is a correct and incorrect answer, it is more difficult to explain a 
difference in levels of shared emotional experience or arousal with respect to a task difficulty 
effect. These are subjective ratings of emotional reactions and experience, and though some 
responses may be conventionally more appropriate, none are strictly incorrect. These deficits in 
emotion recognition and affective sharing for negative stimuli may be the result of greater 
atrophy in regions involved in the processing and recognition of negative emotions (Kumfor & 
Piguet, 2012). More specifically, negative emotions such as fear and disgust appear to have more 
focal representation in the brain, such that lesions to specific regions can result in relatively 
selective recognition deficits for these expressions (Adolphs et al., 1999; Calder, Keane, Manes, 
Antoun, & Young, 2000; Hennenlotter et al., 2004). Abnormalities in similar regions, including 
the amygdala and insula, have also been associated with deficient processing of negative 
emotional expressions in patients with bvFTD (Couto et al., 2013; Kipps, Nestor, Acosta-
Cabronero, Arnold, & Hodges, 2009; Kumfor, Irish, Hodges, & Piguet, 2013; Moll et al., 2011; 
Virani, Jesso, Kertesz, Mitchell, & Finger, 2013). In contrast, happiness recognition tends to be 
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well-preserved across patient populations, including those with lesions and developmental 
disorders. This suggests that the processing and recognition of happy expressions may be 
represented more diffusely (Breiter et al., 1996; Fusar-Poli et al., 2009; O'Doherty et al., 2003; 
Phillips et al., 1998).  
The MET includes both images with a context alone and images with emotional 
individuals embedded in the same context. Thus, it allows for the discrimination between 
affective responses to emotionally charged context-only, non-social and social stimuli (Dziobek 
et al., 2008). In addition to the empathy deficits observed for social stimuli, patients showed 
decreased emotional responsivity for negative, but not positive, non-social stimuli. Notably, 
these findings are not indicative of a positivity bias, as patients did not rate positive stimuli more 
positively than controls, and neither of the groups performed at ceiling. It could be argued that 
the MET context-only stimuli include images with an implied social component (e.g., a crashed 
car, an empty grave). Thus, interpreting these images as negative may be facilitated by an 
understanding of the social ramifications of these contexts. However, at least one other study has 
demonstrated reduced responding in patients with FTD to aversive non-social stimuli (i.e., bursts 
of white noise; Hoefer et al., 2008). Further, our covariate analyses controlling for context-only 
valence ratings indicate that deficient encoding of negative contextual cues may contribute to the 
emotional empathy deficits observed in patients with bvFTD. Impaired performance on affective 
sharing measures for negative stimuli, but not empathic concern, in patients with bvFTD does 
suggest that impaired processing of negative contextual cues is not solely responsible for the 
demonstrated emotional empathy deficits. In relation to this, it is interesting to note the divergent 
effects obtained for empathic concern versus affective sharing measures. Patients with bvFTD 
did not show significant differences in their endorsements of empathic concern (i.e., level of 
concern for people in negative images, or level of happiness for people in positive images), but 
exhibited impaired affective sharing for negative experiences (e.g., reduced shared feelings) 
relative to controls. Affective sharing measures could be considered indirect or implicit measures 
of emotional empathy, as they query about emotional responses self-referentially, without 
actually referring to the people in the image (Dziobek et al., 2008). Alternatively, empathic 
concern is a more direct or explicit index of emotional empathy in that it blatantly asks how the 
participant is feeling for the people in the picture. In this way, affective sharing may be a more 
sensitive index of the difficulties faced by patients with bvFTD, as daily social interactions tend 
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not to be structured or guided. Similarly, patients may be better able to discern what a socially 
appropriate response is for the more explicit empathic concern index than for the affective 
sharing measures of emotional empathy. Additionally, affective sharing likely better captures 
emotional contagion, providing insight into the specific mechanisms that could be responsible 
for emotional empathy deficits in bvFTD. Deficient responding to these affective sharing indices 
for negative stimuli therefore supports the notion that the spontaneous expression of empathy is 
blunted in bvFTD.  
Whether cognitive functioning was related to performance on the MET in patients with 
bvFTD is also of interest. Correlational analyses between ACE-R total scores and MET measures 
revealed a positive association between cognitive empathy accuracy for positive stimuli and 
ACE-R scores, as well as marginally significant positive correlations between ACE-R scores and 
affective sharing measures (intensity, valence, and arousal) for negative stimuli. The correlations 
with ACE-R total scores broadly coincide with results from a previous study demonstrating an 
association between cognitive functioning and measures of both cognitive and emotional 
empathy in patients with bvFTD (Eslinger et al., 2011). Similarly, positive correlations have been 
identified between measures of theory of mind and empathy, and executive resources in patients 
with FTD with social and executive impairments (Eslinger et al., 2007). Deficits in observable 
social behaviour in patients with bvFTD have also been found to be associated with measures of 
executive functioning (Mendez et al., 2014). Accordingly, it has been proposed that deficits in 
cognitive and social functioning in patients with bvFTD may be critically linked, and that the 
deterioration of both social knowledge and executive resources contribute to empathy 
impairments (Eslinger et al., 2011; Eslinger et al., 2007). Executive dysfunction and behavioural 
abnormalities in patients with FTD have been correlated with diminished activity in partially 
overlapping brain areas, including regions implicated in theory of mind or cognitive empathy 
(Raczka et al., 2010). This may help to explain why some behavioural deficits are linked to 
executive functioning in FTD. The present results indicate a relationship between cognitive 
functioning and MET performance, though the lack of strength and specificity of correlations 
does not suggest that cognitive demand is solely responsible for the observed deficits.     
As mentioned, the caregiver version of the IRI has been utilized in many previous 
investigations to evaluate both cognitive and emotional empathy in bvFTD. Because the MET 
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also evaluates aspects of cognitive and emotional empathy, and has been validated using the IRI 
in healthy individuals (Dziobek et al., 2008; Hysek et al., 2013), we expected to find a 
correlation between measures on the MET and the related IRI subscales. Though the measures of 
cognitive empathy on these metrics were not significantly associated, the MET and IRI measures 
of emotional empathy were found to be correlated within the bvFTD group. Thus, we provide 
further construct validation in FTD for measures of emotional empathy on the MET, consistent 
with the relationships that have been demonstrated between the MET and the IRI in the healthy 
population (Dziobek et al., 2008). The lack of a correlation for cognitive empathy as assessed on 
the MET and Perspective Taking on the IRI is in line with prior results in healthy adults which 
did not demonstrate a significant correlation between these two scales (Dziobek et al., 2008; 
Hysek et al., 2013). It should also be noted that though IRI data was not collected for controls, 
comparisons between ratings for our bvFTD and control groups could have provided insight into 
the consistency of deficits demonstrated in bvFTD. Collecting IRI data for control participants 
might have also served to strengthen the MET and IRI correlations.  
This lack of an association for cognitive empathy measures on the MET and IRI, as well 
as the absence of stronger correlations between the emotional empathy scales, likely reflects the 
differential behaviours captured by the two measures. The caregivers complete the IRI based on 
their observations of the naturalistic everyday behaviour of the patient, while patient 
performance may be optimized for behavioural measures in the clinic where motivation is often 
high and distractors are limited (Mioshi, Kipps, & Hodges, 2009). Further, the components of 
cognitive and/or emotional empathy assessed via the items on the IRI likely differ from the 
MET. For example, items on the Perspective Taking subscale of the IRI focus on the history of 
attempts to consider another’s mental state, such as ‘I sometimes try to understand my friends 
better by imagining how things look from their perspective’, and the majority of them contain the 
word ‘try’ (Davis, 1980). In contrast, the cognitive empathy accuracy measure on the MET 
requires the participant to actively infer the mental states of other individuals (i.e., explicit 
mental state inference performance). While these both likely contribute to the empathic 
behaviour exhibited by an individual, the lack of correlation may reflect the distinct components 
indexed by each measure. Our results indicate that treatment studies or interventions targeting 
empathy and related behaviours would benefit from inclusion of both the MET and IRI, as 
performance-based measures may be more sensitive to changes over time in emotional capacity. 
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While the IRI captures functionally relevant changes in empathy that directly impact the 
caregiver-patient dyad in FTD, some behavioural questionnaire measures show improvement in 
scores despite disease progression (Chow et al., 2012; Knopman et al., 2008). In such a situation, 
complimentary performance-based measures may help to clarify the basis for such behavioural 
changes. Based on our findings, emotional empathy as assessed by the MET affective sharing 
intensity ratings may serve as the best outcome measure of performance-based emotional 
empathy in patients with bvFTD.  
Importantly, the MET is a newer measure of empathic performance which has not been 
utilized previously in patients with FTD. As such, further use of the MET in independent cohorts 
is necessary to replicate findings and determine the sensitivity and specificity of its measures of 
cognitive and emotional empathy. Notably, though performance-based measures like the MET 
arguably allow for a more direct assessment of empathic abilities, they are still susceptible to the 
influence of bias such as the potential conforming of answers to socially desirable responses. 
Thus, it is possible that individuals could use cognitive strategies to provide these ratings. Future 
studies would benefit from inclusion of physiological measures during the task to confirm that 
emotional empathy ratings reflect genuine changes in affective responding. Lastly, it is important 
to keep in mind that though evidence supports the existence of dissociable cognitive and 
emotional facets of empathy, it is likely that these aspects work together in daily life and both 
contribute to typical empathic experience (Shamay-Tsoory, 2011).    
 In summary, the use of the MET (Dziobek et al., 2008) to index cognitive and emotional 
empathy in patients with bvFTD uniquely allowed for the discrimination of empathic responses 
to negative versus positive stimuli, as well as the behavioural assessment of emotional empathy. 
Overall, using a performance-based measure we demonstrate deficits in both cognitive and 
emotional empathy in patients with bvFTD, particularly for negative social stimuli, as well as 
diminished emotional responses to negative non-social stimuli. A generalized deficit in 
emotional responding to negative stimuli may therefore contribute to the emotional empathy 
impairments associated with bvFTD, though further research regarding emotional reactivity to 
non-social stimuli in patients with bvFTD is necessary to elucidate this. The present work may 
serve to highlight potential treatment targets and a means to assess the impact of novel therapies 
on social and emotional impairment in bvFTD. Specifically, the MET may prove useful as a 
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performance-based measure to index aspects of cognitive and emotional empathy in patients with 
bvFTD. 
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3 Distinguishing the Relationship Between Different Aspects of 
Empathic Responding as a Function of Psychopathic, Autistic, and 
Anxious Traits2 
Abstract 
Although deficits in cognitive and emotional empathy are associated with specific 
developmental and neurological disorders, such as autism and psychopathy, little is known about 
the relationship between individual differences in psychopathic, autistic, and anxious traits, and 
behavioural measures of cognitive empathy, empathic concern, and affective sharing. 
Particularly, investigations of empathy rarely consider anxiety, or distinguish between different 
components of emotional empathy. Presently, healthy adults completed trait questionnaire 
measures and the Multifaceted Empathy Test, a performance-based task tapping cognitive 
empathy and multiple aspects of emotional empathy elicited by emotionally-charged realistic 
images. Heightened coldhearted psychopathic traits were associated with reduced empathic 
concern and affective sharing in response to affective images, and were unrelated to cognitive 
empathy performance. As expected, autistic traits were not associated with emotional empathy. 
Increased trait anxiety was linked to greater affective sharing, and arousal in particular, but this 
was driven by arousal elicited by contextual rather than social aspects of the stimuli. Thus, while 
coldhearted psychopathic traits appear to disrupt empathic processes thought to motivate 
altruistic behaviours, trait anxiety may influence subjective affective experience without 
instilling greater emotional empathy.
                                                          
2 Chapter 3 is published as: Oliver, L. D., Neufeld, R. W. J., Dziobek, I., & Mitchell, D. G. V. 
(2016). Distinguishing the relationship between different aspects of empathic responding as a 
function of psychopathic, autistic, and anxious traits. Personality and Individual Differences, 99, 
81-88. 
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3.1 Introduction 
Empathy, the comprehension, identification, and/or vicarious experience elicited by 
another individual’s state, plays a critical role in human social interaction. Accordingly, impaired 
empathy is a key feature of many debilitating developmental, neurological, and personality 
disorders. Empathy is largely considered to be a multidimensional construct that includes both 
cognitive and emotional facets (Blair, 2005; Shamay-Tsoory, 2011). Although the purported 
number of distinct facets of empathy varies, it has been proposed that empathy is comprised of 
cognitive empathy, empathic concern, and affective sharing components (Bernhardt & Singer, 
2012; Decety & Cowell, 2014; Preston & de Waal, 2002; Zaki & Ochsner, 2012). Cognitive 
empathy, often used interchangeably with theory of mind (Blair, 2005; Lawrence, Shaw, Baker, 
Baron-Cohen, & David, 2004), refers to the ability to adopt another individual’s perspective, and 
thereby infer their mental state. Whereas empathic concern refers to the motivation to care for 
another’s welfare, affective sharing relates to the capacity to share the emotional experience of 
another person. Thus, affective sharing involves an isomorphic emotional response to another 
individual, while empathic concern may not. Notably, the dissociation of cognitive and 
emotional empathy is supported by behavioural (Lockwood, Bird, Bridge, & Viding, 2013), 
lesion (Shamay-Tsoory, Aharon-Peretz, & Perry, 2009), and functional imaging (Fan, Duncan, 
de Greck, & Northoff, 2011) studies, but less is known about the dissociability of empathic 
concern versus affective sharing. Indeed, most investigations do not distinguish between these 
two putative components, instead using “emotional empathy” to refer to either.  
Importantly, distinct facets of empathy seem to be differentially affected in particular 
disorders. Specifically, psychopathic tendencies are typically linked to impaired emotional 
empathy, but intact cognitive empathy. In contrast, autism spectrum disorder has been associated 
with deficits in cognitive but not emotional empathy in some studies. This double dissociation 
has been demonstrated behaviourally in youths with autism spectrum disorder versus 
psychopathic tendencies (Jones, Happe, Gilbert, Burnett, & Viding, 2010; Schwenck et al., 
2012). Further, evidence for deficient emotional empathy in adults with psychopathy and youths 
with psychopathic tendencies has been inferred from demonstrations of impaired emotion 
recognition (Fairchild, Van Goozen, Calder, Stollery, & Goodyer, 2009; Hastings, Tangney, & 
Stuewig, 2008), dampened electrodermal responding to distress cues (Blair, 1999; Blair, Jones, 
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Clark, & Smith, 1997), and abnormal BOLD response to emotional stimuli in affect-related brain 
regions (Decety, Skelly, Yoder, & Kiehl, 2014; Marsh et al., 2008). Cognitive empathy 
impairments in individuals with autism spectrum disorder have been demonstrated using false 
belief paradigms (Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985) and mental state inference tasks (Abell, 
Happe, & Frith, 2000; Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, Raste, & Plumb, 2001; Happe, 1994). In 
addition, adults with autism show a cognitive empathy deficit but intact empathic concern and 
affective arousal on the Multifaceted Empathy Test (Dziobek et al., 2008). However, it should be 
noted that there have been demonstrations of decreased emotional empathy scores on 
questionnaire measures in patients with autism spectrum disorder compared to healthy controls 
(Grove, Baillie, Allison, Baron-Cohen, & Hoekstra, 2014; Mathersul, McDonald, & Rushby, 
2013b, 2013d; Shamay-Tsoory, Tomer, Yaniv, & Aharon-Peretz, 2002), as well as atypical 
autonomic arousal in response to face stimuli (Mathersul, McDonald, & Rushby, 2013a, 2013c). 
With regard to emotional empathy, it is presently unclear whether psychopathic traits are 
differentially related to empathic concern versus affective sharing. This is a particularly 
important question given that “empathy” is used to refer to multiple phenomena, which may 
differentially relate to behavioural outcomes. For example, evidence suggests that empathic 
concern, but not personal distress, gives rise to altruistic motivation (Batson, Fultz, & 
Schoenrade, 1987). As well, these phenomena may vary independently in some disorders. For 
example, frontotemporal dementia, which features empathy deficits, has been associated with 
impaired affective sharing but intact empathic concern (Oliver et al., 2015). 
In the general population, evidence suggests that psychopathic (Edens, Marcus, 
Lilienfeld, & Poythress, 2006; Hare & Neumann, 2008) and autistic (Constantino & Todd, 2003; 
Posserud, Lundervold, & Gillberg, 2006) traits are continuously distributed. However, little is 
known about how individual differences in these traits map onto facets of empathic performance. 
There is some evidence that affective-interpersonal psychopathic trait levels are negatively 
correlated with questionnaire measures of empathic concern and feelings of positivity or 
negativity in response to emotional faces and stories (Seara-Cardoso, Dolberg, Neumann, Roiser, 
& Viding, 2013; Seara-Cardoso, Neumann, Roiser, McCrory, & Viding, 2012). Other work has 
shown that autistic trait levels in neurotypical adults are inversely associated with performance 
on theory of mind tasks (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, et al., 2001; Miu, Pana, & Avram, 
2012; Voracek & Dressler, 2006). Bridging these findings, Lockwood et al. (2013) observed 
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distinct relationships between high psychopathic traits and reduced valence ratings in response to 
emotional faces, and high autistic traits and diminished theory of mind performance in a 
community sample. However, this study did not include a measure of empathic concern. Thus, 
the relationship between psychopathic versus autistic traits with dissociable empathy indices has 
rarely been examined in healthy individuals. 
 Like psychopathic and autistic traits, trait anxiety varies continuously in the general 
population (Spielberger, Gorsuch, Lushene, Vagg, & Jacobs, 1983), and may have important 
implications for empathic responding. For example, arousal is widely considered to be a 
component of empathic responding (Decety, Norman, Berntson, & Cacioppo, 2012; Decety, 
Smith, Norman, & Halpern, 2014), and increased autonomic arousal to emotional stimuli has 
been observed in individuals with higher levels of emotional empathy (de Sousa et al., 2010; 
Mehrabian, Young, & Sato, 1988). Indeed, autonomic arousal is sometimes assumed to be an 
index of emotional empathy (Blair et al., 1997). Further, opposing patterns of amygdala 
activation have been associated with trait anxiety (Stein, Simmons, Feinstein, & Paulus, 2007) 
and emotional empathy (Seara-Cardoso, Sebastian, Viding, & Roiser, 2015) levels, suggesting 
that there may be overlap in the neurocognitive substrates driving these phenomena. However, 
despite the theoretical influence of trait anxiety on empathy, the inclusion of both anxiety and 
empathy indices is rare, and little work has focused on elucidating their association.  
 The present study had two main objectives. The first was to determine whether 
coldhearted psychopathic and autistic traits in a community sample are differentially associated 
with cognitive empathy, empathic concern, and affective sharing performance. Coldhearted 
psychopathic traits reflect the core emotional features of psychopathy, including a void of 
empathy and callousness towards others (Lilienfeld & Widows, 2005). Coldheartedness is also 
correlated with other emotional empathy indices (Fecteau, Pascual-Leone, & Théoret, 2008; 
Sandoval, Hancock, Poythress, Edens, & Lilienfeld, 2000), and Factor 1 of the Hare 
Psychopathy Checklist – Revised (Poythress, Edens, & Lilienfeld, 1998). Thus, based on the 
existing literature, coldheartedness was expected to be inversely associated with emotional 
empathy ratings, including measures of both empathic concern and affective sharing, but not 
cognitive empathy accuracy. Conversely, we hypothesized that autistic trait levels would be 
negatively correlated with cognitive empathy accuracy, but not emotional empathy ratings. The 
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second key objective of this study was to elucidate the relationship between trait anxiety and 
empathy. Unlike coldhearted psychopathic traits, we hypothesized that anxiety would have a 
positive association with emotional empathy, but that the relationship would be less generalized. 
Specifically, we predicted that trait anxiety levels would be positively associated with measures 
of affective sharing, and arousal ratings in particular. This marks the first time that performance-
based measures of cognitive empathy, empathic concern, and affective sharing have been 
indexed in relation to individual differences in psychopathic, autistic, and anxious traits in the 
same community sample.    
 
3.2 Methods 
 
3.2.1 Participants 
Ninety healthy individuals (54 females, 36 males) with a mean age of 21.7 years (range 
18-36, SD = 3.2) took part in the experiment. As determined by screening, all participants were 
in good physical health and had no history of neurological disease, psychiatric problems, or head 
injury. Participants also had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and none reported colour 
blindness. Flyers were used for participant recruitment. All participants granted informed 
consent and were compensated $30 for their participation. This study was approved by the 
Health Sciences Research Ethics Board at the institution of research.  
The present study was conducted alongside another distinct experiment. The order of task 
completion was randomized across participants. All participants completed the pertinent 
measures for this investigation.  
 
3.2.2 Measures 
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3.2.2.1 Multifaceted Empathy Test (MET; Dziobek et al., 2008; Figure 3.1)  
The MET is a performance-based multi-dimensional measure of empathy. During the 
MET, participants answer questions which dissociably tap cognitive and emotional empathy in 
response to naturalistic emotionally-charged images. Each question was presented on a screen 
that also displayed the relevant image, and slide presentation was controlled by the researcher. 
All ratings were provided using a 9-point Likert scale with pictograms from the Self-Assessment 
Manikin (Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 1997). Responses were voiced aloud and recorded by the 
researcher. Task completion required approximately 30 minutes. The MET consists of 23 pairs of 
realistic positive and negative images: a context-only picture, and a social picture with emotional 
individuals in this context. For each context-only picture, participants are asked to provide a 
valence rating and an arousal rating. For the social stimuli, cognitive empathy is indexed by 
asking participants how the person or people in the picture are feeling from four possible 
choices. Participants then provide an intensity rating for the emotional experience of the person 
or people in the picture. Two aspects of emotional empathy are also evaluated, corresponding to 
empathic concern and affective sharing (also known as emotional mirroring). Empathic concern 
is measured by asking how happy participants are for people in positive images or their level of 
concern for people in negative images. Finally, affective sharing is indexed via an intensity rating 
to indicate the degree of shared emotional experience with people in the pictures, a valence 
rating, and an arousal rating. Table 3.1 includes a summary of the MET measures of interest. We 
opted not to include the cognitive empathy intensity measure in our data analysis because it may 
share features of both cognitive and emotional empathy. 
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Figure 3.1 The Multifaceted Empathy Test 
Example taken from the Multifaceted Empathy Test (MET; Dziobek et al., 2008) of a context-
only image with the valence rating and response scale (left), and the corresponding social image 
with the empathic concern rating and response scale (right). 
 
 
Measure Question Response
Cognitive Empathy How do you think this person is feeling? Choice from 4 possible mental states
Emotional Empathy
   Empathic Concern How concerned are you for this person? (negative stimuli)         
How happy are you for this person? (positive stimuli)
1 = not at all, 9 = completely
   Affective Sharing
      Intensity When looking at this picture, does it make YOU feel _____ 1 = not at all, 9 = completely
at all? If so, how _____ do you feel?
      Valence How positive or negative does this picture make you feel? 1 = most positive, 9 = most negative
      Arousal How calm or aroused does this picture make you feel? 1 = most calm, 9 = most aroused
Context-Only
   Valence How positive or negative does this picture make you feel? 1 = most positive, 9 = most negative
   Arousal How calm or aroused does this picture make you feel? 1 = most calm, 9 = most aroused
Table 3.1: MET measures of interest 
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3.2.2.2 Psychopathic Personality Inventory - Revised (PPI-R; Lilienfeld & Widows, 2005) 
The PPI-R is a 154-item self-report questionnaire tapping global psychopathy and its 
component traits. It is comprised of eight subscales, including Coldheartedness, which 
encompasses the fundamental affective features of psychopathy, such as callousness and a lack 
of empathy, loyalty, and guilt. Responses are made on a 4-point scale ranging from “False” to 
“True”, including items such as “I look out for myself before I look out for anyone else”. 
  
3.2.2.3 Autism Spectrum Quotient (AQ; Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Skinner, Martin, & Clubley, 
2001)  
The AQ assesses autistic traits in healthy adults. The AQ is a 50-item self-report measure 
evaluating social skills, attention to detail, attention switching, imagination, and communication. 
Questions, such as “I find it difficult to imagine what it would be like to be someone else”, are 
answered on a 4-point scale ranging from “Definitely Agree” to “Definitely Disagree”. 
    
3.2.2.4 State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI; Spielberger et al., 1983)  
The STAI is a self-report measure including 20 items assessing trait anxiety, which refers 
to anxiety as a general state and captures an enduring disposition, such as “I worry too much 
over something that really doesn’t matter”. Responses are made on a 4-point scale ranging from 
“Not At All” to “Very Much So”. 
 
3.2.3 Data analysis  
According to inspection of normal Q-Q plots and the Shapiro-Wilk Test, Coldheartedness 
T scores, p < .001, Trait Anxiety Inventory scores, p < .01, Cognitive Empathy accuracy, p < 
.001, and Empathic Concern ratings, p < .01, deviated significantly from normality. Accordingly, 
positively skewed distributions (Coldheartedness and trait anxiety) were log transformed and 
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negatively skewed distributions (Cognitive Empathy and Empathic Concern) were reverse-
scored then log transformed. These transformed variables were utilized in subsequent analyses as 
they did not deviate significantly from normality, p > .1, with the exception of Cognitive 
Empathy accuracy, which remained positively skewed due to most participants performing at 
ceiling. PPI-R data from two participants were also excluded because their scores were within 
the ‘highly atypical’ range on both of the embedded Inconsistent Responding scales, indicating 
that their responses were inconsistent and invalid according to PPI-R guidelines (Lilienfeld & 
Widows, 2005). 
Bivariate correlation analyses were first conducted to investigate the zero-order 
associations between measures of cognitive and emotional empathy on the MET, and 
coldheartedness, autistic trait, and trait anxiety levels.  
In order to elucidate the relationship between the set of trait questionnaire measures and 
the set of behavioural empathy measures, a canonical correlation analysis was also conducted. 
Canonical correlation produces maximized correlations between a weighted sum (linear 
combination) of predictor variables and a weighted sum of criterion variables. It is designed to 
draw out latent relations between the two theoretically-related sets of variables [the topic and 
related analyses, notably as applied to personality research, are reviewed in Neufeld (1977) and 
Neufeld and Gardner (1990)]. Canonical correlation reduces the concatenated array of bivariate 
correlations to a set of canonical functions expressing the main sources of overlap between the 
measurement sets. Each canonical function is accompanied by a reduncancy index, which 
indicates the average predictability of the individual measures in one set from an optimal 
combination of those in the other set.   
The predictor variables included in the analysis were Coldheartedness, AQ, and trait 
anxiety scores, and the criterion variables included each of the MET measures. No multivariate 
outliers were apparent in the predictor variable set (Mahalanobis distance values less than the 
critical chi-square value of 16.27, df = 3, p < .001) or the criterion variable set (Mahalanobis 
distance values less than the critical chi-square value of 24.32, df = 7, p < .001). 
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Lastly, partial correlation analyses were implemented to examine the relationship 
between emotional empathy indices and levels of personality traits, while controlling for arousal 
generated by context, or non-social aspects of the images. 
 
3.3 Results 
 
3.3.1 Bivariate correlation analysis 
The zero-order correlations among all the variables of interest are reported in Table 3.2. 
Importantly, a wide range of scores was found on the personality trait measures, including 
psychopathic trait scores (PPI-R total scores: M = 58th percentile, range 1st-99th percentile; 
Coldheartedness scores: M = 53rd percentile, range 3rd-99th percentile), autistic trait levels (M = 
16, range 2-32, Max 50), and trait anxiety levels (M = 37, range 22-60, Max 80). Of particular 
interest, Coldheartedness was found to be moderately negatively correlated with Empathic 
Concern, somewhat less strongly with Affective Sharing Valence and Affective Sharing 
Intensity, and more weakly with Context-Only Valence ratings. Interestingly, Coldheartedness 
was not correlated with arousal ratings. No significant relationships were identified between 
autistic traits and any of the performance-based empathy measures, including Cognitive 
Empathy; although, autistic trait levels were positively associated with trait anxiety levels. 
Notably, there was no significant relationship between trait anxiety and Coldheartedness. 
However, trait anxiety was positively correlated with Affective Sharing Arousal and Context-
Only Arousal. It was not significantly associated with Empathic Concern, but there was a 
marginal positive association with Affective Sharing Intensity, p = .061, and Context-Only 
Valence ratings, p = .054.  
Steiger’s Z-tests for dependent correlations were also performed to determine whether 
Coldheartedness was differentially associated with Empathic Concern versus Cognitive 
Empathy, and whether Coldheartedness and trait anxiety were differentially related to the 
measures of empathic concern and arousal towards social stimuli. These revealed that 
Coldheartedness was significantly more weakly correlated with Cognitive Empathy than with 
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Empathic Concern, Z = -3.13, p < .01. Additionally, Coldheartedness was significantly more 
strongly associated with Empathic Concern than trait anxiety was, Z = -3.82, p < .001. However, 
the correlations between Coldheartedness versus trait anxiety and Affective Sharing Arousal 
were not found to be significantly different, Z = -1.61, p = .1.  
  
Table 3.2: Bivariate correlations between variables of interest 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 Coldheartedness -- -.044 -.115 -.060 -.498*** -.322** -.370*** .022 -.216* .081
2 Autism Spectrum Quotient -- .491** .077 -.092 -.057 .102 .083 .061 .124
3 Trait Anxiety Inventory -- .098 .067 .198 .124 .275** .204 .307**
4 MET Cognitive Empathy -- -.010 -.046 -.003 -.060 -.031 -.089
5 MET Empathic Concern -- .798*** .679*** .507*** .429*** .364***
6 MET Affective Sharing Intensity -- .689*** .662*** .532*** .544***
7 MET Affective Sharing Valence -- .455*** .771*** .369***
8 MET Affective Sharing Arousal -- .380*** .873***
9 MET Context-Only Valence -- .446***
10 MET Context-Only Arousal --
* p < .05   ** p < .01   *** p < .001  
 
3.3.2 Canonical correlation analysis 
A canonical correlation analysis was also conducted in order to determine the relationship 
between the questionnaire trait measures as a weighted whole (predictor variables) and the MET 
behavioural empathy measures (criterion variables). Two significant canonical functions 
emerged between the sets of variables, Rc = .627, Wilk’s λ = .467, p < .001, Rc = .407, Wilk’s λ 
= .769, p < .05. See Table 3.3 for details. The main predictor loading onto the first canonical 
function was Coldheartedness (.947). The main criterion variables loading onto this canonical 
function were Empathic Concern (-.780), Affective Sharing Intensity (-.462), and Affective 
Sharing Valence (-.513). The redundancy indices for the predictor and criterion variables were 
.128 and .069, respectively. This canonical function demonstrates a link between high 
coldheartedness levels and lower levels of empathic concern, reduced shared feeling intensity, 
and diminished feelings of negativity or positivity in response to social images. Notably, greater 
Coldheartedness was specifically linked to ratings of the social stimuli, as opposed to the 
context-only images. 
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The main predictor loading onto the second canonical function was trait anxiety (.702). 
The main criterion variables loading onto this function were Affective Sharing Intensity (.632), 
Affective Sharing Arousal (.558), and Context-Only Arousal (.565). To a lesser degree, 
Empathic Concern (.349) and Context-Only Valence (.393) also loaded onto the second 
canonical function. The redundancy indices for the predictor and criterion variables were .032 
and .031, respectively. This function illustrates a strong relationship between high trait anxiety 
and increased levels of arousal in response to both social and non-social stimuli, and greater 
shared feeling intensity.  
 
Table 3.3: Canonical loadings for questionnaire trait measures and MET behavioural 
empathy measures 
Variables
Predictor Set I II
   Coldheartedness .947 -.061
   Autism Spectrum Quotient .244 -.280
   Trait Anxiety Inventory .155 .702
Criterion Set
   MET Cognitive Empathy -.043 .111
   MET Empathic Concern -.780 .349
   MET Affective Sharing Intensity -.462 .632
   MET Affective Sharing Valence -.513 .065
   MET Affective Sharing Arousal .133 .558
   MET Context-Only Valence -.261 .393
   MET Context-Only Arousal .246 .565
Canonical Loadings (N = 88)
Canonical Function
 
 
3.3.3 Partial correlation analysis 
Partial correlations were also computed to control for the effects of Context-Only Arousal 
on the associations between indices of emotional empathy and levels of personality traits of 
interest. Partial correlations among these variables of interest are reported in Table 3.4. The 
correlations between Coldheartedness and Empathic Concern, Affective Sharing Intensity, and 
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Affective Sharing Valence remained significant, and were more strongly negatively correlated, 
after controlling for Context-Only Arousal. Conversely, controlling for the effect of Context-
Only Arousal rendered the correlation between trait anxiety levels and Affective Sharing Arousal 
non-significant, and the relationship between trait anxiety and Affective Sharing Intensity no 
longer marginally significant.  
 
Table 3.4: Partial correlations controlling for MET Context-Only Arousal between 
variables of interest 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 Coldheartedness -- -.055 -.147 -.568*** -.435*** -.428*** -.098
2 Autism Spectrum Quotient -- .475*** -.136 -.138 .064 -.050
3 Trait Anxiety Inventory -- -.029 .056 .006 .016
4 MET Empathic Concern -- .762*** .636*** .418***
5 MET Affective Sharing Intensity -- .625*** .458***
6 MET Affective Sharing Valence -- .289**
7 MET Affective Sharing Arousal --
* p < .05   ** p < .01   *** p < .001  
 
3.4 Discussion 
Past investigations of clinical populations have revealed an association between 
psychopathy and deficient emotional empathy, as well as between autism spectrum disorder and 
impaired cognitive empathy or theory of mind. However, little is known regarding the 
relationship between behavioural measures of cognitive empathy, empathic concern, and 
affective sharing, and individual differences in psychopathic, autistic, and anxious traits. 
Distinguishing the relationship at a more refined level is of particular interest given that the term 
“empathy” refers to heterogeneous phenomena with different implications for social behaviour. 
The present study helped address this gap in knowledge using behavioural indices of cognitive 
empathy and several components of emotional empathy. In line with expectations, coldhearted 
psychopathic traits were found to be negatively correlated with elicited emotional empathy, 
including empathic concern and affective sharing, and unrelated to cognitive empathy accuracy. 
As predicted, autistic traits were not associated with the levels of empathic concern or affective 
sharing experienced; however, they were also unrelated to cognitive empathy performance. In 
addition, though trait anxiety levels were positively linked to certain aspects of emotional 
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empathy, and arousal in particular, this appeared to be driven by arousal in response to 
contextual elements as opposed to social aspects of the stimuli. Furthermore, there was little 
evidence that trait anxiety was related to empathic concern. In contrast, the social content of the 
images seemed to underlie the inverse relationship between coldheartedness and emotional 
empathy.  
 
3.4.1 Coldhearted psychopathic traits and empathy 
Evidence for an emotional empathy impairment in psychopathy is predominantly inferred 
from potentially ambiguous outcome measures, including recognition deficits (Hastings et al., 
2008), abnormal activation in emotion-related neural regions (Decety, Skelly, et al., 2014), and 
diminished autonomic arousal (Blair et al., 1997) in response to affective stimuli. Questionnaires 
and some performance-based measures of emotional empathy have also been utilized. For 
example, in healthy adults, affective psychopathic traits have been negatively associated with 
questionnaire measures of empathic concern or affective empathy more generally (Mahmut, 
Homewood, & Stevenson, 2008), and ratings on valence-based affective resonance tasks 
(Lockwood et al., 2013; Seara-Cardoso et al., 2013; Seara-Cardoso et al., 2012). However, there 
is a need for more explicit demonstrations of impaired empathic responding, and a clear 
delineation of the aspects of empathy that are affected in individuals with psychopathic 
tendencies. Recently, Lishner et al. (2012) developed a task that covertly assesses empathic 
concern and affective sharing induced by images of basic emotional expressions and an 
emotional story. To date, however, the results using this task have been mixed. One investigation 
did not provide strong evidence for a link between psychopathic trait levels and empathic 
concern or affective sharing in either community or forensic samples (Lishner et al., 2012). 
Notably, the authors identified the relatively low levels of psychopathic traits in these groups in 
comparison to normative samples as a potential caveat. A more recent study reported a negative 
relationship between callous affect and both empathic concern and affective sharing in healthy 
adults (Lishner, Hong, Jiang, Vitacco, & Neumann, 2015). 
The current work expands what is known about the relationship between callous 
psychopathic traits and emotional empathy. Presently, we provide clear evidence of an inverse 
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relationship between coldheartedness and the elicitation of empathic concern and affective 
sharing in healthy adults with a wide range of psychopathic trait scores. Among other important 
outcomes, this suggests that increased coldheartedness may be linked to reduced prosocial 
behaviour, as empathic concern has been found to result in altruistic motivation (Batson, 
Duncan, Ackerman, Buckley, & Birch, 1981; Edele, Dziobek, & Keller, 2013). We also extend 
previous behavioural findings by examining the link between affective psychopathic traits and 
different aspects of affective sharing. In particular, we have demonstrated a negative association 
between coldheartedness and the degree to which participants shared the feelings of people in 
emotional images (Affective Sharing Intensity). Coldheartedness was also inversely related to 
how positive or negative the social images made participants feel (Affective Sharing Valence), 
but unrelated to arousal levels (Affective Sharing Arousal). 
 
3.4.2 Autistic traits and empathy 
In contrast to the demonstrated relationship with coldheartedness, and as predicted, no 
significant relationships were apparent between measures of emotional empathy and autistic trait 
levels. It should be noted that some investigations have found an emotional empathy deficit 
according to self-report measures in individuals with autism spectrum disorder (Mathersul et al., 
2013b, 2013d; Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2002), though our results support no link between autistic 
traits as they vary in a community sample and reduced emotional empathy. Autistic traits were 
unexpectedly also found to be unrelated to cognitive empathy performance. This finding is likely 
attributable to a ceiling effect, given that the mean Cognitive Empathy accuracy in this sample 
was 94%, SD = 0.046. Prior investigations have demonstrated a negative association between 
autistic traits and cognitive empathy performance in community samples (Baron-Cohen, 
Wheelwright, Hill, et al., 2001; Miu et al., 2012; Voracek & Dressler, 2006). Though the MET 
has been utilized to demonstrate a deficit in cognitive but not emotional empathy in adults with 
autism spectrum disorder (Dziobek et al., 2008), this version may not be sensitive enough to 
detect individual differences in cognitive empathy ability in healthy populations. Further, 
Cronbach’s alpha for the cognitive empathy scale in this version of the MET was 0.71 (Dziobek 
et al., 2008), which may make it more difficult to identify relationships with performance on this 
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scale. Despite this, our data regarding autistic traits and emotional empathy remain informative. 
We had a range of autistic trait levels in our sample, and in accordance with demonstrations of 
heightened anxiety in clinical autistic populations (White, Oswald, Ollendick, & Scahill, 2009), 
they were found to be positively associated with trait anxiety levels.  
 
3.4.3 Trait anxiety and empathy 
In addition to indices of coldhearted and autistic traits, this investigation is unique in its 
examination of trait anxiety in relation to empathic responding. This is of particular interest 
because trait anxiety is implicated in arousal and may be linked to empathy on both a conceptual 
and neurocognitive level. For example, high trait anxiety is associated with an increased risk for 
mood and anxiety disorders, and both trait anxiety (Stein et al., 2007) and mood disorders 
(Beesdo et al., 2009; Davis, 1992) have been associated with amygdala hyperactivity. In contrast, 
high callous psychopathic traits (Blair, 2013a; Marsh et al., 2013) and diminished emotional 
empathy are associated with reduced amygdala responsiveness (Seara-Cardoso et al., 2015). 
Thus, neurocognitive systems that are thought to drive empathy overlap with those implicated in 
negative affect, including anxiety. Accordingly, we found that heightened trait anxiety was 
associated with increased affective sharing intensity and heightened arousal ratings in response 
to social stimuli. However, higher trait anxiety was also strongly linked to greater arousal ratings 
in response to context-only stimuli. Interestingly, controlling for context-only arousal ratings 
revealed that these accounted for the apparent relationship between the levels of affective sharing 
elicited by the stimuli and trait anxiety levels. In contrast, context-only arousal did not account 
for the associations between aspects of emotional empathy and coldheartedness. This suggests 
that whereas coldheartedness may be particularly linked to emotional responding to social 
images, trait anxiety is likely related to a more generalized arousal response that is less clearly 
associated with the social aspects of stimuli. Further, the level of empathic concern experienced 
was more strongly correlated with coldheartedness than trait anxiety. These findings have 
significant implications for models of empathy. Specifically, though the neurocognitive systems 
associated with trait anxiety (Stein et al., 2007) and empathy (Seara-Cardoso et al., 2015) may 
have some overlap, our results suggest that they are not identical. As well, there is evidence that 
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empathic concern motivates altruistic behaviour and the desire to relieve the stress of another 
individual in need (Batson et al., 1981; Pavey, Greitemeyer, & Sparks, 2012). In contrast, 
personal distress pertains to self-oriented feelings of anxiety and discomfort, and has been 
associated with motivation to relieve one’s own discomfort and stress as opposed to motivating 
proactive behaviours that relieve another’s distress (Batson, 1991). It is therefore possible that 
decreased coldheartedness levels are more closely linked with prosocial behavioural outcomes in 
response to the affective experience of another individual. In contrast, high trait anxiety may 
have fewer implications for motivating altruistic behaviours.  
 
3.4.4 Limitations and future directions 
Although the MET allows for the assessment of empathy elicited online, responses are 
subjective and therefore susceptible to response bias, such as socially desirable responding. The 
addition of physiological measures could be beneficial for the validation of subjective arousal 
ratings. Though patients with autism spectrum disorder (Gu et al., 2015; Mathersul et al., 2013b) 
and psychopathy (Blair, 2005; Blair et al., 1997) exhibit impaired empathy and often atypical 
autonomic arousal, rarely do investigations include behavioural indices of empathy in 
conjunction with physiological measures. Future studies including both types of measures would 
be helpful for delineating the relationship between arousal and empathic experience.  
Also, the MET Empathic Concern questions are phrased in such a way that it precludes 
participants from expressing sadistic or otherwise contrary responses (happiness for people in 
negative images and concern for those in positive images). This procedure may therefore bias 
responding. However, we would expect that rates of sadistic responding would be very low in 
our population. Indeed, recent work suggests that even in prison populations sadism is only very 
modestly correlated with psychopathy, and the two phenomena should be considered distinct 
constructs (Robertson & Knight, 2014).  
A few issues concerning measurement should be noted, as well. For example, the 
potential ceiling effect and restricted range of cognitive empathy performance limited 
interpretations related to this measure. There is also no gold standard for measuring psychopathy 
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in a community sample. We focused on the Coldheartedness subscale of the PPI-R due to its 
association with the fundamental interpersonal and affective aspects of psychopathy (Poythress 
et al., 1998). Increased coldheartedness in the healthy population has also been linked to 
functional abnormalities in emotion-relevant neural regions in response to affective stimuli (Han, 
Alders, Greening, Neufeld, & Mitchell, 2011; Harenski, Kim, & Hamann, 2009), aberrant 
interpersonal behaviour (Vieira & Marsh, 2014), and reduced awareness of peri-threshold fearful 
expressions (Oliver, Mao, & Mitchell, 2014). However, being that the construct of psychopathy 
includes a constellation of factors, it is important to note that the conclusions drawn relate 
specifically to coldhearted psychopathic traits rather than psychopathy overall. In addition, the 
inclusion of a depression index would have been useful in determining whether depressive 
symptoms influenced empathic responding and the relationship between anxiety and empathy, 
given that depression is highly comorbid with anxiety (Brown, Campbell, Lehman, Grisham, & 
Mancill, 2001) and has been associated with empathy deficits (Schreiter, Pijnenborg, & aan het 
Rot, 2013).  
Lastly, canonical correlation analysis assesses predictor variables in tandem, such that 
delineating their individual effects can be challenging. Presently, the very high respective 
loadings of Coldheartedness and trait anxiety on the two significant canonical functions allowed 
us to draw conclusions about these particular predictor variables in relation to the criterion 
variables. It is important to note that it is the specific combination of the predictor variables that 
is associated with the particular combination of criterion variables for each canonical function. 
Nevertheless, our interpretation of the results is supported by considering the canonical functions 
in combination with the bivariate and partial correlations.         
 
3.5 Conclusions 
The present investigation provides significant insight into how individual differences in 
coldhearted psychopathic traits, autistic traits, and trait anxiety are associated with cognitive 
empathy, empathic concern, and affective sharing in a community sample. Crucially, increased 
coldheartedness was associated with reduced empathic concern and dampened vicarious 
emotional experience across a variety of complex and more basic positive and negative 
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emotional states, a pattern of responding that has been associated with reductions in prosocial 
behaviour. In addition, as predicted, autistic traits were found to be unrelated to emotional 
empathy. A link between heightened trait anxiety and increased affective sharing was also 
identified, but this appeared to be driven by arousal elicited by contextual as opposed to social 
elements of the stimuli. Accordingly, trait anxiety may influence subjective affective experience 
via generalized arousal, but the emotional aspects affected do not appear to be important for 
motivating one to care for another or for increasing shared emotional experience. Due to the 
difficulties associated with extrapolating findings from community to clinical populations (e.g., 
Blair, 2013b), conclusions regarding clinically significant levels of psychopathy, autism, and 
anxiety should be made with caution. Nevertheless, the current findings raise the possibility that 
there could be a disconnect between arousal generated in response to an emotional scene and 
empathic concern. Therefore, any physiological response generated to such scenes should not be 
considered evidence that an individual or group will necessarily exhibit prosocial behaviours in 
response to such situations. Furthermore, the generation of arousal to emotional situations may 
not in itself be a sufficient index of treatment success for disorders featuring abnormalities in 
empathy. Future work in clinical populations including behavioural measures of both empathic 
concern and affective sharing would be beneficial to gain further insight into empathic 
experience and potential treatment targets for these patients.  
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4 The Neurocognitive Correlates of Distinct Facets of Empathy: 
Greater Involvement of Simulation Mechanisms in Emotional 
Relative to Cognitive Empathy 
Abstract 
Empathy is a crucial component of successful interpersonal interactions, and it is 
impaired in many debilitating disorders. Empathy is largely considered to be a multidimensional 
construct, including cognitive empathy (the ability to adopt another’s perspective) and emotional 
empathy (the capacity to share and react affectively to another’s emotional experience). It has 
been suggested that action-perception matching, or simulation mechanisms, may facilitate 
empathy by supporting the simulation of perceived experience in others. However, whether 
simulation mechanisms are involved in the experience of cognitive or emotional empathy 
remains unclear, and no studies to date have quantitatively compared the involvement of the 
simulation network in cognitive versus emotional empathy. Presently, healthy adults underwent 
functional magnetic resonance imaging while completing a false belief task targeting cognitive 
empathy and an emotional empathy task assessing how strongly they felt for people in emotional 
images. Simulation regions were also localized using a button-pressing task. Conjunction 
analyses revealed common recruitment of the inferior frontal gyrus (IFG), a region thought to be 
critical for action-perception matching, during both simulation and emotional, but not cognitive, 
empathy. Critically, greater activation was also observed in identified simulation regions in the 
left IFG during emotional as compared to cognitive empathy. Further, a positive correlation was 
demonstrated between activity during emotional empathy in a simulation area in the left IFG and 
mean feeling ratings expressed during the emotional empathy task. These findings provide strong 
evidence for greater involvement of simulation mechanisms in emotional empathy than cognitive 
empathy. Thus, the simulation network may be of particular interest in disorders featuring 
emotional empathy impairments. 
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4.1 Introduction 
 Empathy is a crucial component of interpersonal interactions thought to influence 
prosocial behaviour, and it is impaired in many debilitating disorders, such as frontotemporal 
dementia (Dermody et al., 2016; Oliver et al., 2015), schizophrenia (Green, Horan, & Lee, 
2015), borderline personality disorder (Dziobek et al., 2011), psychopathy (Blair, 2005), and 
autism spectrum disorder (Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985; Mathersul, McDonald, & 
Rushby, 2013). It has been suggested that empathy may be facilitated through the embodied 
simulation or internal representation of perceived experience in others (Bastiaansen, Thioux, & 
Keysers, 2009; Carr, Iacoboni, Dubeau, Mazziotta, & Lenzi, 2003; Gallese, 2001; Gallese, 
Keysers, & Rizzolatti, 2004; Iacoboni, 2009; Pineda, Moore, Elfenbeinand, & Cox, 2009; 
Preston & de Waal, 2002). This simulation is thought to be achieved via an action-perception 
neural matching mechanism. For example, interpersonal understanding or shared emotional 
experience may emerge while watching someone dance to their favourite song due to activation 
of some of the same neural regions as when you are dancing yourself. The discovery of mirror 
neurons in the ventral premotor cortex (PMC) into inferior frontal gyrus (IFG), and inferior 
parietal lobule (IPL) of macaque monkeys, which fire during both observation and execution of 
goal-related actions, provided a potential neural basis for this simulation mechanism (di 
Pellegrino, Fadiga, Fogassi, Gallese, & Rizzolatti, 1992; Fogassi et al., 2005; Gallese, Fadiga, 
Fogassi, & Rizzolatti, 1996). In humans, although the existence and role of mirror neurons is 
disputed (Caramazza, Anzellotti, Strnad, & Lingnau, 2014; Turella, Pierno, Tubaldi, & Castiello, 
2009), functional imaging studies of action observation, execution, and imitation suggest that 
such a system is subserved by analogous circuitry including the ventral PMC into posterior IFG 
and the IPL (Caspers, Zilles, Laird, & Eickhoff, 2010; Molenberghs, Cunnington, & Mattingley, 
2012). Thus, the IFG and IPL are engaged during both action observation and execution, and are 
thought to be critical areas for this observation-execution matching simulation mechanism 
(Gallese, 2001; Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004). The posterior superior temporal sulcus (STS) 
does not appear to contain observation-execution matching neurons as it does not respond during 
action execution in isolation, but is activated during action observation and imitation, and 
thought to be the primary visual input to these critical simulation areas via the IPL (Iacoboni et 
al., 2001; Keysers & Perrett, 2004). Within this network, it is believed that the posterior STS 
provides a visual description of actions, the IPL codes motor aspects of actions, and the goal of 
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the action is coded by the ventral PMC/IFG (Iacoboni, 2005; Iacoboni & Dapretto, 2006; 
Keysers & Perrett, 2004). Presently, we refer to this circuitry, also known as the mirror neuron 
system, as the ‘simulation network’. Of particular interest, even the observation and imitation of 
emotional expressions in humans elicits increased activity in areas of the simulation network 
(Carr et al., 2003; Leslie, Johnson-Frey, & Grafton, 2004; Montgomery & Haxby, 2008). Thus, it 
has been proposed that these frontal and parietal simulation regions generate a motor 
representation of other individuals’ mental or emotional states.  
 Whether a simulation mechanism may facilitate empathy is complicated by evidence that 
empathy is a multidimensional construct, including both cognitive and emotional facets 
(Eslinger, 1998; Shamay-Tsoory, 2011). Cognitive empathy refers to the capacity to adopt 
another individual’s perspective, and thereby infer their mental or emotional state, and is often 
used interchangeably with theory of mind (Blair, 2005; Lawrence, Shaw, Baker, Baron-Cohen, 
& David, 2004). Emotional empathy involves the ability to share and react affectively to the 
emotional experience of another individual. The dissociability of these facets is supported by 
behavioural data from different clinical populations (Lockwood, Bird, Bridge, & Viding, 2013) 
and lesion data (Shamay-Tsoory, Aharon-Peretz, & Perry, 2009). Functional imaging studies 
have also provided evidence for this, with meta-analyses demonstrating that cognitive empathy 
typically elicits activity in areas including the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), temporoparietal 
junction (TPJ), STS, and precuneus (Bzdok et al., 2012; Carrington & Bailey, 2009; Schurz, 
Radua, Aichhorn, Richlan, & Perner, 2014; Van Overwalle, 2009). Alternatively, emotional 
empathy has been associated with activation in areas including the anterior insula, anterior 
cingulate cortex, IFG, and sometimes the amygdala (Bzdok et al., 2012; Fan, Duncan, de Greck, 
& Northoff, 2011; Lamm, Decety, & Singer, 2011; Shamay-Tsoory, 2011; Walter, 2012). 
Although there is some evidence that the simulation network may be involved in the experience 
of both cognitive and emotional empathy, this remains uncertain. 
With respect to cognitive empathy, it has been proposed that the simulation network may 
influence this by way of the posterior STS/TPJ, providing rapid goal-related information from 
others’ actions (Tramacere & Ferrari, 2016; Van Overwalle, 2009). The simulation network has 
been implicated in several aspects of cognitive empathy, including intention understanding and 
mental state attribution. Specifically, support for the involvement of the simulation network in 
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cognitive empathy initially came from findings of increased IFG activation to actions when they 
were embedded in contexts congruent with the intention of the action (e.g., grasping a cup to 
drink in the context of a breakfast ready to be eaten versus grasping it to clean up; Iacoboni et al., 
2005; Kaplan & Iacoboni, 2006). Activity in the IFG and IPL has also been observed during 
mental state attribution for facial and bodily expressions (Lawrence et al., 2006). Further, mental 
state attribution accuracy has been found to modulate activation in simulation regions (Zaki, 
Weber, Bolger, & Ochsner, 2009), as well as being positively associated with mu suppression, a 
reputed electroencephalography (EEG) marker of simulation network activity (Pineda & Hecht, 
2009). However, another functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study found that the 
degree of mental state content in participants’ descriptions of others’ actions did not modulate 
activity in simulation areas (Spunt, Satpute, & Lieberman, 2011). Additionally, a negative 
association has been identified between questionnaire scores of perspective taking, an aspect of 
cognitive empathy, and mu suppression during the observation of hand movements (Milston, 
Vanman, & Cunnington, 2013). Lastly, and of particular relevance, a conjunction analysis has 
demonstrated common activation in the posterior STS, but not in critical simulation areas 
including the IFG or IPL, between a cognitive empathy animation task and an action observation 
task used to define the simulation network (Ohnishi et al., 2004). Indeed, meta-analytic results 
have demonstrated that many fMRI investigations of cognitive empathy fail to find significant 
activation in putative critical simulation areas (Van Overwalle & Baetens, 2009). Thus, there is 
some support for a role of the simulation network in cognitive empathy, but results are limited 
and inconsistent. 
Notably, it has also been suggested that the simulation network may underlie emotional 
empathic experience, influencing areas of the limbic system, such as the amygdala, via the IFG 
and the insula (Carr et al., 2003). Indeed, studies that have examined the involvement of the 
simulation network in both cognitive and emotional empathy have provided some support for 
greater involvement in emotional empathy. Specifically, questionnaire scores of emotional, but 
not cognitive, empathy have been positively correlated with IFG activation during the 
observation and imitation of emotional expressions (Pfeifer, Iacoboni, Mazziotta, & Dapretto, 
2008) and gray matter volume of the right IFG and IPL (Cheng et al., 2009). Further, white 
matter integrity in the superior longitudinal fasciculus connecting temporoparietal regions to 
inferior frontal areas has also been positively associated with scores on questionnaire measures 
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of emotional, but not cognitive, empathy (Parkinson & Wheatley, 2014). Of particular note, one 
fMRI investigation found that emotional empathy recruited the right anterior PMC (BA 6) more 
than cognitive empathy, which was interpreted as evidence for greater engagement of the 
simulation network (Nummenmaa, Hirvonen, Parkkola, & Hietanen, 2008). However, this 
cluster was not identified using a simulation network localizer or compared to areas functionally 
defined as having simulation properties in other work. Thus, despite some evidence for greater 
involvement of the simulation network in emotional empathy, there is a lack of empirical 
evidence directly relating online emotional empathic responding to activation in these regions 
(Baird, Scheffer, & Wilson, 2011; Decety, 2010; Lamm & Majdandzic, 2015). 
Taken together, though there is some support for a role of the simulation network in 
cognitive empathy, evidence suggests that it is more involved in emotional empathy. However, 
the degree to which simulation is implicated in these different facets of empathy remains unclear. 
Critically, no studies to date have statistically compared the involvement of the simulation 
network in cognitive versus emotional empathy. It is also important to note that prior 
investigations have largely provided evidence in the form of activation during empathy tasks in 
vast regions previously implicated in simulation, rather than areas functionally defined using a 
simulation network localizer. This is problematic because neurons that respond to both action 
observation and execution are believed to be found in specific areas of these larger implicated 
regions, and account for only a small proportion of the neurons in these areas in macaques 
(Decety, 2010). Correlations have also been demonstrated between questionnaire measures of 
empathy and activity in identified simulation regions, but these do not provide insight into the 
relationship between neural activity and the online experience of empathy. Accordingly, the 
objective of this study was to delineate the involvement of the simulation network in cognitive 
and emotional empathy. Crucially, this marks the first time that functional localizers will be used 
to determine the correspondence between brain areas identified as having simulation properties, 
and those recruited during cognitive and emotional empathy within the same participant 
population. This allows for a direct comparison of the extent to which cognitive and emotional 
empathy tasks modulate activity in functionally defined regions of the simulation network. 
Further, cognitive and emotional empathic abilities will be assessed during fMRI using 
behavioral indices, uniquely allowing for the determination of relationships between activation in 
localized simulation network regions and empathic responding. Our central hypothesis is that 
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regions within the simulation network critical for action-perception matching will be 
preferentially involved in the facilitation of emotional versus cognitive empathy. Specifically, 
regions of the localized simulation network identified using a button-pressing imitation task are 
expected to show some overlap with regions significantly activated during both the cognitive and 
emotional empathy tasks. However, critical simulation regions, including the ventral PMC into 
IFG and the IPL, are expected to be significantly more active during emotional as compared to 
cognitive empathy. Beyond evidence from prior work, the notion that shared neural 
representations should underlie the sharing of emotional experience involved in emotional 
empathy is logically consistent, especially given that emotional contagion, an automatic 
tendency to mimic expressions and postures of other individuals (Hatfield, Cacioppo, & Rapson, 
1994), is thought to be a building block of emotional empathy (Decety & Meyer, 2008; Shamay-
Tsoory, 2011). Lastly, behavioural indices of emotional empathy are expected to correlate more 
strongly with activity in the simulation network than behavioural measures of cognitive empathy.  
 
4.2 Methods 
 
4.2.1 Participants  
Thirty-six healthy, right-handed individuals (19 females, 17 males) with a mean age of 
21.5 years (range 18-26, SD = 2.2) took part in the experiment. As determined by screening, all 
participants were in good health and had no history of psychiatric problems, neurological 
disease, or head injury. Participants also had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and none 
reported colour blindness. All participants granted informed consent and were compensated for 
their participation. Flyers posted throughout campus at the University of Western Ontario were 
used for participant recruitment. This study was approved by the Health Sciences Research 
Ethics Board at the University of Western Ontario, London, Ontario, Canada. 
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4.2.2 Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) tasks 
 Participants underwent fMRI while performing four randomly presented tasks. Three of 
these tasks were utilized for the present investigation, including tasks tapping cognitive empathy, 
emotional empathy, and simulation. The fourth task involved viewing images of emotional 
individuals or hands performing an action, and providing a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ response as to how or 
why an individual was doing this. Prior to scanning, participants were presented with a practice 
version of the tasks which included one block of each condition type for each task with the same 
presentation times as the fMRI tasks. All tasks were programmed using E-Prime software 
(Schneider, Eschman, & Zuccolotto, 2002). 
  
4.2.2.1 Cognitive empathy (Figure 4.1a)  
The publicly available False Belief Task (Dodell-Feder, Koster-Hale, Bedny, & Saxe, 
2011; Dufour et al., 2013) was used to localize brain regions recruited for cognitive empathy. 
Participants were presented with two types of visually presented short stories. False belief short 
stories described an individual’s false belief and their resultant actions, requiring belief 
inference, and false photo short stories described outdated, or no longer true, maps or pictures. 
False photo stories are utilized for the control condition because they are matched with the false 
belief stories for causal structure and difficulty, and also require the representation of false 
content (Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003). For each trial, stories were presented visually for 10 s, after 
which participants were asked to respond ‘true’ or ‘false’ via button press to a statement related 
to the false representation or reality of the situation. Placement of the ‘True’ and ‘False’ response 
options on either side of the screen was randomized on each trial to prevent a response bias from 
forming. Stimuli were presented on a black background in white font. The task included 24 
stories per condition, presented in 3 runs of 4 blocks per condition (2 trials per block). Each 
block was followed by an inter-block interval of 18 s, during which a fixation cross was shown. 
The runs were presented in random order, and each one included a subset of stories that were 
randomly presented within the blocks. Accuracy for the cognitive empathy task was calculated as 
the proportion correct of the true or false questions following the false belief and false photo 
stories for each participant. Mean reaction times (RTs) were also determined for questions across 
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each condition. Paired t-tests demonstrated no significant difference in accuracy or RTs between 
false belief and false photo story questions, confirming the conditions were matched in difficulty 
(both p > .1; false belief accuracy: M = 82.9%, SD = 14%, range 42-100%; false photo accuracy: 
M = 83.4 %, SD = 11% range 54-100%; false belief RT: M = 3120.36, SD = 360.2, range 
2472.67-3936.54; false photo RT: M = 3074.33, SD = 347.0 range 2512.58-3809.25). 
    
4.2.2.2 Emotional Empathy (Figure 4.1b)  
The emotional empathy task was based on the Multifaceted Empathy Test (Dziobek et 
al., 2011). The modified task includes only emotional empathy and control conditions. For 
feeling trials (emotional empathy), participants were presented with emotionally-charged 
naturalistic social images with a tagline conveying how people in the image are feeling, and 
asked how strongly they are feeling for people in the image. The emotional state of the 
individuals in the images was explicitly given to minimize the need for mental state inference 
(cognitive empathy) during the task. Responses were made on a four-point Likert scale from ‘not 
at all’ to ‘very strongly’ using a button box. The control condition consisted of age estimation 
trials; participants were presented with the same images without a tagline, and asked, “How old 
is this person?” Responses were made via button press on a four-point Likert scale from ‘very 
young’ to ‘very old’. Thus, the same images were presented in each condition, and similar 
response scales were utilized for both. Stimuli included 36 images (18 positive, 18 negative), 
taken from the Multifaceted Empathy Test (Dziobek et al., 2008) and supplemented with 
additional images from the International Affective Picture System (Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 
2008). All images depict people in context varying in emotional expression, age, ethnicity, and 
gender. Images were presented for 8 s along with the relevant question and response scale. The 
task included the same 36 images per condition, presented in 3 runs of 4 blocks per condition (3 
trials per block). Each block began with a 4 s instruction slide indicating which condition would 
follow by displaying the relevant response scale, and each one was followed by an inter-block 
interval of 18 s featuring a fixation cross. Run presentation was randomized, and each one 
contained a subset of images, balanced for valence, that were randomly presented within the 
blocks. For the emotional empathy task, mean feeling ratings were determined across all feeling 
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trials for each participant (M = 3.06, SD = 0.51, range 1.94-3.97). Mean RTs were also computed 
across each condition. Paired t-tests demonstrated that reaction times were significantly greater 
for feeling in comparison to age estimation responses (p < .001; feeling RT: M = 2966.81, SD = 
528.28, range 1805.45-3826.81; age estimation RT: M = 2143.80, SD = 369.06, range 1517.33-
2916.11). 
 
4.2.2.3 Simulation (Figure 4.1c)  
The simulation network localizer task was designed based on the paradigm used by 
Iacoboni et al. (1999) in order to identify brain regions activated during action imitation within 
the sample of individuals completing the cognitive and emotional empathy tasks. Participants 
were presented with images and video clips of an actor’s hand pressing a button on a response 
box and asked to merely observe or execute a button press in response. Task stimuli were 
developed by the laboratory as part of a larger stimulus set depicting dynamic actions and 
expressions. To construct the stimulus set, amateur actors were recruited through a local theatre 
group and were compensated for their participation. Videos of actors’ hands making a button 
press, as well as actors making particular facial expressions (for use in another investigation), 
were filmed and trimmed to a duration of 2 s. Videos from 24 actors (12 females and 12 males) 
used in the task feature left hands with either the index or middle finger being moved up and 
down to press a button on the same button box used by participants in the scanner. Still-frames 
were also taken from these videos (1 image per finger from each actor), and each one included a 
symbolic cue (‘X’) atop the index or middle finger to indicate the pressing finger. Simulation 
regions were identified using a contrast of action imitation versus action execution in response to 
a symbolic cue, as in previous investigations (e.g., Cross, Torrisi, Losin, & Iacoboni, 2013; 
Iacoboni et al., 1999; Koski, Iacoboni, Dubeau, Woods, & Mazziotta, 2003), on the basis that 
simulation areas are maximally activated during imitation (Iacoboni, 2009). Task conditions 
included observe-image (‘Just watch the image’), execute-image (‘Raise and lower the finger 
labeled X to press the button’), observe-video (‘Just watch the video’), and imitate-video 
(‘Imitate the finger movement in the video to press the button’). Still-frame images were 
presented during the -image conditions, whereas videos were presented during the -video 
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conditions. During the task, stimuli were presented for 2.5 s, followed by a fixation cross for 0.5 
s. The task included the same 48 images and 48 videos (24 index finger, 24 middle finger each) 
for both of the image and video conditions, presented in 3 runs of 2 blocks per condition (8 trials 
per block). Each block began with a 4 s instruction screen indicating which condition would 
follow and a short description (shown above), and each one was followed by an inter-block 
interval of 18 s, during which a fixation cross was displayed. The runs were presented in random 
order, and each one included a subset of stimuli that were randomly presented within the blocks. 
 
 
Figure 4.1 Trial examples for each of the fMRI tasks  
(a) Trial structure for the False Belief Task (Dodell-Feder, Koster-Hale, Bedny, & Saxe, 2011; 
Dufour et al., 2013), including examples of false belief and false photo conditions. (b) Trial 
structure for the emotional empathy task (adapted from Dziobek et al., 2011), including 
examples of feeling and age estimation conditions. (c) Trial structure for the simulation network 
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localizer task (based on Iacoboni et al., 1999), including an example of the execute-image 
condition. 
 
4.2.3 MRI data acquisition 
Participants were scanned in a single session using a 3T Siemens Prisma scanner with a 
32-channel head coil at Robarts Research Institute at the University of Western Ontario. fMRI 
images were taken with a T2*-gradient echo-planar imaging sequence [repetition time (TR): 
3000 ms; echo time (TE): 30 ms; field of view (FOV): 20 cm; 80 x 80 matrix]. These parameters 
were chosen to optimize the signal-to-noise ratio for the amygdala (Morawetz et al., 2008; 
Robinson, Windischberger, Rauscher, & Moser, 2004) while still achieving complete brain 
coverage. For all functional scans, 50 contiguous slices of 2.5 x 2.5 mm in-plane with a slice 
thickness of 2.5 mm (forming voxels of 2.5 x 2.5 x 2.5 mm) were obtained. At the midway point 
of the scanning session, after completion of the second task, a high-resolution, T1-weighted, 
anatomical scan was obtained with whole-brain coverage (TR: 2300 ms; TE: 2.98 ms; FOV: 25.6 
cm; 256 x 240 matrix; 192 axial slices; 1 x 1 x 1 mm voxels). 
 
4.2.4 fMRI analysis 
Individual and group analyses of fMRI data were conducted using the Analysis of 
Functional NeuroImages (AFNI) software (Cox, 1996). Prior to performing analyses, images 
were motion corrected by registering all volumes of a given task to a functional volume adjacent 
to the anatomical scan. Within task runs, volumes were also censored, along with the preceding 
volume, if the derivatives of the six generated motion parameters had a Euclidean norm greater 
than 2.0 mm (Siegel et al., 2014). All data were spatially smoothed using a 4 mm full width at 
half maximum isotropic Gaussian kernel. The time series data were normalized such that each 
time point within a voxel was represented as a percent change from the mean voxel intensity. A 
general linear model was defined for each task for each participant. For each task, regressors for 
each condition were created by convolving the blocked stimulus events with a gamma-variate 
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hemodynamic response function. The blood-oxygen-level dependent (BOLD) response was 
fitted to each regressor to conduct linear regression modeling for each task. To account for 
voxel-wise correlated drifting, a baseline plus linear drift and quadratic trend were modeled to 
the time series of each voxel, as well. This produced a beta coefficient and t-statistic for each 
voxel at each regressor. Regression coefficients represented the percentage signal change from 
the mean activity. Group analyses involved transforming each participant’s data into the standard 
space of Talairach and Tournoux (1988).    
In addition to the regressors created for the task conditions (i.e., false belief and false 
photo for the False Belief Task, feeling and age estimation for the emotional empathy task, and 
observe-image, execute-image, observe-video, and imitate-video for the simulation task), 
regressors were made to model in-block instructions, for the emotional empathy and simulation 
tasks. Regressors of no interest were also created to model error-laden blocks from the 
simulation task. Blocks of the simulation task were deemed unusable if the participant did not 
follow the block instructions on at least 5 out of 8 trials (e.g., pressing during an observe block, 
or vice-versa). In order for a participant’s data to be included for a specific condition, at least 4 
out of 6 blocks per condition had to be usable. On the basis of these exclusion criteria, data from 
6 participants were excluded from the simulation network localizer analysis, along with an 
additional participant’s data due to computer error. For the False Belief Task, data from one 
participant was excluded due to a failure to understand the task.     
A series of t-tests were conducted in AFNI to investigate within-task effects. These 
compared the whole-brain BOLD response to false belief versus false photo stories for the False 
Belief Task, feeling versus age estimation questions for the emotional empathy task, and imitate-
video versus execute-image conditions for the simulation network localizer task. As in previous 
investigations (e.g., Cross et al., 2013; Iacoboni et al., 1999; Koski et al., 2003), simulation 
regions were identified using a contrast of action imitation versus action execution in response to 
a symbolic cue. This contrast was implemented on the basis that simulation areas are activated 
during action observation and execution, and maximally active during imitation as it involves 
both visual encoding of the action and execution (Iacoboni, 2009). This contrast also served to 
control for initiation of the motor plan since both conditions involved the same action. Whole-
brain contrasts were thresholded at p < .005 and corrected for multiple comparisons to p < .05 
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(16 contiguous voxels) using AFNI’s updated 3dClustSim, a spatial clustering operation with 
10,000 Monte Carlo simulations on the whole brain echo-planar imaging matrix. Notably, we are 
mindful of recent findings regarding false-positive rates using clusterwise inference (Eklund, 
Nichols, & Knutsson, 2016). A threshold of p < .005 was reasoned to be sufficiently 
conservative being that we were particularly interested in the regions of overlap identified in the 
conjunction analyses, and reducing Type II errors as a result (Lieberman & Cunningham, 2009; 
Lin, Yu, Zhao, & Zhang, 2016).   
Conjunction analyses were performed using the minimum statistic compared to the 
conjunction null (Nichols, Brett, Andersson, Wager, & Poline, 2005) to identify overlap between 
regions engaged during cognitive empathy (false belief > false photo) and simulation regions as 
identified using the simulation network localizer (imitate-video > execute-image), and emotional 
empathy (feeling > age estimation) and localized simulation regions, as well as across cognitive 
and emotional empathy, and all three conditions. Thus, the contrasts of interest were individually 
thresholded at p < .005 and corrected for multiple comparisons to p < .05, then overlapping areas 
of significant activation were determined. 
Paired t-tests with Bonferroni correction were also conducted in SPSS to examine 
differences in percent BOLD signal change during cognitive empathy (false belief > false photo) 
versus emotional empathy (feeling > age estimation). To restrict the number of comparisons, this 
was only interrogated in significant clusters identified using the simulation network localizer 
(imitate-video - execute-image) that incorporated regions traditionally considered to be part of 
the simulation network, or mirror neuron system, including the IFG, PMC, IPL, and/or posterior 
STS (Grezes, Armony, Rowe, & Passingham, 2003). Lastly, correlational analyses with 
Bonferroni correction were utilized to identify relationships between behavioural performance on 
the cognitive and emotional empathy tasks and activation within the same subset of simulation 
clusters, as well as activity in regions of overlap identified using conjunction analyses between 
cognitive and emotional empathy, and the simulation network localizer. Data points falling +/- 3 
SDs from the mean for extracted percent BOLD signal change for cognitive empathy and 
emotional empathy, in each region of interest, were identified as outliers and removed from the 
analyses. For accuracy on the false belief questions during the cognitive empathy task, and mean 
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feeling ratings during the emotional empathy task, data points falling +/- 3 SDs from the mean 
were also excluded from the analyses. 
 
4.3 Results 
 
4.3.1 Within-task effects (Table 4.1, Figure 4.2) 
 
4.3.1.1 Cognitive empathy  
The contrast of false belief trials versus false photo trials for cognitive empathy revealed 
significantly greater activation in bilateral temporal pole, superior temporal sulcus (STS), and 
temporoparietal junction (TPJ), dorsal to ventromedial prefrontal cortex (PFC), and posterior 
cingulate into precuneus, consistent with expectations. Alternatively, during false photo trials as 
compared to false belief trials, increased activity was observed in the bilateral dorsolateral PFC 
and IPL.  
 
4.3.1.2 Emotional empathy  
The feeling versus age estimation contrast for emotional empathy showed significantly 
heightened activity in areas implicated in emotional empathy (Bzdok et al., 2012), including 
bilateral inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) and dorsomedial PFC, as well as left premotor cortex 
(PMC), anterior insula, and a large area extending from the temporal pole to the posterior STS 
and TPJ. Age estimation in comparison to the feeling condition produced greater activation in 
the right dorsolateral PFC and bilateral IPL. 
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4.3.1.3 Simulation  
The contrast of imitate-video versus execute-image conditions from the simulation 
network localizer task revealed greater activity in bilateral posterior STS into inferior parietal 
lobule (IPL) and mid occipital gyrus, bilateral IFG and PMC, as well as bilateral anterior insula, 
supplementary motor area (SMA), and precuneus during action imitation in comparison to action 
execution in response to a symbolic cue. 
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Table 4.1: Whole-brain within-task contrasts 
 
 
Region L/R BA x y z t-value Voxels
Cognitive Empathy
     false belief > false photo
          temporal pole/STS/TPJ R 38/21/22/39/40 54.3 2.1 -19.2 9.75 2414
          temporal pole/STS/TPJ L 38/21/22/39 -56.8 -56.4 20.1 8.30 1946
          mPFC L/R 9/10 -8.8 54 31.4 6.52 1605
          precuneus/posterior cingulate cortex L/R 7/31 -1.3 -59.9 39 10.45 1217
          pyramis (cerebellum) L -24 -74.5 -38.6 5.77 83
          subgenual cingulate cortex/caudate L 25 -6.3 4.2 -7.2 4.86 56
          middle frontal gyrus/PMC R 6 39.1 1.6 47.7 3.73 21
          anterior cingulate cortex L 24 -3.8 26.7 8.2 4.01 17
          middle frontal gyrus R 8 21.5 24.8 48.9 3.53 16
     false photo > false belief
          IPL/postcentral gyrus L 40/2 -56.8 -36.7 40.2 -6.24 601
          dorsolateral PFC L 46 -41.7 28.2 30.1 -5.97 470
          mid/inferior temporal gyrus L 20/37 -59.3 -41.9 -15.8 -7.08 389
          dorsolateral PFC R 46 49.2 36.4 22.3 -5.40 321
          IPL/postcentral gyrus R 40/2 41.7 -50.1 50.4 -5.14 273
          mid/inferior temporal gyrus R 20/37 56.8 -39.2 -18.7 -5.39 122
          IFG L 9 -51.8 7.4 34.4 -4.91 64
          IFG R 9/44 49.2 0.1 25.8 -4.60 50
          medial frontal gyrus/SMA R 6 6.3 -14.7 65.9 -4.62 36
          paracentral lobule/SMA L 4/6 -8.8 -32.6 62.2 -3.87 26
          medial postcentral gyrus R 2/5 11.4 -48.5 69.5 -4.60 22
          precuneus L 7 -11.4 -83.3 43.2 -3.88 20
          middle frontal gyrus L 10/46 -36.6 37.6 -5.3 -4.26 19
Emotional Empathy
     feeling > age estimation
          cuneus/lingual gyrus/R cerebellum L/R 17/18/19 11.4 -73.7 2.9 10.91 3025
          IFG/anterior insula/temporal pole/STS/TPJ L
44/45/47/13/              
38/21/22/39/40
-46.7 20.3 -21.2 7.74 2346
          dorsomedial PFC L 6/8/9 -6.3 5.7 69.7 5.85 717
          temporal pole/IFG R 38/47 39.1 15 -18.5 5.31 239
          IFG R 45/47 49.2 34.8 0.5 4.29 62
          middle frontal gyrus/PMC L 6 -44.2 -4.2 61 3.76 46
          inferior occipital gyrus L 18/19 -31.6 -88.5 -12.6 3.82 43
          mid STS R 22 44.2 -29.7 -0.2 5.34 38
          dorsomedial PFC R 9 11.4 51.3 34 4.02 30
          parahippocampal gyrus/fusiform gyrus L 20/36 -39.1 -26.2 -20.9 4.02 22
          middle frontal gyrus/PMC L 6 -41.7 4.1 50.5 4.15 21
          anterior cingulate cortex R 24 8.8 15.1 34.8 3.65 19
          medial/superior frontal gyrus R 9 24 38.4 33.3 3.37 17
          anterior cingulate cortex L 32 -8.8 12.3 40.1 4.1 16
     age estimation > feeling
          IPL/precuneus R 40/39/19 46.7 -55.5 55.6 -7.84 1853
          dorsolateral PFC R 8/9/46 26.5 6.1 61.5 -8.03 1331
          IPL/precuneus L 40/19 -36.6 -77.8 35.3 -6.18 524
          mid/inferior temporal gyrus R 20/37 56.8 -23.9 -14.8 -6.82 378
          precuneus L/R 7/31 6.3 -64.9 36 -4.43 268
          posterior cingulate cortex L/R 31 3.8 -39.3 40.1 -5.9 209
          superior/mid frontal gyrus/PMC L 6 -21.5 6.4 56.1 -5.55 121
          mid/inferior temporal gyrus L 20/21 -59.3 -36.7 -15.5 -5.55 75
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          subgenual cingulate cortex L 25/32 -11.4 17.3 -12.4 -4.35 41
          frontal pole R 10 24 62.5 15.5 -3.93 21
          inferior semilunar lobule (cerebellum) L/R -6.3 -79 -53.7 -4.24 20
          inferior temporal gyrus R 37 64.4 -49.7 -13.3 -4.23 20
          primary motor cortex R 4 61.9 -18.6 38.5 -3.99 18
          orbitofrontal cortex/ventromedial PFC R 11 6.3 35.6 -17.3 -5.1 17
Simulation Network Localizer
     imitate-video > execute-image
          mid-posterior STS/TPJ/IPL/mid-inferior temporal R 22/37/19/39/40 51.8 -63.1 -2.2 13.7 2628
          gyrus/mid occipital gyrus/fusiform gyrus         
          PMC/mid frontal gyrus/IFG/anterior insula R 6/45/47/13 39.1 -6.9 63.6 5.59 1168
          posterior STS/TPJ/IPL/mid temporal gyrus/mid L 22/19/39/40 -54.3 -53.2 6.7 6.81 928
          occipital gyrus/fusiform gyrus
          precuneus/superior-mid occipital gyrus R 7/19 21.5 -73.3 49.2 5.55 797
          medial-superior frontal gyrus/SMA R 6 16.4 3 72.3 5.56 422
          pyramis/uvula (cerebellum) L -16.4 -66.6 -41.1 6.66 225
          superior-mid frontal gyrus/PMC L 6 -29 -7.3 71.7 4.92 209
          dorsolateral PFC L 46 -49.2 41.4 25.3 4.49 108
          anterior insula L 13 -39.1 19.1 5.1 4.44 53
          declive (cerebellum) L -46.7 -51.7 -28.3 4.16 44
          lateral mid frontal gyrus L 10 -44.2 52.3 12.3 4.04 42
          culmen (cerebellum) L -29 -56.7 -31.6 4.94 32
          precuneus R 7 26.5 -49.7 42.3 3.67 32
          pre/cuneus L 7 -18.9 -80.6 40.6 4.57 31
          fusiform gyrus R 20 41.7 -20.8 -26.5 4.45 29
          lateral mid frontal gyrus R 10 34.1 43.6 33.6 4.04 29
          IFG L 9/6 -44.2 2.6 26 4.29 28
          IFG L 47/45/13 -49.2 16.9 -3.5 4 26
          IPL L 40 -59.3 -26.3 38.1 3.91 25
          medial-superior frontal gyrus/SMA L 6 -8.8 -14.9 68.6 3.94 25
          orbitofrontal gyrus R 11 21.5 25.4 -20.9 4.19 22
          superior frontal gyrus L 9 -34.1 48.5 39.3 4.08 22
          superior parietal lobule/precuneus L 7 -16.4 -73.4 51.9 4.05 18
     execute-image > imitate-video
          cuneus L/R 17/18 -16.4 -79 5.4 -4.76 178
          caudate/hippocampus R 29 -34.7 -3.5 -5 38
Thresholded at p  < .005; p  < .05 corrected. Table displays region (STS, superior temporal sulcus; TPJ, temporoparietal 
junction; PMC, premotor cortex; PFC, prefrontal cortex; SMA, supplementary motor area; IFG, inferior frontal gyrus), 
hemisphere (L, left; R, right), Brodmann area (BA), MNI coordinates (x, y, z), maximum neural activity for the peak of that   
cluster (t-value), and cluster size in voxels. 
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Figure 4.2 Neural regions demonstrating significant effects in within-task contrasts  
Whole-brain analyses were conducted at a threshold of p < .005, and corrected to a family-wise 
error rate of p < .05. (a) The false belief > false photo contrast revealed greater activity in areas 
including bilateral STS and TPJ, medial PFC, and posterior cingulate into precuneus. False photo 
> false belief showed greater activity in areas including bilateral dorsolateral PFC. (b) The 
feeling > age estimation contrast showed greater activity in regions including bilateral IFG, 
anterior insula, and temporal pole, and left posterior STS and TPJ. Age estimation > feeling 
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revealed greater activity in regions including right dorsolateral PFC. (c) The imitate-video > 
execute-image contrast showed greater activity in areas including bilateral posterior STS into 
IPL, IFG and PMC, and anterior insula. Execute-image > imitate-video showed greater activity 
in bilateral cuneus and right hippocampus. 
 
4.3.2 Conjunction analyses (Table 4.2, Figure 4.3) 
 
4.3.2.1 Cognitive empathy and simulation  
In order to identify simulation regions that were also recruited during cognitive and/or 
emotional empathy, conjunction analyses were conducted. Regions found to be commonly 
activated by the simulation network localizer (imitate-video > execute-image) and cognitive 
empathy (false belief > false photo) included the right mid/posterior STS and TPJ, left posterior 
STS and TPJ, and bilateral precuneus. 
 
4.3.2.2 Emotional empathy and simulation  
A second conjunction analysis revealed brain areas that were significantly 
activated both during the simulation network localizer and emotional empathic 
experience (feeling > age estimation), including the left posterior STS and TPJ, two 
regions in the SMA, the right mid STS, and left IFG. 
 
4.3.2.3 Cognitive and emotional empathy  
A conjunction of regions significantly activated during both cognitive empathy and 
emotional empathy identified commonly recruited regions including the left temporal pole into 
STS and TPJ, bilateral dorsomedial PFC, and right temporal pole and mid STS. 
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4.3.2.4 Cognitive empathy, emotional empathy, and simulation  
The left posterior STS and right mid STS were identified as regions activated by the 
simulation network localizer, and both cognitive and emotional empathy. 
 
Table 4.2: Conjunction analyses 
  
 
 
Region L/R BA x y z Voxels
Cognitive Empathy and Simulation
mid/posterior STS/TPJ R 21/22/39 46.7 -18.9 -11.5 591
posterior STS/TPJ L 22/39 -59.3 -42.8 4.5 199
precuneus L/R 7 3.8 -55 44.7 18
Emotional Empathy and Simulation
posterior STS/TPJ L 22/39 -59.3 -47.7 -1.3 274
pre/cuneus R 18/31 26.5 -79.2 10.8 103
superior frontal gyrus/SMA R 6 11.4 6 64.3 27
medial frontal gyrus/SMA L/R 6 -1.3 1.1 58.6 26
mid STS R 21/22 46.7 -24.4 -2.9 21
IFG L 47/45/13 -54.3 19.6 -6.3 16
Cognitive Empathy and Emotional Empathy
temporal pole/STS/TPJ L 38/21/22/39 -41.7 10.7 -39.6 804
dorsomedial PFC L 9 -11.4 46.5 25.6 272
temporal pole R 38 54.3 12.9 -30.5 162
mid STS R 21/22 44.2 -26.8 -6 37
dorsomedial PFC R 9 8.8 56.6 31.6 27
Cognitive Empathy, Emotional Empathy, and Simulation
posterior STS/TPJ L 22/39 -59.3 -42.8 4.5 158
mid STS R 21/22 46.7 -24.4 -2.9 21
Table displays region (STS, superior temporal sulcus; TPJ, temporoparietal junction; PMC, premotor cortex; PFC, 
prefrontal cortex; SMA, supplementary motor area; IFG, inferior frontal gyrus), hemisphere (L, left; R, right), Brodmann 
area (BA), MNI coordinates (x, y, z), and cluster size in voxels. 
Conjunction analyses
Table 4.2
141 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3 Neural regions demonstrating significant effects in conjunction analyses  
(a) The conjunction of cognitive empathy (false belief > false photo) and the simulation network 
(imitate-video > execute-image) revealed overlap in areas including bilateral posterior STS and 
TPJ, and bilateral precuneus. (b) The conjunction of emotional empathy (feeling > age 
estimation) and the simulation network showed overlap in regions including right mid STS and 
left IFG. (c) The conjunction of cognitive empathy, emotional empathy, and the simulation 
network showed overlap in areas including left posterior STS. 
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  4.3.3 Between-task effects 
Paired t-tests were also utilized to determine whether simulation regions were 
significantly more active during emotional as compared to cognitive empathy. There were seven 
simulation clusters identified using the simulation network localizer that included our a priori 
regions of interest (the IFG, PMC, STS, and/or IPL; see Table 4.1). Of these regions, paired t-
tests revealed that activation was significantly greater during emotional versus cognitive 
empathy in two clusters in the left IFG, including one in Brodmann area (BA) 9/6 [t(34) = 3.02, 
corrected p = .035; Figure 4.4a] and one in BA 47/45/13 [t(34) = 3.17, corrected p = .021; Figure 
4.4b]. Notably, none of these clusters within the simulation network showed significantly greater 
activity for cognitive relative to emotional empathy. Further, one-sample t-tests revealed that 
activation during cognitive empathy in these clusters of interest did not differ significantly from 
baseline, other than the cluster in the left IPL, where activation was significantly less than 
baseline [t(34) = -3.19, corrected p = .021]. 
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Figure 4.4 Between-task effects 
Mean percent BOLD signal change during cognitive empathy (false belief > false photo) and 
emotional empathy (feeling > age estimation) in clusters identified using the simulation network 
localizer task (imitate-video > execute-image), including (a) a cluster in BA 9/6 in the left IFG 
and (b) a cluster in BA 47/45/13 in the left IFG. Error bars represent standard errors;                   
* Bonferroni corrected p < .05. 
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4.3.4 Correlational analyses with task performance 
 
4.3.4.1 Correlations with activation in simulation regions of interest  
Correlational analyses between task performance and corresponding neural activity were 
conducted in the same seven simulation clusters of interest (see Table 4.3). For cognitive 
empathy, accuracy on the false belief questions was not significantly correlated with activation 
during the cognitive empathy task (false belief > false photo) in any of the seven identified 
simulation clusters including regions of the IFG, PMC, STS, and/or IPL (all p > .1). For 
emotional empathy, a positive association was identified between mean feeling ratings in 
response to emotionally-charged images and activation during the emotional empathy task 
(feeling > age estimation) in the cluster identified in BA 47/45/13 of the left IFG (r = .461, 
corrected p = .035; Figure 4.5a). 
Fisher z-transformation (Fisher, 1915) was performed to determine whether the 
correlation between mean feeling ratings and emotional empathy activation in this cluster in left 
BA 47/45/13 was significantly stronger than the relationship between accuracy on the false belief 
questions and cognitive empathy activation in this region (r = .109, corrected p > .1). This was 
done to test the prediction that activation in the simulation network would be associated more 
strongly with emotional empathy versus cognitive empathy task performance. There was a trend 
towards a stronger association between mean feeling ratings and emotional empathy activation 
than between cognitive empathy accuracy and activation within the simulation cluster identified 
in BA 47/45/13 of the left IFG (z = 1.57, p = .058 one-sided). 
 
4.3.4.2 Correlations with activation in conjunction-based regions of overlap  
Correlations were also utilized to determine whether cognitive or emotional empathy task 
performance was associated with activation in regions of overlap identified in the conjunction 
analyses, between simulation areas and those activated during these respective tasks. 
Specifically, accuracy on the false belief questions during the cognitive empathy task was not 
significantly associated with activation during cognitive empathy in any of the three identified 
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regions recruited by both the simulation network localizer and the cognitive empathy task, 
including right and left STS into TPJ, and bilateral precuneus. However, mean feeling ratings on 
the emotional empathy task were found to be positively associated with activity during emotional 
empathy in the region of the left inferior frontal gyrus (BA 47/45/13) recruited by both the 
simulation network localizer and emotional empathy tasks (r = .437, corrected p = .048; Figure 
4.5b). Activation in the other five areas of overlap between emotional empathy and simulation 
was not associated with emotional empathy performance. 
 
Table 4.3: Correlations between task performance and corresponding neural activity in 
significant clusters identified using the simulation network localizer including a priori 
regions of interest 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 Cluster 4 Cluster 5 Cluster 6 Cluster 7
False belief question accuracy 0.121 0.040 0.063 -0.018 -0.029 0.109 -0.045
Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 Cluster 4 Cluster 5 Cluster 6 Cluster 7
Mean feeling ratings 0.297 0.129 0.333 0.293 0.111 0.461* 0.274
* Bonferroni corrected p  < .05
Cluster 2 - R PMC/mid frontal gyrus/IFG/anterior insula
Activation during cognitive empathy (false belief > false photo)
Activation during emotional empathy (feeling > age estimation)
Cluster 1 - R mid-posterior STS/TPJ/IPL/mid-inferior temporal gyrus/mid occipital gyrus/fusiform gyrus
Cluster 3 - L posterior STS/TPJ/IPL/mid temporal gyrus/mid occipital gyrus/fusiform gyrus
Cluster 4 - L superior-mid frontal gyrus/PMC
Cluster 5 - L IFG (BA 9/6)
Cluster 6 - L IFG (BA 47/45/13)
Cluster 7 - L IPL
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Figure 4.5 Correlational analyses with task performance 
Correlations between percent BOLD signal change during emotional empathy (feeling > age 
estimation) and mean feeling ratings on the emotional empathy task in (a) the cluster in BA 
47/45/13 in the left IFG identified using the simulation network localizer task (imitate-video > 
execute-image), and (b) the region of overlap (pink) in the left IFG identified in the conjunction 
of emotional empathy and the simulation network. 
 
4.4 Discussion 
Suggestions that simulation mechanisms underlie empathy are fairly common (Agnew, 
Bhakoo, & Puri, 2007; Bastiaansen et al., 2009; Gallese, 2001; Iacoboni, 2009; Molnar-Szakacs, 
2011; Preston & de Waal, 2002; Wolf, Gales, Shane, & Shane, 2001), but past investigations 
have provided limited evidence regarding the role of the simulation network in cognitive and 
emotional empathy. In particular, support for this has largely relied on demonstrations of 
activation in regions broadly considered to be part of the simulation network during cognitive or 
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emotional empathy tasks, and correlations between questionnaire indices of empathy and activity 
in simulation regions during action observation or imitation. Crucially, no studies to date have 
quantitatively compared the involvement of localized simulation regions in cognitive versus 
emotional empathy. The present study utilized tasks tapping the simulation network, cognitive 
empathy, and emotional empathy during fMRI in healthy adults to address this gap in 
knowledge. As predicted, conjunction analyses revealed some overlap between simulation areas 
and those activated during cognitive empathy, as well as emotional empathy. However, overlap 
in localized inferior frontal simulation areas, thought to be crucially involved in action-
observation matching, was only observed for emotional, and not cognitive, empathy. Critically, 
and in line with expectations, greater activation was also observed during emotional empathy 
relative to cognitive empathy in localized simulation regions in the left IFG. Indeed, activity was 
not found to be greater during cognitive than emotional empathy in any of the localized 
simulation regions of interest. Further, consistent with our predictions, within a region of overlap 
between emotional empathy and the simulation network in the left IFG, a positive association 
was demonstrated between the mean feeling ratings provided and activation during the emotional 
empathy task. Thus, our results suggest that simulation areas thought to be critical for 
observation-execution matching are preferentially involved during the experience of emotional 
empathy. 
 
4.4.1 Cognitive empathy and simulation 
  Consistent with expectations, areas of overlap were identified between simulation regions 
and brain areas recruited during both cognitive and emotional empathy. More specifically, 
identified simulation regions that were also recruited during cognitive empathy included bilateral 
posterior STS extending into the TPJ, and bilateral precuneus. Studies typically identify 
activation in the posterior STS during both simulation (Caspers et al., 2010; Grezes et al., 2003) 
and cognitive empathy (Carrington & Bailey, 2009; Mar, 2011; Molenberghs, Johnson, Henry, & 
Mattingley, 2016) tasks. It has also been suggested that this region may act as a link between 
these two systems (Van Overwalle, 2009). Notably, though the posterior STS is considered part 
of the simulation network, it is not engaged during action execution and instead provides visual 
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input to the other regions (Iacoboni et al., 2001; Keysers & Perrett, 2004). Thus, the absence of 
common recruitment of the IFG, PMC, or IPL demonstrated presently does not provide support 
for the involvement of critical simulation regions, and thereby an action-perception matching 
mechanism, in cognitive empathy based on mental state inference from verbal information. This 
coincides well with demonstrated overlap in bilateral STS, as well as visual association areas and 
the fusiform gyri, from an fMRI investigation that directly compared neural activity during 
cognitive empathy and simulation (Ohnishi et al., 2004). Further, a recent meta-analysis of 
simulation and theory of mind investigations found that regions engaged by each were largely 
distinct and rarely recruited simultaneously, suggesting that these systems are complementary 
rather than subserving one another (Van Overwalle & Baetens, 2009). The STS responds to 
biological motion (Puce & Perrett, 2003) and is also thought to be involved in social perception 
and mental state inference (Allison, Puce, & McCarthy, 2000; Yang, Rosenblau, Keifer, & 
Pelphrey, 2015). Thus, the STS appears to be involved in both simulation and cognitive empathy, 
but it may serve to encode visual properties of actions in the simulation network, whereas it may 
be involved in understanding mental states requiring inference and reflective representation 
along with the other regions typically implicated in cognitive empathy (de Lange, Spronk, 
Willems, Toni, & Bekkering, 2008; Spunt et al., 2011; Yang et al., 2015). This account is 
consistent with our present results, as we see recruitment of typical cognitive empathy regions 
during belief inference, including regions of the posterior STS that are also engaged during 
simulation, but not other critical regions of the simulation network. 
 
4.4.2 Emotional empathy and simulation 
In the case of emotional empathy, overlap with localized simulation areas was observed 
in several regions. These included the left posterior STS, right middle STS, right precuneus 
extending into the cuneus, bilateral SMA, and the left IFG. Notably, the IFG represents a critical 
region of the simulation network for observation-execution matching, as it has been established 
as an area that contains neurons that respond to both goal-directed action observation and 
execution, in macaque monkeys (di Pellegrino et al., 1992; Gallese et al., 1996; Rizzolatti, 
Fadiga, Gallese, & Fogassi, 1996). In humans, the IFG has also consistently been shown to 
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respond during both action perception and execution using fMRI (Caspers et al., 2010; 
Molenberghs et al., 2012), and there is compelling evidence for the existence of neurons with 
these properties in the left IFG from fMRI adaptation paradigms (de la Rosa, Schillinger, 
Bulthoff, Schultz, & Uludag, 2016; Kilner, Neal, Weiskopf, Friston, & Frith, 2009). Further, 
transient lesions induced using repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation over bilateral 
posterior IFG has been shown to result in impaired imitation compared to stimulation of the 
occipital cortex (Heiser, Iacoboni, Maeda, Marcus, & Mazziotta, 2003), and patients with IFG 
lesions have demonstrated deficits in encoding human actions (Fazio et al., 2009). Prior 
investigations often identify the IFG as being significantly activated during emotional empathy 
tasks (Bzdok et al., 2012; Lamm et al., 2011; Shamay-Tsoory, 2011), but such investigations 
tend not to directly compare identified clusters with those activated during simulation tasks. Of 
particular relevance, a study by Nummenmaa et al. (2008) examined the neural correlates of both 
cognitive and emotional empathy and interpreted significant activation in the right anterior PMC 
(36, -12, 64) during their emotional empathy condition as involvement of the simulation 
network. However, this identified region was not explicitly compared to coordinates of areas 
identified in prior studies of simulation nor was a simulation network localizer included. Our 
findings corroborate the involvement of the IFG, a critical region of the simulation network, in 
emotional empathy. Crucially, here we provide unique confirmation of this by demonstrating 
overlap in recruitment between an emotional empathy and simulation task in the same sample 
population.   
 
4.4.3 Emotional versus cognitive empathy and simulation 
The demonstration of common recruitment of the IFG, a region thought to be critical for 
action-perception matching, during simulation and emotional, but not cognitive, empathy 
suggests that the simulation network may be more involved in the facilitation of emotional 
empathy. However, the presence of activation does not prove that this region is significantly 
more involved in emotional than cognitive empathy. Critically, we also provide quantitative 
evidence for this, consistent with expectations. Namely, two localized simulation clusters in the 
left IFG were found to be recruited to a significantly greater degree during emotional empathy in 
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comparison to cognitive empathy. Correlational analyses also revealed a brain-behaviour 
relationship that provides unique and further support for the functionality of the left IFG in 
emotional empathic behaviour. Specifically, within one of these clusters in the left IFG (BA 
47/45/13), there was a positive association between activation during emotional empathy and 
mean feeling ratings on the emotional empathy task. In line with our prediction that behavioural 
indices of emotional empathy would be more strongly associated with activity in simulation 
areas than cognitive empathy, this correlation in the left IFG was marginally significantly 
stronger than that between activity during cognitive empathy in this region and false belief 
accuracy. Lastly, this association was also observed within the region of the left IFG that was 
commonly recruited during both emotional empathy and simulation. This marks the first time 
that a link has been demonstrated between emotional empathic behaviour and activity in an 
independently localized simulation region also recruited during emotional empathy. These 
findings corroborate demonstrations of positive relationships between questionnaire measures of 
emotional, but not cognitive, empathy, and IFG activation during a facial emotional observation 
and imitation task (Pfeifer et al., 2008), as well as gray matter volume in the right IFG (Cheng et 
al., 2009). Further, this is consistent with prior work showing emotional empathy deficits, but 
intact cognitive empathy, in patients with IFG lesions (Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2009). These 
results provide compelling evidence that the simulation network is preferentially involved in 
emotional empathy, and that the IFG may be a particularly important simulation region for 
emotional empathic responding. 
 
4.4.4 Mechanisms of simulation in emotional empathy 
Our findings provide strong evidence for a role of critical regions of the simulation 
network in emotional empathy. However, areas found to be significantly activated during 
emotional empathy extended beyond the simulation network, as in previous investigations 
(Bzdok et al., 2012; Fan et al., 2011), and the question remains as to how the simulation network 
interacts with these other neural regions to elicit emotional empathy. Is has been suggested that 
the anterior insula may act as a critical link between action representation in the simulation 
network and emotion representation in the limbic system to modulate empathic experience (Carr 
151 
 
 
et al., 2003; Molnar-Szakacs, 2011; Pfeifer & Dapretto, 2009; Preston & de Waal, 2002). The 
insula is situated between the IFG and regions of the limbic system, such as the amygdala, and 
anatomical data suggest that its dysgranular field is connected to the inferior frontal, posterior 
parietal, and superior temporal cortices, as well as the limbic system (Augustine, 1996). 
Increased activation found in the IFG and ventral PMC, the anterior insula, and the amygdala 
during the observation and imitation of emotional facial expressions has been taken to provide 
support for the insula acting as a relay between action and emotion representation (Carr et al., 
2003; Dapretto et al., 2006; Leslie et al., 2004). Further, Granger causality has been utilized to 
demonstrate functional connectivity from BA 45 of the IFG to a region including the anterior 
insula during the observation of emotional expressions, reflecting a causal link between motor 
simulation and emotional simulation (Jabbi & Keysers, 2008). This coincides with the present 
findings being that the area of the IFG engaged during both our simulation and emotional 
empathy tasks was localized on the boundaries of BA 45 and the anterior insula. During 
emotional empathy, activation was also elicited in the anterior insula, as well as the anterior 
cingulate cortex, a region of the limbic system.  
This account is also particularly interesting given that humans show an unconscious drive 
to imitate facial expressions in others (Dimberg, Thunberg, & Elmehed, 2000). Such emotional 
mimicry could reflect an overt behavioural form of emotional resonance, parallel to this more 
covert neural matching mechanism instantiated by the simulation network during observation 
(Jabbi & Keysers, 2008), that may also generate neural activity in simulation and emotional 
regions to influence emotional responding. Indeed, stronger facial mimicry in response to 
emotional scenes has been linked with reports of heightened shared emotional experience (Van 
der Graaff et al., 2016), as well as greater emotional empathy questionnaire scores (Balconi, 
Bortolotti, & Crivelli, 2013). Further, a positive correlation has been shown between imitation 
accuracy and activation in both the insula and PMC during imitation of emotional faces, as well 
as between empathy scores and premotor activity during imitation (Braadbaart, de Grauw, 
Perrett, Waiter, & Williams, 2014). These findings are compatible with ours and support the 
suggestion that the mechanism underlying emotional empathic responding may involve 
emotional resonance by way of an interaction between the simulation network and the limbic 
system via the insula. 
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4.4.5 Roles of additional regions of overlap  
Notably, the left posterior STS and middle right STS were identified as the only regions 
commonly recruited during simulation, cognitive empathy, and emotional empathy. The STS is 
involved in the perception of biological movement in both humans and monkeys (Allison et al., 
2000; Puce & Perrett, 2003). It is also believed to be involved in the processing of static and 
dynamic social stimuli, as well as temporal integration of information and intention 
understanding (Bahnemann, Dziobek, Prehn, Wolf, & Heekeren, 2010; Barraclough, Xiao, 
Baker, Oram, & Perrett, 2005; Yang et al., 2015). Within the simulation network, it is thought to 
provide visual input to the IPL and IFG (Iacoboni et al., 2001). Accordingly, a recent meta-
analysis confirms that the posterior STS is the common region recruited by theory of mind, 
social perception, and action observation paradigms, also demonstrating that it is functionally 
connected to areas in these respective neural networks (Yang et al., 2015). It was suggested that 
the posterior STS is involved in the temporal integration of social cues and decoding basic 
intention from behaviour, and that this information is then relayed to downstream regions in 
these theory of mind, social perception, and action observation systems (Yang et al., 2015). Our 
results align with these findings and provide further support for a role of the STS in each of these 
processes.  
We also found that the bilateral precuneus was commonly engaged during simulation and 
cognitive empathy, and a region of the right precuneus was commonly recruited during 
simulation and emotional empathy. This coincides with the postulation that cortical midline 
structures such as the precuneus interact with simulation regions due to their mutual involvement 
in self-other representations (Uddin, Iacoboni, Lange, & Keenan, 2007). Notably, it is believed 
that simulation regions are more involved in physical representations of the self (Uddin, Kaplan, 
Molnar-Szakacs, Zaidel, & Iacoboni, 2005), whereas the precuneus is likely to be more involved 
in mental representations (Uddin et al., 2007).  
Of additional note, the bilateral SMA was also commonly recruited during simulation and 
emotional empathy. The SMA is involved in motor control and action preparation, and a meta-
analysis has demonstrated its consistent activation during action observation, execution, and 
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mental simulation (Grezes & Decety, 2001). Indeed, single-cell recording in humans has 
revealed neurons that respond during both action execution and observation in the SMA 
(Mukamel, Ekstrom, Kaplan, Iacoboni, & Fried, 2010). It has also been identified as a region 
activated across empathy paradigms in a recent meta-analysis (Fan et al., 2011). Based on the 
demonstration of a positive correlation between SMA activation during the observation of 
another’s pain and emotional empathy scores, it has been suggested that such SMA activation 
may be the result of internal simulation and resultant priming of associated responses (Lamm, 
Batson, & Decety, 2007).  
 
4.4.6 Cognitive empathy, action understanding, and simulation 
Despite the lack of evidence provided here for a role for the simulation network in 
cognitive empathy, it is important to consider the potential that simulation could be implicated in 
particular types or components of cognitive empathy. Specifically, prior work has suggested that 
cognitive empathy tasks involving the perception of movement, facial or bodily expressions, and 
action-based intention understanding in particular may engage the simulation network to a 
greater degree than those involving more abstract intentions (Gobbini, Koralek, Bryan, 
Montgomery, & Haxby, 2007; Iacoboni et al., 2005; Kaplan & Iacoboni, 2006; Pineda & Hecht, 
2009; Schurz et al., 2014; Van Overwalle, 2009). However, opinions and results are mixed 
(Gallese & Goldman, 1998; Goldman & Sebanz, 2005; Kobayashi, Glover, & Temple, 2007; 
Pineda et al., 2009; Saxe, 2005; Spunt et al., 2011), and we chose to utilize the false belief task 
for our cognitive empathy paradigm because it is a classic test of theory of mind and a reliable 
and well-validated localizer (Dodell-Feder et al., 2011; Dufour et al., 2013). In addition, 
cognitive empathy is also believed by some to include both cognitive (inference of beliefs and 
intentions) and affective (inference of feelings) components (Shamay-Tsoory & Aharon-Peretz, 
2007). Thus, the exclusion of affective components allowed for optimal distinction between 
cognitive and emotional empathy components. Future studies incorporating different varieties of 
cognitive empathy tasks would be beneficial in elucidating this. 
 
154 
 
 
4.4.7 Implications for disorders featuring empathy impairments 
The present findings could have important implications for clinical populations that 
feature debilitating deficits in specific facets of empathic responding. More specifically, the 
simulation network may be of particular interest in disorders featuring emotional empathy 
impairments. Individuals with psychopathy and conduct disorder typically present with 
emotional empathy impairments but intact cognitive empathy, whereas patients with autism 
spectrum disorder have been found to demonstrate the opposite pattern (Blair, 2005; Dziobek et 
al., 2008; Jones, Happe, Gilbert, Burnett, & Viding, 2010; Schwenck et al., 2012). Alternatively, 
schizophrenia (Derntl et al., 2009; Green et al., 2015) and behavioural variant frontotemporal 
dementia (Baez et al., 2014; Lough et al., 2006; Oliver et al., 2015) appear to be characterized by 
deficits in both cognitive and emotional empathy (see Chapter 2.). Accordingly, it has been 
suggested that dysfunction in the simulation network may underlie social cognitive deficits in 
some of these patient populations. For example, individuals with psychopathy have shown 
reduced spontaneous activation in functionally and anatomically defined simulation regions, 
including the ventral PMC, during the observation of emotional hand interactions (e.g., loving 
and painful interactions) compared to healthy controls (Meffert, Gazzola, den Boer, Bartels, & 
Keysers, 2013). As well, a recent review illustrates that multiple investigations have found 
diminished activity in simulation network regions, including the IFG, ventral PMC, and IPL in 
patients with schizophrenia during motor and social tasks (Mehta et al., 2014). This raises the 
possibility that emotional empathy impairments in these patient populations may be associated 
with simulation network dysfunction. It should also be noted that a deficit in the simulation 
network has been postulated to underlie social cognitive impairments in autism spectrum 
disorder (Iacoboni & Dapretto, 2006; Williams, Whiten, Suddendorf, & Perrett, 2001). However, 
evidence for this account is mixed and alternative explanatory models have been suggested 
(Hamilton, 2013; Hamilton, Brindley, & Frith, 2007), such that this does not necessarily 
contradict our findings regarding a greater role for the simulation network in emotional than 
cognitive empathy. Thus, there is some support for simulation network dysfunction in disorders 
featuring emotional empathy impairments, but the demonstration of a causal link between these 
elements is still required to determine whether treatments or compensatory options targeting the 
simulation network, such as imitation or action observation interventions (Iacoboni & Mazziotta, 
2007), would be beneficial. 
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In relation to this, our findings suggest that the experience of emotional empathy involves 
the simulation network, and thereby that simulation of the perceived experience in others 
influences emotional empathy, but we cannot conclude that simulation mechanisms are 
necessary for emotional empathy. However, the demonstration of emotional empathy 
impairments in patients with IFG lesions including anatomically defined simulation areas 
(Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2009) supports this idea. Notably, if simulation mechanisms are 
necessary for emotional empathy, it does not follow that they are sufficient. For example, lesions 
to the insula have also been found to result in emotional empathy deficits (Driscoll, Dal Monte, 
Solomon, Krueger, & Grafman, 2012; Gu et al., 2012). Further, it has been suggested that action-
perception matching mechanisms may be essential for certain aspects of emotional empathy, and 
sharing the emotional experience of another individual (affective sharing) in particular, but that 
top-down mechanisms may also influence emotional empathic experience (Balconi & Bortolotti, 
2012; Decety & Jackson, 2004; Decety & Meyer, 2008; Preston & de Waal, 2002; Tousignant, 
Eugene, & Jackson, 2016). The complexity of these proposed relationships highlights the need 
for additional work focused on their elucidation, and how this is linked to the manifestation of 
empathy impairments. 
 
4.4.8 Limitations and future directions 
 Although the empathy tasks presently utilized included behavioural measures of both 
cognitive and emotional empathy, it should be noted that there could be an issue concerning 
measurement. Namely, it is possible that the difference identified between correlations for 
emotional empathy activation and mean feeling ratings versus cognitive empathy activation and 
accuracy on the false belief task was a result of the feeling ratings being a better measure of 
performance than false belief accuracy. Though participants did not perform at ceiling on the 
false belief task, they did perform quite well with limited variability, which may have reduced 
the possibility of identifying correlations with this measure. However, the spread of feeling 
ratings provided during the emotional empathy task appeared to be quite similar (see 4.2.2 fMRI 
tasks for details). The use of an alternative cognitive empathy task in future investigations may 
serve to clarify this. Similarly, as mentioned, future studies investigating the role of the 
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simulation network in different aspects of cognitive empathy, and action understanding in 
particular, would assist in the elucidation of whether simulation is involved in particular types of 
cognitive empathy or when certain stimuli are used. In relation to this, the simulation network 
localizer and emotional empathy tasks both included biological images, whereas the type of 
visual stimuli presented in the cognitive empathy task differed substantially. However, the 
respective control conditions were matched for visual input, such that these differences should 
not be driving our results. As well, incorporating an emotional simulation paradigm, such as a 
facial expression imitation task, versus a purely motor simulation task, such as that used 
presently, could be useful to further examine the interaction between the simulation network and 
the limbic system during emotional empathy. Lastly, more work is needed to determine whether 
patient populations characterized by emotional empathy impairments demonstrate deficits in the 
simulation network, and if these are causally associated.  
 
4.5 Conclusions 
The present work uniquely determined the correspondence between brain areas recruited 
during cognitive and emotional empathy, and those identified as having simulation properties, 
within the same participant population. Critically, this allowed for the quantitative comparison of 
the involvement of the simulation network in cognitive versus emotional empathy. The use of 
behavioural measures also provided insight into the relationship between the online experience 
of empathy and activation in localized simulation areas. This marks the first time that an 
investigation has utilized a localizer to define simulation regions along with a behavioural index 
of cognitive and emotional empathy. Overall, our findings provide strong evidence for greater 
involvement of simulation mechanisms in emotional empathy than cognitive empathy. More 
specifically, our results demonstrated common recruitment of a critical simulation area for 
observation-execution matching, the IFG, during simulation and emotional empathy, but not 
cognitive empathy. In addition, we uniquely determined that localized simulation regions in the 
IFG were recruited to a greater degree during emotional than cognitive empathy. Lastly, 
correlational analyses demonstrated a functional link between activation during emotional 
empathy in inferior frontal simulation areas and the degree of emotional empathy expressed 
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during the task. These findings suggest that simulation mechanisms are preferentially involved in 
emotional empathy, providing unique insight into the nature of empathy and daily interpersonal 
interactions. Further, the simulation network may be of particular interest in disorders featuring 
emotional empathy impairments. 
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5 Discussion 
The three studies comprising this thesis provide unique insight into the dissociability, 
influential factors, and neural mechanisms of cognitive empathy, and emotional empathy, 
including affective sharing and empathic concern. In combination, they exemplify a multifaceted 
approach which includes between-group contrasts of behavioural data in patients with empathy 
dysfunction and healthy controls, as well as individual differences, and functional neuroimaging 
approaches in the healthy population. Taken together, these findings support our central 
hypothesis that cognitive empathy, affective sharing, and empathic concern represent aspects of 
empathy that are distinguishable and differentially linked with certain patient populations, 
subclinical traits, and neurocognitive mechanisms.   
In Study I, investigating empathic responding to both negative and positive emotionally-
charged social images in patients with behavioural variant frontotemporal dementia (bvFTD) 
provided novel information about the specificity of the empathy deficits seen in this patient 
population, which also served to inform our fundamental conceptualization of empathy and its 
components. More specifically, patients with bvFTD demonstrated a global cognitive empathy 
impairment in the form of reduced mental state inference accuracy for both negative and positive 
states relative to healthy controls. Patients also exhibited diminished affective sharing selectively 
for negative experiences, but expressed similar levels of empathic concern as controls in 
response to negative and positive social images. Lastly, less negative emotional reactions were 
demonstrated in response to negative context-only images in patients with bvFTD in comparison 
to healthy controls, and covariate analyses revealed that this may have contributed to the 
observed affective sharing deficits. These findings confirmed our prediction that aspects of 
empathy can be differentially affected in patient populations featuring empathy deficits. 
Given that empathy has been inversely associated with aggressive, antisocial behaviour 
(Miller & Eisenberg, 1988), and offending (Eisenberg, Eggum, & Di Giunta, 2010; Jolliffe & 
Farrington, 2004), differences in empathic abilities even within the healthy population may have 
pronounced social effects and be costly to society. Thus, following the demonstration of 
differential deficits in components of empathy in bvFTD in Study I, we were interested in 
determining whether individual differences in specific traits linked with disorders characterized 
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by empathy impairments, including psychopathic, autistic, and anxious traits, would be 
differentially associated with aspects of empathy in a community sample. Accordingly, using the 
same task as Study I in a sample of healthy adults, Study II revealed an association between 
increased coldhearted psychopathic traits and both dampened affective sharing and empathic 
concern, but not cognitive empathy accuracy. We were particularly interested in coldhearted 
traits because they reflect the core affective features of psychopathy, including a lack of empathy 
and callousness towards others (Lilienfeld & Widows, 2005). Though a significant relationship 
was not identified between autistic traits and levels of affective sharing or empathic concern 
experienced, as predicted, they were also unrelated to cognitive empathy accuracy. Lastly, higher 
trait anxiety was found to be positively correlated with increased affective sharing, and 
subjective arousal in particular. However, arousal in response to contextual rather than social 
aspects of the stimuli appeared to be driving this relationship. There was also little evidence for 
an association between empathic concern and trait anxiety levels. Thus, as predicted, differential 
relationships were identified between cognitive empathy, affective sharing, and empathic 
concern, and psychopathic, autistic, and anxious traits in the healthy population, providing 
further evidence that these components are distinguishable. 
Studies I and II provided evidence consistent with cognitive empathy and aspects of 
emotional empathy being separable in both individuals featuring empathy dysfunction and the 
healthy population, respectively. Despite support from a range of methodologies suggesting that 
cognitive and emotional empathy facets are separable, it remains contentious whether they 
involve some similar underlying neurocognitive mechanisms. Specifically, it has been suggested 
that embodied simulation of perceived experience in others, via action-perception neural 
matching mechanisms, may facilitate cognitive and/or emotional empathy. However, the degree 
to which simulation is implicated in these different facets remains unclear, and the involvement 
of the simulation network in cognitive versus emotional empathy has not been quantitatively 
compared. Thus, in Study III we investigated the involvement of simulation mechanisms in 
cognitive versus emotional empathy using a simulation network localizer task, as well as tasks 
tapping cognitive empathy and emotional empathy during functional magnetic resonance 
imaging (fMRI) in healthy adults. Critically, conjunction analyses revealed common recruitment 
of the inferior frontal gyrus (IFG), a region thought to be critical for execution-observation 
matching, during both simulation and emotional, but not cognitive, empathy. Further, identified 
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simulation regions in the left IFG were recruited to a significantly greater degree during 
emotional as compared to cognitive empathy. These findings strongly suggest that simulation 
mechanisms are more involved in emotional than cognitive empathy, further elucidating the 
dissociability of these facets of empathy. 
 
5.1 Further Insight into Cognitive and Emotional Empathy  
As mentioned, there is an abundance of evidence providing support for cognitive and 
emotional empathy being distinguishable. Indeed, lesion (Shamay-Tsoory, Aharon-Peretz, & 
Perry, 2009) and behavioural data (Jones, Happe, Gilbert, Burnett, & Viding, 2010; Lockwood, 
Bird, Bridge, & Viding, 2013; Schwenck et al., 2012) have demonstrated a double dissociation 
between these two facets. Recently, gray matter density has also been differentially associated 
with questionnaire measures of cognitive and emotional empathy in the medial prefrontal cortex 
(PFC) and insula, respectively (Eres, Decety, Louis, & Molenberghs, 2015). Our behavioural 
findings from Study I coincide with this, as patients with bvFTD presented with differential 
deficits in cognitive versus emotional aspects of empathy. Further, in Study II, greater 
coldhearted psychopathic traits in healthy adults showed a selective association with decreased 
emotional, but not cognitive, empathy levels. Coldheartedness was also found to be more 
strongly related to empathic concern ratings than cognitive empathy performance. Lastly, and 
most critically, in Study III we provided the first quantitative evidence for greater involvement of 
the simulation network during emotional empathy as compared to cognitive empathy, 
demonstrating a greater role for simulation mechanisms in emotional empathic experience. We 
also identified, for the first time, a positive correlation between online emotional empathic 
experience and activation in a localized simulation region in the left IFG, suggesting that this 
area may be particularly important for emotional empathic responding. Further, greater 
activation was not observed for cognitive relative to emotional empathy in any of the localized 
simulation regions of interest. These results uniquely support and expand on prior work revealing 
a positive relationship between questionnaire measures of emotional, but not cognitive, empathy 
and IFG activation during a facial simulation task (Pfeifer, Iacoboni, Mazziotta, & Dapretto, 
2008), as well as the demonstration of emotional empathy deficits but intact cognitive empathy 
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in patients with IFG lesions (Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2009). Thus, we provide novel insight into 
the mechanisms underlying cognitive and emotional empathy consistent with their distinction. 
 
5.2 Dissociability of Affective Sharing and Empathic Concern 
Affective sharing and empathic concern are believed by many to be distinguishable 
phenomena (Decety & Cowell, 2014; Hatfield, Rapson, & Le, 2009; Singer & Klimecki, 2014; 
Zaki & Ochsner, 2012). Affective sharing pertains to sharing the affective experience of another 
individual, whereas empathic concern refers to the motivation to care for another’s welfare, 
including feelings of concern and compassion. However, prior work often does not discriminate 
between affective sharing and empathic concern components of empathy, using the term 
emotional empathy to refer to either (Decety, 2009; Vossen, Piotrowski, & Valkenburg, 2015). 
This is an important distinction to make given that they may be linked to different behavioural 
outcomes. Critically, here we provide behavioural evidence suggesting that affective sharing and 
empathic concern are at least partially dissociable. More specifically, in Study I patients with 
bvFTD were found to show an impairment in affective sharing for negative images but expressed 
a similar degree of empathic concern for negative and positive images in comparison to healthy 
controls. Canonical correlation results from Study II also revealed an association between higher 
trait anxiety levels in healthy adults and greater affective sharing, which appeared to be driven by 
arousal to contextual elements of the stimuli. In contrast, there was little evidence for a link 
between heightened trait anxiety and increased empathic concern. Further, the inverse 
relationship between coldhearted psychopathic traits and empathic concern was found to be 
stronger than the association between trait anxiety and empathic concern. The demonstration of a 
differential deficit in affective sharing and empathic concern in bvFTD and a relatively selective 
association between trait anxiety and affective sharing supports the notion that these are 
distinguishable components of empathic responding. 
Consistent with these findings, recent factor analyses including different self-report 
empathy measures found that affective sharing and empathic concern loaded on distinct factors 
consistently (Jordan, Amir, & Bloom, 2016). Further, functional imaging investigations have 
provided some evidence suggesting that affective sharing and empathic concern may be 
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subserved by partially distinct neural substrates (Decety & Michalska, 2010; Klimecki, Leiberg, 
Ricard, & Singer, 2014), with traditional regions including the anterior insula, anterior cingulate 
cortex, and IFG involved in affective sharing (Lamm, Decety, & Singer, 2011), and regions 
including the ventromedial PFC, anterior cingulate cortex, and ventral striatum being particularly 
implicated in empathic concern (FeldmanHall, Dalgleish, Evans, & Mobbs, 2015; Klimecki, 
Leiberg, Lamm, & Singer, 2013). In addition, recent data from an electroencephalography study 
revealed that affective sharing in response to distress cues was associated with an early automatic 
response, whereas empathic concern modulated a later controlled response, providing evidence 
for the differentiation of these components at a physiological level (Decety, Lewis, & Cowell, 
2015).   
However, it should be noted that a marginally significant positive correlation was 
demonstrated between behavioural measures of affective sharing for negative stimuli and 
questionnaire measures of empathic concern in Study I, which suggests that affective sharing and 
empathic concern are not orthogonal constructs. Further, in Study II, bivariate correlational 
analyses demonstrated that the Multifaceted Empathy Test (MET) affective sharing and empathic 
concern ratings were positively associated with one another. This provides some support for our 
inclusion of affective sharing and empathic concern aspects under the facet of emotional 
empathy in our conceptualization of empathy. Though more work is needed to further 
characterize and delineate affective sharing and empathic concern, our results are consistent with 
these being partially dissociable but related constructs. 
 
5.3 Links to Behavioural Outcomes 
As mentioned, one of the motivating factors for distinguishing between affective sharing 
and empathic concern is that they may be associated with different behavioural outcomes. 
Specifically, evidence suggests that empathic concern is associated with prosocial and altruistic 
behaviours to relieve the stress of another individual (Batson, Duncan, Ackerman, Buckley, & 
Birch, 1981). In contrast, personal distress refers to feelings of discomfort and anxiety elicited in 
response to another individual’s distress, which has been linked to the desire to relieve one’s own 
stress rather than others’ (Batson, 1991; Batson, Fultz, & Schoenrade, 1987; Eisenberg, Fabes, & 
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Spinrad, 2006). Personal distress is thought to be akin to emotional contagion by some (Dziobek 
et al., 2008; Rankin, Kramer, & Miller, 2005), which raises the possibility that it may align with 
affective sharing for negative situations (Singer & Klimecki, 2014). Indeed, increased levels of 
negative affect have been reported in response to videos of human suffering following training in 
affective sharing (Klimecki et al., 2014). Accordingly, our results from Study II could suggest 
that greater coldheartedness in the healthy population may be associated with both decreased 
prosocial behaviour and personal distress reactions to another’s distress, based on its 
demonstrated association with reduced empathic concern and affective sharing. In contrast, 
heightened trait anxiety may have fewer implications for influencing altruistic behaviour, being 
that it was only weakly related to greater empathic concern. Instead, it may be associated with 
increased personal distress, given the demonstrated association between trait anxiety and 
affective sharing potentially driven by arousal, and evidence suggesting that personal distress is 
associated with greater levels of physiological arousal than empathic concern (Eisenberg & 
Eggum-Wilkens, 2009; Eisenberg et al., 2006; Eisenberg, Valiente, & Champion, 2004).  
 
5.4 Additional Factors Affecting Empathic Responding 
Interestingly, results from Study I also suggest that the representation of affective sharing 
may differ according to valence. Specifically, patients with bvFTD were found to demonstrate a 
deficit in affective sharing particularly for negative emotional states. This coincides well with 
some evidence for a selective impairment in recognizing negative emotional expressions in 
bvFTD with intact recognition of happy faces (Fernandez-Duque & Black, 2005; Kipps, Mioshi, 
& Hodges, 2009). These deficits in affective sharing and emotion recognition for negative, but 
not positive, stimuli may be due to greater degeneration of regions involved in processing 
negative emotions (Kumfor & Piguet, 2012). Negative emotions such as fear and disgust appear 
to be represented more focally in the brain (Adolphs et al., 1999; Calder, Keane, Manes, Antoun, 
& Young, 2000; Hennenlotter et al., 2004), whereas processing happy expressions may be 
represented more diffusely (Breiter et al., 1996; Fusar-Poli et al., 2009; O'Doherty et al., 2003; 
Phillips et al., 1998). If the experience of negative versus positive emotions is indeed dependent 
on partially dissociable networks, then the embodied simulation of an observed negative versus 
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positive affective experience of another individual should similarly involve the activation of at 
least a subset of these same valence-specific regions. Thus, evidence for the involvement of 
simulation mechanisms in emotional empathy from Study III provides support for the notion that 
the sharing of another’s emotions might engage different brain areas according to valence, just as 
the experience of these emotions appears to. Indeed, a recent fMRI investigation that included 
empathy for pain, anxiety, and happiness conditions, has demonstrated that empathy for negative 
versus positive emotions respectively elicits activation in brain areas linked to negative and 
positive affect (Morelli, Rameson, & Lieberman, 2014). Notably, critical simulation network 
regions, including the IFG and inferior parietal lobule, are believed to be involved in triggering 
such affective simulation in additional regions via the insula (Bastiaansen, Thioux, & Keysers, 
2009). 
 
5.5 Implications for Clinical Populations Featuring Empathy Dysfunction 
The findings from Study I provide greater insight into the nature of the empathy deficits 
associated with bvFTD. In particular, though a cognitive empathy deficit is well-established in 
bvFTD, we uniquely demonstrated an impairment in inferring both negative and positive mental 
states of others. As well, patients with bvFTD expressed reduced affective sharing for people in 
negative, but not positive, situations, suggesting that they show a deficit in sharing the negative 
emotions of other individuals. This is consistent with findings of reduced physiological 
responding, subjective emotional responding, and facial displays of emotion in patients with 
bvFTD as compared to controls during a disgust-eliciting video (Eckart, Sturm, Miller, & 
Levenson, 2012). In contrast, patients were found to express similar levels of empathic concern 
to healthy controls in response to both negative and positive social images. Notably, prior studies 
utilizing questionnaire measures (Eslinger, Moore, Anderson, & Grossman, 2011; Lough et al., 
2006; Rankin et al., 2006) and more recent investigations using a behavioural paradigm (Baez et 
al., 2014; Baez et al., 2016) have demonstrated a deficit in empathic concern in bvFTD. With 
regard to our discrepant findings, it may be the case that the use of a more explicit question 
regarding concern or happiness for others in the MET allowed patients to better discern what a 
socially appropriate response was. However, it is of interest that empathic concern ratings on the 
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MET were found to be positively correlated with questionnaire scores of empathic concern in the 
patient group. Interestingly, a study recently found that patients with bvFTD could comply with 
basic social norms such as fairness, and exhibited a tendency towards prosocial behaviour 
(O'Callaghan et al., 2016). Patients nonetheless demonstrated significantly diminished prosocial 
responding in comparison to healthy controls, which the authors attributed to a deficit in 
integrating contextual factors in bvFTD (O'Callaghan et al., 2016). In relation to this, we 
observed abnormal affective responding to negative context-only stimuli in our bvFTD group, 
which may have contributed to their affective sharing deficits. This raises the possibility that our 
sample of patients with bvFTD possessed the capacity to express concern for others if directly 
asked, but that there may still be a disconnect between this capacity and prosocial behaviours due 
to contextual processing impairments. This disparity may be similar to the striking demonstration 
of patients with ventromedial PFC lesions expressing that they knew which decks were 
advantageous to choose from in a gambling task, but nonetheless continuing to make 
disadvantageous choices (Bechara, Damasio, Tranel, & Damasio, 1997).   
Being that Study II was conducted in healthy individuals, extrapolating results regarding 
links between empathic responding and psychopathic trait levels to clinical populations proves 
difficult (e.g., Blair, 2013). Nonetheless, few investigations examining either subclinical or 
clinical psychopathic traits have included measures of both affective sharing and empathic 
concern, such that our findings are particularly informative. Presently, increased coldhearted 
psychopathic traits in a community sample were found to be associated with both reduced 
affective sharing and empathic concern. This coincides with another investigation that identified 
an inverse association between callous affect in healthy adults and both of these aspects of 
empathy (Lishner, Hong, Jiang, Vitacco, & Neumann, 2015). Given that affective sharing and 
empathic concern may have partially dissociable neural substrates and different underlying 
mechanisms, confirming whether both aspects are also affected in clinical psychopathy is of 
particular interest to inform potential treatment or compensatory options.  
More generally, the findings from Study III suggest that the simulation network may be 
of particular interest in disorders featuring emotional empathy deficits. Indeed, some studies 
have attempted to determine whether the simulation network is dysfunctional in such patient 
populations. For example,  an investigation has demonstrated diminished spontaneous activity in 
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simulation regions during the observation of loving and painful hand interactions in individuals 
with psychopathy (Meffert, Gazzola, den Boer, Bartels, & Keysers, 2013), and several 
investigations have identified reduced activation in simulation regions during motor and social 
tasks in patients with schizophrenia (Mehta et al., 2014). This implies that simulation network 
dysfunction could contribute to emotional empathy deficits in these clinical populations. 
However, identifying whether there is a causal link between these variables is necessary to 
determine whether treatments designed to target simulation mechanisms, such as interventions 
based on imitation (Iacoboni & Mazziotta, 2007), might be of assistance. Further, establishing an 
underlying deficit in the simulation network would provide insight into the level at which an 
empathic impairment is occurring. More specifically, simulation mechanisms are thought to be 
bottom-up processes, which occur automatically at the level of incoming perceptual or sensory 
stimuli, rather than implying a deficit in higher-level top-down modulatory processes (Decety & 
Meyer, 2008; Decety & Moriguchi, 2007; Dvash & Shamay-Tsoory, 2014; Preston & de Waal, 
2002).  
 
5.6 The Conceptualization of Empathy 
Taken together, our results support a model of empathy including separable cognitive and 
emotional empathy facets, as well as at least partially dissociable components of emotional 
empathy, including affective sharing and empathic concern (Bernhardt & Singer, 2012; de Waal, 
2008; Decety & Cowell, 2014; Decety & Jackson, 2004; Hatfield et al., 2009; Preston & de 
Waal, 2002; Zaki & Ochsner, 2012). Our findings are also consistent with the notion that both 
bottom-up and top-down processing contribute to empathic experience (Decety & Moriguchi, 
2007; Preston & de Waal, 2002; Shamay-Tsoory, 2011; Singer & Lamm, 2009; Tousignant, 
Eugene, & Jackson, 2016). As mentioned, bottom-up processing is thought to be automatically 
elicited in response to sensory or perceptual information, whereas top-down processing involves 
incorporating the motivations, intentions, and self-regulation of an individual and moderating the 
degree of empathic responding (Decety & Meyer, 2008; Decety & Moriguchi, 2007). 
Specifically, our findings from Study III suggest that simulation mechanisms, a form of bottom-
up processing, are particularly important for emotional empathy, though they cannot provide 
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evidence that they are necessary. However, lesion data does support a critical role for the IFG 
(Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2009), as well as the insula (Driscoll, Dal Monte, Solomon, Krueger, & 
Grafman, 2012; Gu et al., 2012), in emotional empathy, suggesting that simulation mechanisms 
may be necessary but are likely not sufficient for emotional empathy. With regard to how the 
simulation network is involved in the generation of emotional empathy, it has been proposed that 
the anterior insula may act as a critical link between action representation in the simulation 
network via the IFG and emotion representation in areas of the limbic system, such as the 
amygdala, to modulate empathic experience (Carr, Iacoboni, Dubeau, Mazziotta, & Lenzi, 2003; 
Molnar-Szakacs, 2011; Pfeifer & Dapretto, 2009; Preston & de Waal, 2002). Of particular note, 
this account is supported by the demonstration of a causal link between BA 45 of the IFG in the 
simulation network and a region including the anterior insula during emotional expression 
observation (Jabbi & Keysers, 2008). This is consistent with our findings from Study III, as the 
IFG cluster recruited during both simulation and emotional empathy was located on the 
boundaries of these two areas.  
Our findings from Study III also suggest that cognitive empathy relies less on simulation 
mechanisms than emotional empathy. Indeed, cognitive empathy was not found to commonly 
activate simulation regions thought to be critical for execution-observation matching. Notably, 
the cognitive empathy task utilized in Study III involved mental state inference from verbal 
information. Thus, it may be the case that top-down processing, or higher-level deliberate 
cognitive processing, including perspective-taking, is more important for this aspect of cognitive 
empathy (Decety & Jackson, 2004; Decety & Meyer, 2008; Preston & de Waal, 2002; 
Tousignant et al., 2016). It is also possible, as suggested by prior work, that simulation 
mechanisms contribute to cognitive empathy in situations involving action-based or visual 
stimuli, and action-based intention understanding in particular (Gobbini, Koralek, Bryan, 
Montgomery, & Haxby, 2007; Iacoboni et al., 2005; Kaplan & Iacoboni, 2006; Pineda & Hecht, 
2009; Schurz, Radua, Aichhorn, Richlan, & Perner, 2014; Van Overwalle, 2009). 
With regard to affective sharing versus empathic concern, it has been suggested that 
action-perception matching mechanisms may be particularly important for affective sharing, but 
that additional top-down mechanisms, such as emotion regulation and effortful control, may also 
contribute to emotional empathic experience (Balconi & Bortolotti, 2012; Decety & Jackson, 
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2004; Decety & Meyer, 2008; Preston & de Waal, 2002; Tousignant et al., 2016). The findings 
from Study III cannot address this being that our emotional empathy task did not distinguish 
between affective sharing and empathic concern in response to emotional images. However, our 
results from Study I suggest that the representation of affective sharing is valence-dependent, 
which is consistent with the involvement of simulation mechanisms and observation-experience 
neural matching in affective sharing. 
Lastly, despite evidence presented here and elsewhere supporting the distinguishability of 
cognitive empathy, affective sharing, and empathic concern, it is important to note that these 
components of empathic responding can be elicited in response to similar situations and may not 
often occur in isolation. Indeed, recent work has demonstrated that the capacity to empathize 
cognitively and emotionally are independent at both a behavioural and neural level, but that they 
flexibly interact (Kanske, Bockler, Trautwein, Parianen Lesemann, & Singer, 2016). 
Accordingly, it is widely believed that these aspects influence one another and that both 
cognitive and emotional empathy contribute to our phenomenological experience of empathy 
(Cox et al., 2012; Decety & Svetlova, 2012; Kerem, Fishman, & Josselson, 2001; Shamay-
Tsoory, 2011).  
 
5.7 Limitations and Future Directions 
The present work not only provides unique insight into the nature of empathic responding 
and its constituents, but it also highlights points of specific interest moving forward and 
remaining questions in the field. For example, Study I provided novel details concerning the 
cognitive and emotional empathy impairments in bvFTD, and Study II revealed an association 
between heightened coldhearted psychopathic traits and both reduced affective sharing and 
empathic concern. However, more work is needed to better understand the components affected 
in patient populations featuring empathy dysfunction, and whether these may be linked to 
simulation network deficits, with a view to informing targeted treatment or compensatory 
options for these devastating symptoms. Studies I and II also relied on a performance-based 
measure of empathic responding, the MET, which allows for the online assessment of empathy, 
but is also susceptible to response bias such as socially desirable responding. The addition of 
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physiological measures could be important for providing further insight into the nature of the 
affective response elicited in the future. Interestingly, in relation this to, results from our 
subjective arousal ratings in Study II suggested that there could be a disconnect between arousal 
generated in response to an emotional scene and empathic concern, but additional work including 
both behavioural and physiological measures is needed to elucidate this. The incorporation of 
indices to assess behavioural outcomes such as prosocial behaviour is also of interest, as though 
a link between empathic concern and prosocial behaviour has been fairly well-established 
(Batson, 1991; Eisenberg et al., 2006), the relationships between affective sharing, arousal, and 
prosocial responding remain fairly ambiguous. Of additional note, the emotional empathy task 
utilized in Study III did not distinguish between affective sharing and empathic concern, and 
instead used a metric that could capture both. Determining the involvement of the simulation 
network in cognitive versus emotional empathy was viewed as the natural first step for an initial 
quantitative comparison, being that these two facets are almost universally accepted, and have 
been well-established and dissociated. In addition, affective sharing and empathic concern are 
arguably more difficult to evoke independently. However, future work including indices tapping 
each of these facets is necessary to determine whether simulation mechanisms are particularly 
important for affective sharing, or empathic concern. Lastly, future investigations should also 
attempt to evaluate additional factors believed to influence empathic experience that have not 
been addressed presently, such as self-other distinction (Decety & Jackson, 2004; Singer & 
Lamm, 2009), emotion regulation and effortful control (Decety & Jackson, 2004; Eisenberg & 
Eggum-Wilkens, 2009), and similarity of the other to oneself (Hein, Silani, Preuschoff, Batson, 
& Singer, 2010; Krebs, 1975). 
 
5.8 Conclusions 
 In conclusion, the results presented here advance our understanding of the nature of 
cognitive empathy, affective sharing, and empathic concern components of empathic responding, 
and how these aspects are differentially influenced in clinical and healthy populations. We 
uniquely identified differential deficits in these components in response to emotionally-charged 
social images in patients with bvFTD. In addition to providing evidence for the dissociability of 
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cognitive empathy, affective sharing, and empathic concern in a clinical model of empathy 
dysfunction, our results also suggested that valence may influence the representation of affective 
sharing for others’ experiences, and patients with bvFTD may have a generalized deficit in 
affective responding to negative stimuli. Following this, the administration of the same task in a 
community sample revealed that coldhearted psychopathic traits disrupt affective sharing and 
empathic concern, whereas trait anxiety may influence subjective affective experience via 
generalized arousal with fewer implications for prosocial responding. Further evidence for the 
distinguishability of cognitive empathy, affective sharing, and empathic concern was also 
provided in the form of differential relationships between these components and subclinical 
psychopathic, autistic, and anxious traits. Lastly, we utilized separate fMRI localizers for 
cognitive empathy, emotional empathy, and the simulation network in healthy individuals, 
quantitatively demonstrating, for the first time, that action-perception simulation mechanisms are 
more involved in emotional than cognitive empathy. Thus, we also presented mechanistic 
evidence for the dissociability of cognitive and emotional facets of empathy. Taken together, 
these findings provide novel insight into the dissociability, influential variables, and 
neurocognitive mechanisms of cognitive empathy, and aspects of emotional empathy, including 
affective sharing and empathic concern. This highlights the complexity of empathic responding 
and the need to determine how these different constituents are affected in disorders featuring 
empathy impairments, with a view to identifying cognitive and neurological risk factors and 
providing targeted treatments for deficits in particular components of empathy. 
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